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The Constitutionally mandated task of assigning Congressional seats to the various U.S. States
proportional to their represented populations (“according to their numbers”) has engendered much
contention, but rather less consensus. Using the same principles of entropic inference that underlie
the foundations of information theory and statistical thermodynamics, and also enjoy fruitful appli-
cation in image processing, spectral analysis, machine learning, econometrics, bioinformatics, and a
growing number of other fields, we motivate and explore a method for Congressional apportionment
based on minimizing relative entropy (also known as Kullback-Leibler divergence), or, equivalently,
maximizing Shannon entropy. The ideal apportionment of seats to states is that which minimizes
(subject to prescribed constraints on the total number of representatives, as well as on the minimum
and maximum number of representatives per state) the relative entropy or discrimination informa-
tion, arising as the natural measure of divergence between two probability distributions—in this
case a uniform distribution of representational weight, or polling probability, across all represented
individuals, as in an ideal or direct democracy, and a Congress-mediated distribution of represen-
tational weight, where individuals receive political representation indirectly, through their elected
representatives. Equivalently, the optimal apportionment maximizes (subject to said constraints)
the Shannon entropy, which is the natural measure of uncertainty or missing information associ-
ated with the indirect distribution. Statistically speaking, the optimal apportionment maximizes
the uniformity of the sampling distribution induced by the division of seats, consistent with states
receiving a whole number of representatives (between allowed lower and upper bounds). In terms of
communication theory, we might say that the entropic apportionment gives each constituent as equal
a voice as possible. If we view representational weight as a finite resource to be distributed amongst
the represented population, the entropic measure is identical with the Theil index long employed in
economics to measure inequality in the distribution of wealth or income, or in ecology to measure the
distribution of biomass or reproductive fitness. In actual application to U.S. Census data, entropic
apportionment tends to perform similarly to the well-known Huntington-Hill and Webster-Wilcox
methods, but enjoys a more fundamental motivation and more natural mathematical properties that
either. In fact, both of these traditional methods can be viewed as approximations to the entropic
apportionment method. Besides Congressional apportionment, the method is also directly appli-
cable to other multi-regional or multi-constituency legislatures, to party-list proportional voting
systems used in various parliamentary elections, and similar settings, where the task is to allocate
a discrete number of seats or other resources, and the primary goal is one of maximal proportion-
ality or equity. In addition, the same entropic figure-of-merit can be used in parallel to compare
different choices for the total number of representatives, and then subsequently to assess different
Congressional district sizes, after seats are assigned and proposed district boundaries drawn.
∗ This work is dedicated to the memory of an ever inquisitive and congenial teacher, Professor Harold Lecar, who took time
from studying how the brain works in order to try to ensure that elections work they way they should. I shall certainly
miss what undoubtedly would have been his insights and outrage regarding our most recent presidential contest.
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2It has been said that democracy is the worst form of government
except all the others that have been tried.
Winston Churchill
“The world isn’t fair, Calvin.”
“I know Dad, but why isn’t it ever unfair in my favor?”
Bill Watterson
You should call it entropy, for two reasons. In the first place your
uncertainty function has been used in statistical mechanics under
that name, so it already has a name. In the second place, and more
important, no one really knows what entropy really is, so in a debate
you will always have the advantage.
John von Neumann, to Claude Shannon
1. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
With each U.S. Census arrives a burst of renewed interest in the associated political, legal, philosophical,
and mathematical issues surrounding the subsequent apportionment of Representatives to the various
states “according to their respective numbers,” as required by the U.S. Constitution. With much at stake
in terms of legislative influence, the loss or gain of districts, and as we have recently seen, votes in the
Electoral College, debate periodically percolates through courtrooms and the Capitol, in law reviews and
even scientific journals [1–55]. In intervening years, attention tends to wane, but such lacunae actually
provide us with opportunities to reconsider more dispassionately goals and methods for this consistently
contentious Constitutional obligation.
Both the periodic apportionment of representatives across states, and subsequent redistricting within
states, have struck many commentators as curious inversions in the usual democratic dynamic: instead
of voters choosing their representatives, elected representatives in effect choose their constituencies.
Certainly circumspection is called for as we confront questions of some complexity, controversy, and con-
sequence. But as suggested by “I cut/you choose” fair-division principles familiar to game theorists and
suspicious siblings everywhere, evaluating apportionment algorithms before knowing actual census counts
might serve to encourage better debate, and possibly even better legislation, based on methodological
merits, and not particular political consequences.1
Here we explore, from an information-theoretic perspective, the fundamental questions posed by appor-
tionment: what does it mean, or should it mean, to distribute seats proportionally? How should we
round rational numbers to integers, and thereby [46] “convert census data into congressional seats?”
Also, we touch on certain related questions: how many representatives should represent the people, and
exactly which people2 should each of these representatives represent?
Tentative answers to the questions raised may be considered from various perspectives, including the
legal, the political, the moral, and the mathematical, leading to still more questions. What do we under-
stand to be the ultimate goals and evaluative criteria for census, choice of House size, apportionment,
or districting, and what technical procedures or algorithms best achieve these goals? Are the intent
and application of these various methods consistent on their face with the U.S. Constitution, and, if so,
would they otherwise require modification of relevant court decisions or federal laws and regulations?
Finally, would they stand any reasonable chance of being accepted by a majority of Congress, or would
they otherwise be likely to be enacted if within the discretion of the existing executive branch, and could
they withstand any subsequent challenges in federal courts or the Supreme Court?
1 After all, one could hardly expect Representatives to be so broad-minded as to vote their own districts out of existence.
2 We will end up addressing here the question of the size of districts, or variations in the sizes of districts, but not
the nature of their geographic boundaries or other determinants of their constituencies That is, we will speak to the
question of how many people each Representative represents, but not the thornier political questions of exactly who is
to be represented by whom, a problem receiving much deserved attention of late, but left for another day.
3After exploring the Constitutional ground rules and basic features of the problem, we shall here focus
primarily on technical issues at the level of allocating representatives to states, along with some subse-
quent discussion of the optimal choice of the overall House size and determination of sizes for districts, if
not their exact make-up. We will mostly set aside various issues of political feasibility3 4, and attempt to
avoid wading too deeply into the related if tangential quagmires such as districting and gerrymandering.5
Despite the plethora of suggestions and algorithms for apportionment made over the last 225 years or so,
the criterion argued for here—which might immediately come to the mind of many modern physicists,
chemists, electrical engineers, and statisticians—has received surprisingly little serious attention or con-
sideration.6 Our aim is therefore to argue for the merits of a method for apportioning representatives
by borrowing key ideas about entropy from the fields of statistical mechanics and information theory.
The actual algorithm advocated can determine the “optimal” apportionment of representatives to states
for a fixed total House size. If desired it can also be used concurrently to choose the optimal size of
the House of Representatives within some allowed range, as well as the optimal size (but not actual
demographic make-up) of each Congressional district within individual U.S. states. Importantly, it not
only generates optimal apportionments, House sizes, and district sizes, but can objectively compare or
rank different proposals.
The method amounts to minimizing a certain measure of discrepancy between actual and ideal polling
probabilities, or equivalently weights of representation, held by represented individuals under a proposed
apportionment. In communication theory, this measure is known as the relative entropy, and in statistics,
as the discrimination information, information gain, or Kullback-Leibler divergence, and is closely related
to notions of entropy, availability, or exergy in statistical thermodynamics.
In a certain sense, we describe how allocations of Congressional seats may assume their “fairest” values
in the same way that in electrical engineering we describe how better codes lead to shorter messages, or
in physics why temperatures tend to equalize—essentially via a principle of maximum entropy. While
such parallels between physics and politics might initially seem far-fetched, we will endeavor to carefully
motivate our method from plausible desiderata, guided by what little the U.S. Constitution has to say
on the matter.
The modern notion of information-theoretic entropy was introduced by Claude Shannon in the mid-20th
century [58–60] as a measure of uncertainty or missing information, building on some earlier ideas of
Hartley and Nyquist. But Shannon’s measure has deep connections to the physical concept of thermo-
dynamic entropy as explored earlier by Carnot, Clausius, Kelvin, Maxwell, Boltzmann, Gibbs, Planck,
Einstein, and other pioneers of thermal physics and statistical mechanics [61, 62]. The closely related
notion of relative entropy provides the most natural information-theoretic measure of similarity between
two probability distributions over the same sample space, or more generally between any two sets of
nonnegative proportions or additive measures that might not even have an obvious probabilistic inter-
pretation but which can be defined on a distributive lattice of possibilities. We use relative entropy as
the most natural measure of discrepancy or inequity in the effective indirect representational weight of
individuals as represented by Congress, as compared to the equal weights that would hold in a pure
direct democracy. This relative entropy itself was employed at least as far back as World War II, in
the code-breaking work of Alan Turing and I.J. Good in Great Britain [63], and popularized within the
statistics community by researchers Solomon Kullback and Richard Leibler [64] while working for the
U.S. government.7
And while we focus on the apportionment problem for the U.S. House of Representatives, the algorithm
advocated here can be easily adapted for other sorts of apportionment, including other federal or re-
gional systems involving political subdivisions of unequal size, or party-list proportional representation
3 Particularly because no major changes to the status quo seem likely any time soon, given the current level of polarization
and dysfunction in Congress....
4 Parts of this document date prior to the 2016 U.S. election. Subsequent events have only made it more unlikely that we as
a nation will, at least in any short term, take positive steps to improve fairness in representative governance, since the one
political party that now controls all three branches of the federal government has been the main beneficiary of existing
inefficiencies and inequities. Still, one may naively contend that it is important to know what “fair” apportionment
looks like, and how to measure it, in the hope that rational debate might some day resume....
5 However, we note in passing that entropy and information theory can also “inform” issues such as optimal district-
drawing, and detection or prevention of gerrymandering. This topic will be pursued in a subsequent paper.
6 Along with some other methods, entropic apportionment has been explored by Agnew [56], and independently by Ossipoff
[57], although its truly fundamental justification, unique properties, and multiple advantages were not emphasized.
7 They did, however, work in one of the least transparent parts of the executive branch, the National Security Agency, so
perhaps it is not altogether unexpected that their idea did not make its way directly to Congress or the Census Bureau.
4systems used in many parliamentary democracies. In fact, general applicability of a single underlying
apportionment rule will be a guiding desideratum.
Indeed, it turns out that the same entropic figure of merit was introduced decades ago by the econo-
metrician Henri Theil [65] as a measure of distributional inequality of some finite asset or resource, and
has been used to quantify inequality of income or wealth distributions in economics, as well as species,
fitness, or biomass diversity in ecology.
One can only approach with some measure of humility any question of mathematical principle that com-
pelled the attention of Edward Huntington, Marston Morse, John von Neumann, and Garrett Birkhoff,
or a question of democratic practice addressed by the likes of Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson,
John Quincy Adams, and Daniel Webster. While aware that there will almost certainly never be any one
method of apportionment universally agreed upon as “best” by all interested parties in all situations for
all times, we nevertheless contend that the entropic framework proposed here possesses a more natural
interpretation and more objective justification than methods used previously, and provides a unified
perspective and figure-of-merit from which we can generate optimal apportionments, compare or rank
alternative apportionments, quantify the effects of different choices of House size, and assess choices
regarding the size of Congressional districts, all while in actual practice leading to sensible apportion-
ments that when applied to real census data tend to agree with one or both of the most commonly
recommended methods, known as the Huntington-Hill method and the Webster-Wilcox method—but
enjoying a more fundamental motivation and interpretation than either.
2. THE CONGRESSIONAL APPORTIONMENT PROBLEM
What requirements the U.S. Constitution [66] does prescribe are spelled out in Article I, Section 2, later
modified by the 14th Amendment:8
Representatives ... shall be apportioned among the several states which may be included in
this Union, according to their respective Numbers.... The actual Enumeration [of which] shall
be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and
within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct....
The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each
State shall have at Least one Representative....
The phrase “according to their respective Numbers” clearly suggests an intent of proportional repre-
sentation, in some sense and to whatever extent possible, but the Constitution is otherwise reticent on
precise definitions or methodology, hence the talk of an apportionment “problem,” because in general
the assigned number of Representatives cannot all be in exact common proportion to the respective
represented populations as revealed by the “actual Enumeration.” More details of the long legal and
historical context may be found in Appendix A (starting on page 40).
2.1. Inputs and Outputs
In determining the apportionment of the R representatives (current statue specifying that R = 435)
amongst the S states (where currently of course S = 50 in the U.S.), a reasonable reading of the
“according to their respective numbers” clause denies use of any other demographic information except
the state-level represented population counts ps, for s = 1, . . . , S. These so-called “populations for
apportionment,” or represented populations, are mathematically speaking, specified as nonnegative whole
8 In order to enforce voting rights of newly enfranchised (male) African American citizens, the 14th Amendment stipulated
that in the event that voting rights in federal elections were denied to any adult males entitled to vote, the “basis of
representation” (i.e., population for apportionment) should be reduced in proportion to the fraction of those denied the
vote relative to the total number of adult male citizens. Neither the later 19th nor 26th Amendments explicitly expanded
this penalty clause to include women, or 18–20 year-old voters.
5numbers, practically speaking, subject to some uncertainty or measurement error, but, legally speaking,
accepted as exact for the purpose of apportionment, as determined from the most recent official decennial
census (now conducted by the Census Bureau, part of the Department of Commerce).
Given officially accepted values for the populations p = (p1, . . . , pS), a feasible apportionment a =
(a1, . . . , aS) is an assignment of a nonnegative integer number of representatives or seats to each state,
summing to a prescribed total of R =
∑
s
as voting representatives in the House, for which in addition,
the number of seats awarded to each state must satisfy
λs ≤ as ≤ us, (1)
where the U.S. Constitution requires λs = 1 as a lower bound, and us = max
[
1, bps/Dminc
]
as an
upper bound, for all states s = 1, . . . , S, Dmin = 30000 being the mandated minimum number of
represented person per Representative.9 The represented populations, the apportionment bounds, and
related quantities are defined and discussed in more detail in Appendix B (starting on page 44).
2.2. Fractional Dessert but Integer Rewards
The over-arching goal of proportionality (“according to their respective numbers”) suggests that the
apportionments a are to be chosen such that the ratios of delegation sizes as/as′ between pairs of states
are, in some sense to be made precise, close to the ratios of represented populations ps/ps′ of those same
states, but the Constitution appears otherwise silent on what exactly should be meant by closeness to
this ideal, or how it should be measured or maximized. As noted by Balinski and Young [67], two of the
most prominent scholars of apportionment, the overarching “issue is to find an operational method for
interpreting this mandate, and to identify the essential properties that any fair and reasonable method
ought to have.”
Congressional apportionment therefore requires converting “census data to Congressional seats” [46]
according to some definite mathematical procedure, hopefully one viewed as reasonable by all of the
various stakeholders. But analogous problems arise in other political or economic contexts, so such
apportionment problems are by no means unique to the U.S. Congress. For example, in party-list pro-
portional representation systems,10 the number of seats earned by a given political party is intended to
be proportional to the number of valid votes cast for that party. Mathematically, the problem is virtually
the same as Congressional apportionment, only with the ps representing votes cast for the sth party
rather than persons residing within the sth state, the major difference being that the minimum allowed
apportionment is usually zero, so parties must reach some threshold of popularity before earning a first
representative in the parliament. Apportionment of delegates from member countries to the European
Parliament is set by treaty rather than mathematical formula, but perhaps (quasi-)proportional represen-
tation might be a more satisfactory approach. At regional or local levels, various executive or legislative
bodies, councils, etc., may also involve assigning representatives from unequally-sized constituencies.
More generally, our basic problem is that of distributing or assigning a finite number R of unit resources
that are discrete, indivisible, but essentially identical and interchangeable, to S categories which are
discrete and exclusive, when the apportionments a are intended to be, to whatever extent possible,
proportional to certain populations, votes, magnitudes, counts, weights, or other measures p of merit or
dessert, possibly subject to additional constraints on the minimum or maximum number of resources to
9 But the meaning of “but” is not entirely unambiguous, so it is not entirely clear whether the Constitution strictly rules
out a state with less than Dmin inhabitants, or whether the requirement for at least one representative overrules the
requirement on a minimum number of persons per representative. However, the issue has never needed adjudication,
and in the event of some future demographic drop due to major natural or sociopolitical disaster, if the population of
some U.S. state ever were to fall below Dmin, I imagine that we would have more important things to worry about. For
mathematical convenience, I have expressed the upper bounds us in a manner that always remains consistent with the
lower bounds λs.
10 Proportional representation systems are currently used, in some form, in Algeria, Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Cambodia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Guatemala, Hong
Kong, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia,
Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Turkey, Uruguay, and other countries and regions. Countries like Mexico and the U.K. use
mixed systems combining proportional representation and first-past-the-post voting. Currently, the United Kingdom
uses no fewer than six different voting methods, with members of the House of Commons elected by first-past-the-post
plurality voting within districts (periodically proposed by the U.K. Boundary Commission and approved by the House of
Commons, based on preference for “geographically naturally” boundaries over population equality, as well as legislation
specifying separate quotas for England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Island). For elections to the European Parliament
(soon to be irrelevant), party-list systems were instead used (except in Northern Ireland).
6be allocated to each category.11 So in our subsequent discussion, we may think of “seats” more broadly
as the discrete items to be apportioned, the “House size” to be the number of items to be apportioned,
the “States” to be the regions, parties, political units, economic agents or other categories to which the
items are apportioned, and “populations” to be the counts, votes, sizes, or other measures of dessert in
proportion to which the items are to be distributed. The goal is to find an apportionment method that
does the fairest job of apportioning the discrete items, in some well-defined sense of “fairest” that ought
to be motivated, quantified, and justified, particularly when, generally speaking, no perfect distribution
of rewards can be said to exist.
3. TOWARDS AN OPTIMAL SOLUTION TO APPORTIONMENT
Given the impossibility of perfect proportionality in general, the real problem is not one of failure to find
a workable method, but rather a surfeit of methods that can and have been suggested, all using different
but ostensibly reasonable-looking rules, and all offering some semblance of approximate proportionality.
To avoid ad hocness, argument must turn to why one approach is any better, or more fair, or less
arbitrary, than any other.
3.1. Guiding Principles: Uniformity, Universality, and Uniqueness
We therefore seek a principled way to winnow down the plethora of plausible-looking apportionment
methods. At the highest level of abstraction, we will be guided by three underlying principles based upon
what we will call the Three U’s: Uniformity of individual representation, Universality of apportionment
methodology, and Uniqueness of the resulting algorithm and its output. While admittedly sounding
both a bit vague and high-handed, these desiderata will lead us toward more concrete quantitative
criteria and, with the help of some mathematical theorems from information theory, finally to a single,
well-motivated, well-behaved, and easily executed apportionment algorithm.
3.1.1. Uniformity of Representation
First and foremost, we take seriously the idea of the House of Representatives as “the People’s House,”
and the associated goal of maximum equality or Uniformity of representation between and among in-
dividuals, rather than other political units or actors. Many apportionment methods and metrics are
instead overtly (and overly) state-centric, focusing on the number of representatives to which states are
somehow entitled, or on the fairness of certain states (hypothetically) gaining marginal seats from, or
losing seats to, other states. In our view, states do not deserve representatives; people of the various
states deserve an equal say in their governance. Only, in the U.S. system based on a (sometimes strange)
mix of representative democracy and federalism, Congressional representation must be granted to the
people through their respective states of residence, and representatives cannot be shared or split across
states.12
Undergirding this outlook is what we call the One Person, One Voice (OPOV) principle. In essentially
all cases involving proportional representation or other forms of political apportionment, the underlying
11 Elections to the Scottish Parliament use an additional member system, where voters cast separate ballots for a local
representative within single-member districts, and a party-list vote for representation within larger regions, but a second
vote determines the total number of representatives for a party including those elected to the single-member constituencies
after taking into account the seats gained in each region by each party in the first ballot. Scandinavian countries also
include so-called “leveling” or “adjustment” seats, which supplement members directly elected by each constituency to
better ensure that each party’s share of the total seats in the national legislature is proportional to the party’s overall
share of votes. Bi-proportional or other schemes are also employed. For instance, proportional representation with
respect to both party and region might be sought—a particular apportionment scheme developed by mathematician
F. Pukelshiem was used within Switzerland for cantonal and municipal elections with precisely this goal. Increasingly,
single transferable vote (STV) selection is also combined with proportional representation, which adds another layer of
complication. But with appropriate modifications, the entropic method advocated here should be applicable to these
more complex systems of representation.
12 Similarly, in party-list systems, it is voters who deserve proportional representation, not political parties who deserve
seats, but ultimately, finite, whole numbers of seats must be granted to discrete parties for whom the voters voted.
7goal would seem to be to enjoy the advantages and efficiencies of representative government, but in a way
that embodies, as nearly as possible, the ideal of equality inherent in direct democracy. In the context
of U.S. legislative apportionment, a fundamental corollary of the Equal Protection clause is commonly
referred to as the “One Person, One Vote” principle.13 In Australia, they instead speak of the concept
of “one vote, one value.” But the U.S. Constitution is very clear that Congressional representatives are
to be allocated based on the full represented populations of the states, not their respective numbers of
voters, or eligible voters, or even just citizens14, so One Person, One Voice would seem a more accurate
catchphrase to embody the goal of uniformity of representation in this context.
3.1.2. Universality of Methodology
A second natural principle is Universality. Although we focus here on the case of U.S. Congressional
apportionment, we view this task as just one of many closely related political or economic apportionment
problems, to which one and the same methodology or strategy should be applicable whenever the goal is
equality or proportionality of representation or, more broadly, fairness in the distribution or division of
some limited, discrete resource. In particular, in the case of the U.S. Congress, the Constitution requires
that as ≥ 1 for each state, but this is not necessarily or even typically the case for, say, party-list
proportional representation, where parties with few votes may not receive any seats, and in principle
there could even be more parties than seats (S > R). Universality demands that in the face of any
these tasks, essentially the same goals should be pursued and same methods adopted, just with different
interpretations of the variables and with different choices for the auxiliary constraints, rather than relying
on some ad hoc or artificial adjustment to the optimization method itself or to its output. This alone
seems to rule out about half of the traditional apportionment algorithms, namely any that automatically
assign at least one seat to each party even in the absence of explicit lower bound constraints.
A second aspect of Universality arises as we recall that the congressional apportionment problem in the
narrow sense, i.e., awarding of legislative seats, is part of a hierarchical sequence of related political
tasks, namely:
1. choice of House size R (total number of representatives);
2. inter-state apportionment of representatives a;
3. intra-state choice of congressional district sizes dsk, when district-based representation is employed
(which is currently required by law for all states with as > 1),
all based on the represented populations p obtained from the census, and consistent with Constitutional
lower and upper bounds. It seems to us that the very same principles of fair allocation or measures of
proportionality which guide the apportionment of seats between states, should also be able to inform
better choices of overall House size, or to assess inequities in Congressional district sizes within states.
While it is evident that with fixed population counts, certain seat totals R divide up more reasonably
(with fewer “leftover” seats to award) than others, and while it is equally clear that differences in district
sizes within states are, from the point of view of constituents, as undemocratic and unfair as differences
between states,15 few methods of apportionment purport to quantify these sorts of mismatches using
the same type of measure employed to judge the apportionments themselves. We consider it a major
selling point that our proposed method achieves this unified perspective in a completely natural way.
13 Traditionally, reference was made to the “one man, one vote” principle. Perhaps more historically accurate would have
been the “one sufficiently wealthy white man, one vote” principle.
14 See Appendix A for some discussion of the legal history.
15 Here we are thinking of inequalities in legislative representation. Because of the structure of the electoral college,
inter-state inequities in apportionment also introduce an additional layer of unfairness in presidential elections.
83.1.3. Uniqueness of Algorithms and Outcomes
Altogether, desiderata for the apportionment methodology should entail Uniqueness of the specific al-
gorithm, and (near)-uniqueness of the output. As to method, we ought to be able to pinpoint one best
algorithm, eliminate—or at the very least minimize—ad hoc assumptions or arbitrary choices, and sup-
ply fundamental justifications why this one method is preferred to all others, instead of just pointing to
a few ostensibly desirable operational features, plausible-sounding properties, or empirical claims of per-
formance. This algorithm in turn should produce a unique apportionment, except in the unlikely event
of exact ties arising from symmetries or accidental commensurability between the populations counts,
in which cases (but only in such cases) the only fair way to choose amongst the remaining possibilities
would be by random lottery.
Below, we shall attempt to argue why, out of all the different types of methods that have been suggested,
these three guiding principles single out global optimization as bestf˙ootnoteAlthough subsequently, such
global optimization methods can be reinterpreted or implemented as so-called divisor methods or ranking
methods. Then, in seeking an optimand, objective function, or figure-of-merit to optimize that embodies
these principles, we will argue why the goal should be to equalize the representational shares or weight
of individuals, rather than matching apportionments to state-level quotas, or balancing district sizes.16
Finally, we will invoke some ideas from information theory to arrive at the most natural way to measure
(and then minimize) inequality in the individual weights of representation.
3.2. Quota, Divisor, Ranking, or Optimization Method?
For a summary of various properties that might be expected of an apportionment method, and of the
“paradoxes” that arise when certain of these properties fail to hold, see Appendix C (page 55 ff.). For a
survey describing and comparing various types of apportionment methodologies used or suggested, see
Appendix D (page 59 ff.). Specific methods are discussed in Appendix E (page 70 ff.).
In evaluating any apportionment methods, we ought to at least try to focus first on democratic principle
before politics or pragmatics. In the Federal Courts, legal claims often come down to one state arguing
why it deserves a marginal representative more than does another state. In Congress itself, debates and
votes on apportionment are usually (if not always overtly) strategic, with keen attention paid to which
apportionments or apportionment methods favor which states or which sorts of states—for instance,
large or small, urban or rural, and/or predominately “red” (Republican-leaning) or “blue” (Democratic-
leaning). But, really we should endeavor to prioritize rights of the people rather than interests of states,
or of political parties or particular demographics.
That is, a fair apportionment method should above all highlight the goal of equality of representation
of individuals, within the confines of federalism, rather than any claims to seats by the states per se.17
For these reasons, we are extremely skeptical of quota methods that demand |as − qs| < 1 for every
s = 1, . . . , S, where the exact state quotas qs =
ps
P R =
ps
D¯
are regarded as the ideal number of seats to
which each state is entitled based on the goal of purely proportional representation. (See Appendix B
for more details on state quotas and related quantities).
Whilst with almost any method, the exact state quotas qs emerge as ideal targets for apportionment,
18
there is no compelling reason to insist a priori that the apportionments must remain within one unit
of the corresponding quotas for all states, rather than, say, trying to match representatives to quotas at
the level of counties or boroughs or precincts or other sub-units within states, or else larger geographic
regions or groups of states, or any other sub-divisions of the populace.
In our reading, the prescribed Constitutional lower bounds (specifically, requirements of at least one
representative per state) are not at all intended to deliberately nudge congressional representation away
16 Although subsequently, we can re-express the figure-of-merit in terms of either quotas, or average district sizes, if desired.
17 Or in a party-list system, apportionment should emphasize the rights of voters over claims by the parties.
18 After all, they are just proportional to the respective state populations, or can even be identified with the populations,
measured in multiples of the overall average district size D¯.
9from proportionality or to purposefully over-represent smaller states19, but merely reflect a desire to
ensure that no individuals entitled in principle to a national voice are left without any Congressional
representation whatsoever. Likewise, the upper bounds (implicit in the prescribed minimum number
Dmin of persons per Congressional representative) are not intended to deliberately under-represent larger
states, but merely reflect a sense of the scale of workable district sizes or representational ratios that
might contribute to efficient operation of the House (providing a diversity of ideas, but not an unwieldy
number of members), or an effective democratic dynamic (wherein each member represents a sufficiently
large sampling of people and viewpoints, balancing opportunity for healthy debate with likelihood of
common ground and compromise).20
Thus, we are also led to reject methods based on rounding the states’ so-called fair shares21, because
the very notion of “fair” share as used in the literature overemphasizes the claims of states rather than
focusing on individuals, and otherwise exaggerates what should be an altogether auxiliary role played
by the lower and upper bound constraints.
Regarding so-called divisor methods: amongst all of the academic literature, and committee reports, and
Congressional debates, we can see no principled way to select definitively amongst the myriad quotient
rounding rules themselves (See Appendix D for more details). Disagreement at this level has been ongoing
for a couple of centuries, and though Huntington’s method of so-called equal proportions [3, 69, 70] has
earned approval from the National Academy of Sciences and has been entrenched in Congressional statute
for over 75 years, the various justifications offered have proven less than compelling, the method is of
dubious universality, being inapplicable without ex post modification to party-list systems, and little
actual consensus has ever emerged amongst experts on either the political or mathematical sides.
Choice of pairwise comparison tests would appear equally arbitrary, despite Huntington’s advocacy to
the contrary,22 and criteria involving mere local optimality or Pareto optimality lack compelling rationale
when there exist well-behaved rules guaranteeing globally optimal apportionments that maximize some
overall measure of fairness. Additionally, a global optimization method induces a total ordering of all
feasible apportionments, so can be used not only to select an optimal apportionment but to compare or
rank any and all proposed apportionments in a meaningful way.
So we narrow the methodological search to apportionment via variational principle, based on constrained
global optimization (i.e., minimization of some measure of unfairness, inequity, inequality, or dispropor-
tionality, or maximization of some measure of fairness, equity, uniformity, or proportionality), subject
to auxiliary inequality constraints on lower or upper bounds for each state, and to equality or inequality
constraints on the total number of seats to be apportioned.
3.3. Match Quotas, Equalize District Sizes, or Balance Representational Weights?
We have decided that the apportionment problem is one of mapping a set of rational numbers to a set of
nearby integers in some optimally fair way. But what precisely should be near to what, and how should
closeness or fairness be measured?
Obviously the state quotas qs =
ps
P R are not generically integers, so the as cannot be chosen exactly
equal to the qs, without violating Constitutional mandates dictating that each state receive at least one
representative but always a whole number of representatives.
19 Given the “Great Compromise,” exaggerating the influence of smaller states would seem to be the job for the U.S. Senate.
Indeed, as of the 2010 U.S. Census, 18 Senators represented just over 51% of the population, with the remaining 49% of
the population represented by 82 Senators. As of 2017, it is estimated that the population of just Los Angeles County
exceeds that of 43 U.S. States. This sort of is mismatch is only expected to get worse given projected demographic
trends. As we will see, relative entropy could also be used to characterize this inequality, but there is no Constitutional
remedy short of a fundamental and entirely implausible amendment process.
20 In early drafts of the Constitution, Dmin was apparently set at 40000, but George Washington thought that number
too high, and asked the convention to reconsider. In the Federalist Papers 55 [68], Madison warned of the democratic
dangers of not expanding the House as the population grew, and in fact later proposed (along with what became the
Bill of Rights) another amendment (never ratified) that would have mandated maximum district sizes:
After the first enumeration ..., there shall be one representative for every 30,000, until the number shall
amount to 100, after which the proportion shall be so regulated by Congress, that there shall be not less
than 100 representatives, nor less than one representative for every 40,000 persons, until the number of
representatives shall amount to 200; after which the proportion shall be so regulated by Congress, that there
shall not be less than 200 representatives, nor more than one representative for every 50,000 persons.
21 Again, see Appendix B for a precise definition of these quantities.
22 And anyhow, workable pairwise comparison criteria (which lead to transitive rankings) all turn out to be mathematically
equivalent to divisor rules.
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As a corollary, given the proposed apportionments, the state-level average district sizes d¯s =
ps
as
, cannot
all be all chosen to be equal to the national average D¯ = PR , and likewise the representational weights
(or equivalently, polling probabilities) w¯sn =
as
R
1
ps
= asqs
1
P cannot all assume the value associated with
an ideal direct democracy, namely w¯ = 1/P for all represented individuals in all districts of all states.
Almost always, there must be some cost in terms of democratic fairness in order to gain the presumed
practical efficiencies of indirect or representative government. This is of why we speak of apportionment
as a problem.
(Again, all these various quantities, including the represented populations ps, proposed apportionments
as, and various related quantities such as quotas qs, average district sizes d¯s, and weights of representation
w¯sn, are discussed in more detail in Appendix B).
From the perspective of a single state23 the most natural assessment might compare as to qs, indicating
whether the state received as many Congressional seats as to which it is “entitled” based on its popula-
tion. Or else perhaps the state will look at its average district size d¯s in comparison to some other state’s
average d¯s′ , in attempting to justify a claim that it marginally “deserves” an additional seat more than
the other state.
From the perspective of any one incumbent Congressional Representative, the key comparison would
be between his or her district size dsk and the average size D¯, i.e., whether his or her district is larger
than it “should” be, which effects the difficulty and cost of campaigning and provisioning of constituent
services. (After apportionment, but before Congressional districts are assigned, the state-level average
district size d¯k would again become the natural quantity to consider).
But to reiterate, we maintain that the relevant perspective is not that of a state (or party, or a congres-
sional representative), but of the represented individuals themselves. And the only natural comparison
that relates directly to individual representation will involve the weights of representational, or equiva-
lently, polling probabilities.
While virtually any figure-of-merit to be optimized may be re-expressible in terms of state-level variables,
fundamentally it should be interpretable as a measure of disproportionality in representation across all
individuals, not just discrepancies between seats deserved and seats allotted to states. But how do we
choose a measure of fairness to maximize, or of unfairness to minimize? Any number of functions might
be imagined. To avoid the same sort of criticisms of ad hockery that we have leveled against other
approaches, we had better try to construct this function from compelling principles.
4. ENTROPIC APPORTIONMENT
To recap: we seek to motivate a unique and universal mathematical procedure that allots discrete seats
to states by optimizing a natural global measure of equity of individual weights of representation across
all represented inhabitants of those states.
We tolerate some cost in terms of imperfect equality in order to gain the presumed advantages and
efficiencies of a representative government. But the task of fair apportionment is to contain this cost
by rounding the allotments of seats to whole numbers, so as to minimize some measure of discrepancy
between the actual and ideal weights of representation, or equivalently (since the ideal weights are all
equal), to maximize a measure of the uniformity of the realized weights across all represented individuals.
Shifting to an equivalent interpretation in terms of polling probabilities, we can equivalently speak of
making the indirect polling probability distribution p¯isk =
as
R
1
ps
as close as possible to the direct polling
distribution, p¯i = 1P . But once we accept that weights of representation can be interpreted as probabilities
(or even just as nonnegative, additive measures), we contend that the choice of a figure-of-merit becomes
clear, as then various arguments all point to a single functional form used to measure the discrepancy
23 Or rather, from the point of view of the state’s own governor, legislature, attorney general, or other political leadership.
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between two probability distributions over the same space, namely the relative entropy, otherwise known
as the Kullback-Leibler divergence, or discrimination information [62, 64, 71, 72].
And since the direct distribution is by design completely uniform across all represented individuals,
choosing the indirect probability distribution to be as close as possible to the direct probability distri-
bution amounts to choosing the former to be as uniform as possible, and similar arguments single out
the Shannon entropy as the natural measure of uniformity of a probability distribution.
The entropy and relative entropy are closely related quantities, and in the current context the relative
entropy can just be expressed in terms of a difference of Shannon entropies, so entropy maximization
and relative entropy minimization lead to equivalent variational principles.
4.1. Some Characterizations of and Motivations for Relative Entropy
For a more thorough discussion of entropy and relative entropy and an explication of a variety of
information-theoretic arguments all leading to relative entropy minimization or entropy maximization,
see Appendix F (starting on page 82). For a discussion of (relative) entropy as a measure of distributional
inequality in the context of economics and ecology, see Appendix G (starting on page 110). Here
we will summarize one fundamental characterization theorem, and suggest some additional heuristic
interpretations or motivations.
We seek a quantified measure of discrepancy, departure, or divergence, K(ω;µ) between one “trial” distri-
bution ω and an ideal, reference or target distribution µ. These can be any probability distributions—or
really any nonnegative, normalized weights over the same set of possibilities—but for our task, ultimately
we can interpret the ωsn = p¯isn as the indirect or Congress-mediated weights of representation across all
represented individuals assuming uniform intra-state representation, while µsn = p¯i =
1
P will represent
the the direct or democratically ideal distribution of weights of representation. But we can proceed
somewhat more generally.
First, the most basic notions of fairness demand that only the numbers of people in the various states
should matter, not the identities of particular people, the identities of particular states, nor which par-
ticular people reside in which particular states. Beyond how many people live in each state, the measure
of divergence should ignore any other demographic features or labels. How we arbitrarily choose to name
individuals or their states, or the order in which we happen to list states, or individuals within states,
should not affect our judgements of similarity between different distributions of representational weight.
This means that the divergence measure K(ω;µ) must be numerically invariant under permutation of
the arbitrary labels we use to refer to states and individuals within states.
Second, adding “irrelevant”24 individuals (for example, foreign nationals, or residents of Washington,
D.C.) to the list of individuals, but with zero direct and zero indirect weight of representation, should not
change the measure. This says that the divergence K must be extensible, or invariant under the addition
or removal of superfluous alternatives with no weight under either the trial or target distributions.
Third, if we aggregate some of the individuals into a group and consider only their aggregated weight
of representation in the measure of divergence, then the corresponding change ∆K to the divergence K
should depend only on the weights of representation within the grouped individuals, and not the weights
of other individuals. We then say that K(ω;µ) satisfies a branching property.
Together, these imply that the divergence must assume an additive form,
K(ω;µ) =
S∑
s=1
ps∑
n=1
ωsn ψ(ωsn, µsn), (2)
24 Irrelevant, that is, only in the legal context of Congressional apportionment. Obviously their interests, rights, and dignity
should matter in other contexts.
12
where ψ(ωsn, µsn) should assume the same functional form for all individuals in all states. Therefore,
the divergence K must be some average (with respect to the trial distribution) of some function ψ(ω, µ)
of the trial and target weights assigned to each person.
Fourth, making small changes to the weights of representation should lead to small changes in the
measure of discrepancy. That is, we demand that K is a continuous function of all of its inputs (except
perhaps at certain boundary points where the weights vanish).
Fifth, if the two distributions of weights ω and µ are exactly equal, then obviously there is no discrepancy,
and so a measure of discrepancy K(µ;µ) should vanish. Otherwise, there must be some discrepancy, so
the measure should be non-negative. We say that K(ω;µ) is positive semi-definite.
Sixth, the divergence between the best-case uniform distribution of representational weights and a worst-
case “dictatorial” distribution of weights should be positive, but finite:
0 < K(1, 0, . . . , 0; 1P , . . . , 1P ) <∞, (3)
for any populations size P satisfying 1 < P <∞. The lower bound flows from positive semi-definiteness
as described above. The upper bound is imposed because giving no weight to individuals deserving some
weight may be undesirable, but is not logically contradictory. On the other hand, it would be nonsensical
to assign positive weight of representation to some individual who is not even entitled to it—otherwise,
where would never even know when to stop including people in the summation—so the divergence can
be infinite in such cases. We refer to this as an ordering assumption.
Seventh, and finally, it is natural to demand that divergence should be additive under conditions of
independence. So for example, in order to measure the degree of disproportionality of representation in
the U.S.A. via the House of Representatives, and in Mexico via its Chamber of Deputies, the overall
divergence should just be the sum of the divergences associated with the two nations. Or, if we consider
conducting multiple independent polls of individuals within one country, then the overall divergence
between sampling distributions based on the indirect versus direct weights of representation should be
the sum of divergences for each poll separately.
It turns out [73] that the only functional form for the divergence K(ω;µ) satisfying all seven of these
properties is
K(ω;µ) = κ
S∑
s=1
ps∑
n=1
ωsn log
[ωsn
µsn
]
, (4)
which is the Kullback-Leibler divergence, or relative entropy, of the distribution ω relative to the dis-
tribution µ. Here κ is some positive constant reflecting the choice of units and/or the base of the
logarithms. Except where otherwise noted, we will take κ = 1 and log x = log2 x, thereby measuring
(relative) entropies in bits (short for binary digits).
The relative entropy sees widespread application in physics, communication theory, statistics, economics,
machine learning, image processing, bioinformatics, ecology, and other fields, both as a measure of di-
vergence between probability distributions, and as the basis of variational principles or other algorithms
used to: assign probability distributions based on limited information; to approximate one probabil-
ity distribution by a simpler model; or to test statistical hypotheses predicting different probability
distributions.
Relative entropy then naturally extends to the problem of assessing representational inequality, and the
associated task of minimizing such inequality in the optimal apportionment of Congressional seats to
states, or parliamentary seats to parties. As mentioned, entropy has already been used in closely related
distributional, social choice, and social welfare contexts. For example, Sewell, et al. [74] have developed a
maximum-entropy stochastic voting scheme, and Theil [65] introduced an entropic measure of inequality
for income or wealth distributions. In fact, entropy reflects inequality in the share of the total income
(in a country, or state, or city, etc.) controlled by given shares of the population, in the same way that
it measures inequality in the share of the total votes in the U.S. House of representatives controlled by
given shares of the population.
No other measure besides relative entropy can possess all of the defining characteristics listed above,
nor several other natural mathematical properties enjoyed by relative entropy. This alone is enough to
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recommend it. Broadly brushed, the following interpretations of or rationales for entropic apportionment
may be further offered:
• the overarching objective is to give an equal voice to equal numbers of people. The entropic ap-
proach takes very seriously, indeed almost literally, the goal of giving individuals an equal say in
their governance, because communication theory provides an explicit way to compare the demo-
cratic signal associated with their “voices” and to quantify the extent to which individuals do have
an equal say in Congress;
• institutional and cultural norms effectively presume that everyone gets equal representation, which
means that, implicitly, democratic “messages” are encoded according to a the direct polling dis-
tribution. But messages are effectively sampled based on the indirect, Congress-mediated polling
distribution. Minimizing the relative entropy minimizes the number of spurious or extraneous bits
of information associated with this mismatch;
• we choose that apportionment which makes it most difficult to distinguish direct from indirect
polling (if one is given the results of repeated polling, and asked to guess which sampling procedure
was used);25
• we seek the most uniform distribution of representational weights across individuals, and Shannon
entropy is the natural measure of uniformity, and so maximizing entropy maximizes uniformity;
• we seek the least informative or least biased distribution of representational weights across individ-
uals, such that no more information is put into the indirect polling probability distribution than is
needed to satisfy the constraints, and no individual is arbitrarily given more weight under indirect
sampling than is justified by the prior information;
• the more unequal are the representational weights, the less surprise we experience, less uncertainty
we resolve, and less information we receive in learning of the outcome of indirect (Congress-
mediated) polling;
• even if one is reluctant to attach a probabilistic interpretation to the weights of representation, they
are by necessity nonnegative (the worse that can happen is individuals lack any representation) and
additive (the net weight of representation of any group is the sum of the weights of representations
for all individuals within the group). Compatible with this structure, the most natural variational
principle measuring departure of one such measure from another is once again the relative entropy.
As to the last point: we do continue to maintain that it is both meaningful and natural to interpret
the weights of representation probabilistically, namely as polling probabilities, and so we may apply
without apology the full apparatus of information theory. But even if we were to avoid attaching
probabilistic meanings to the representational weights, we would still be led to the Shannon entropy as
the natural measure of the uniformity of these weights, and the relative entropy as a measure of divergence
or discrepancy between two distributions of weights, in particular those distributions associated with
representative (Congress-mediated) versus direct (unmediated) democracy, and therefore to the principle
of relative entropy minimization or entropy maximization as the most justifiable variational principle for
apportionment.
Next, we turn to some specific features of this entropic figure-of-merit and its properties in the context
of apportionment.
4.2. Apportionment via Entropic Optimization
Given the state populations p and a proposed House size R, entropic apportionment selects a by mini-
mizing what is called the relative entropy or Kullback-Leibler divergence between the indirect and direct
25 In the social choice literature, one reads of the “random dictator” model which obviates certain impossibility theorems—
at the expense of leaving a decision in the hands of randomly chosen dictator. For what it is worth, we could also
interpret entropic apportionment in terms of choosing a random dictator either directly or indirectly. The entropic
apportionment is that which is predicted to yield a particular individual as randomly or uniformly as possible if we have
to choose indirectly.
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polling distributions:
K(a,p, R) =
S∑
s=1
ps∑
n=1
p¯isn log
[
p¯isn
w¯
]
=
S∑
s=1
ps∑
n=1
as
psR
log
[ as
psR
1
P
]
=
S∑
s=1
as
R log
[
as/R
ps/P
]
, (5)
subject to the constraint
S∑
s=1
as = R on the total number of seats,
26 and to lower and upper bound
constraints on individual states, λs ≤ as ≤ us. That is, we minimize the discrimination information
between the probability of selecting constituents directly and at random in a pure democracy, versus
selecting constituents indirectly via their congressional representatives. Refer again to Appendix F for
more details.
This relative entropy further simplifies to
K(a, q, R) =
S∑
s=1
as
R log
[as/R
qs/R
]
= 1R
S∑
s=1
as log
[
as
qs
]
, (6)
which is the form typically most convenient for numerical optimization, using the incremental “greedy”
algorithm outlined in Appendix H (beginning on page 126). Notice that while this quantity does start off
fundamentally as a measure of divergence between the direct and indirect polling probabilities across all
represented individuals, it can be expressed as a sum over the state-level variables a and q, and can also
be interpreted as the discrimination information between choosing a state with probability proportional
to the size of its congressional delegation, and choosing a state with probability proportional to its
population. Crucially, this discrimination information is derived and motivated at the level of represented
persons, but because all represented persons within a state are treated equivalently, the relative entropy
over the space of represented person reduces to a relative entropy over the space of states.27
Because the ideal democratic polling distribution is completely uniform, we can also write the relative
entropy as the deficit in the Shannon entropy compared to the democratic ideal,
K(a, q, R) = Smax(P )− S(a, q, R), (7)
where
Smax = Smax(P ) = logP (8)
represents the maximum possible Shannon entropy, associated with choosing uniformly at random
amongst the total population of P persons, and
S(a,p, R) = −
S∑
s=1
ps∑
n=1
p¯isn log p¯isn = −
S∑
s=1
ps∑
n=1
as
psR
log
[
as
psR
]
= − 1R
S∑
s=1
as log
[
as
qs
1
P
]
(9)
is the Shannon entropy when polling persons indirectly via their representatives, and quantifies the
degree of uniformity in the representational weights across all represented individuals. So for given
populations p and a fixed house size R, minimizing the relative entropy K is equivalent to maximizing
the Shannon entropy S, both subject to suitable constraints on the allowed values of a.
Expressing in this way a relative entropy as the difference between the maximum possible entropy and
actual entropy is possible if and only if the relative entropy compares one probability distribution to
the completely uniform distribution. But more generally, the entropy deficit (Smax −S) is known as the
absolute redundancy and plays an important role in information theory, as it measures the inefficiency
of the coding relative to the total capacity of the communication channel.28
From the various expressions for the relative entropy, we may infer that it always lies in the range
0 ≤ K(a, q, R) ≤ logP. (10)
26 This equality constraint can be replaced with inequality constraints to find the optimal apportionment over some range
of House sizes. This is actually our recommended procedure, as discussed below.
27 This is possible because (i) the sub-sampling within states was implicitly assumed to be uniform, and (ii) the relative
entropy is an f -divergence, as defined and discussed in Appendix F.
28 The normalized difference
(
1− SSmax
)
is known as the relative redundancy, or data compression ratio.
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The so-called Gibbs inequality (which undergirds the mathematical foundations of statistical mechanics)
guarantees that the relative entropy K(a, q, R) is nonnegative, and vanishes if and only if as = qS for
all states s = 1, . . . S. Of course, for this to happen, it must be the case that all state-level quotas are
exact integers, which is highly unlikely in real-world examples.29 The lower bound on Shannon entropy
entails the upper bound on K, but this bound can only be achieved if exactly one individual out of
the population is assigned any positive polling probability, which is not mathematically possible under
our assumptions,30 unless there happens to be a state for which ps = 1. So generically, the bounds in
Equation (10) tend to both be strict, with the equity of the proposed apportionment decreasing with
increasing K or, equivalently, decreasing S.
Yet another way to re-write the relative entropy is in terms of the resulting (average) district sizes across
states:
K(d¯;a, D¯) =
S∑
s=1
ps∑
n=1
as
psR
log
[ as
psR
1
P
]
=
S∑
s=1
ps∑
n=1
1
R
1
d¯s
log
[
P
R
1
d¯s
]
= log
[
P
R
]− S∑
s=1
as
R log[d¯s]
= log[D¯]− log
[{ S∏
s=1
d¯s
as
} 1
R
]
= log
[
D¯{ S∏
s=1
d¯sas
} 1
R
]
.
(11)
Information theory aside, we see that for given population counts p and a fixed house size R, optimization
of inter-state apportionments according to this entropic rule will have a very simple interpretation. Note
that the argument of the first logarithm is the arithmetic mean of the district sizes across all states,
D¯ = PR =
1
R
S∑
s=1
asd¯s, whereas the argument of the second logarithm is the geometric mean of the (intra-
state average31) district sizes d¯s. Recalling that the logarithm function is strictly monotone, we see that
minimizing the relative entropy is equivalent to maximizing the geometric mean of all district sizes for
a fixed arithmetic mean of district sizes. The arithmetic-geometric-mean inequality32 guarantees that
the geometric mean is no greater than the arithmetic mean, with equality if and only if all intra-state
averaged district sizes are equal, d¯s = D¯ for s = 1, . . . , S, consistent with the positive definiteness of K.
More will be said on this formulation below, when we discuss evaluation of district sizes themselves.
4.3. Comparison of Huntington, Webster, and Entropic Apportionments
The Huntington (or Huntington-Hill) [3, 69] and Webster (or Webster-Wilcox) [2, 6] schemes are perhaps
the most widely advocated and discussed of the historic apportionment methods, so provide obvious
foils for entropic apportionment. As mentioned, the former is the methodology currently mandated by
Congressional statute.
In actual application to modern U.S. Census data, the Webster and Huntington methods tend to produce
either identical apportionments, or very similar apportionments, differing perhaps in the allocation of the
last representative between a pair of states. Applied to the same census data, the entropic apportionment
method tends to agree with both the Webster and Huntington methods when the latter agree, or more
often than not with the Huntington method otherwise.
In artificial examples where the populations can be chosen arbitrarily, so as to intentionally create
difficult boundary cases, entropic apportionment tends to accord with both the Webster and Huntington
methods when the latter two coincide, to agree with the more plausible of their answers when the
29 But in such a fortuitous case, virtually any apportionment method worth the name would recognize the assignment
a = q as optimal.
30 Additionally, this would also violate lower bound and other Constitutional constraints for U.S. Congressional apportion-
ment. The actual largest achievable value of K consistent with both upper and lower bund constraints depends on the
distributional details, but generally speaking, the worst case will leave the largest states having only one seat, and give
the smallest state or states the most seats possible without exceeding the upper bounds.
31 Note that the intra-state average district sizes here still refer to arithmetic averages, d¯s =
1
as
as∑
k=1
dsk =
ps
as
.
32 Recall that the Harmonic-Geometric-Arithmetic-Quadratic Mean Inequality says that if x1, . . . , xn are all positive real
numbers, then their harmonic mean, geometric mean, arithmetic mean, and quadratic mean (root-mean square) satisfy:
0 <
(
1
n
n∑
j=1
1
xj
)−1 ≤ ( n∏
j=1
xj
)1/n ≤ ( 1
n
n∑
j=1
xj
)
≤
(
1
n
n∑
j=1
x2j
)1/2
, with equality between the means if and only if
x1 = · · · = xn. The inequality actually generalizes to any sequence of power means.
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differences between the output of the Huntington and Webster apportionments are non-zero but small,
or effectively to interpolate between them when the differences become more pronounced.
See Appendix K (beginning on page 139) for some numerical examples.
4.3.1. Taylor Expansions
Given that the Huntington and Webster methods are the most widely advocated historical approaches,
this similar performance offers some reassurance of reasonable output for the entropic method, beyond
its theoretical justification. It is not difficult to understand why these three methods tend to produce
similar results for assignment of seats, because, apart from an overall pre-factor, their respective figures-
of-merit all agree up to second order when Taylor expanded with respect to the apportionments as,
about the exact state quotas qs.
Recall that the Webster objective function, usually motivated as the mean-squared deviation in best-case
shares of representatives (over all individuals), may be defined as
UW =
1
P
∑
s
ps
(
1
d¯s
− 1
D¯
)2
= RP 2
∑
s
(as−qs)2
qs
, (12)
while the Huntington objective function arises as the mean-squared deviation of (best-case) district sizes,
and can be expanded as
UH =
1
R
∑
s
as
(
d¯s − D¯
)2
= P
2
R3
∑
s
(as−qs)2
as
= P
2
R3
∑
s
qs
as
(as−qs)2
qs
≈ P 2R3
∑
s
(as−qs)2
qs
+ . . . ; (13)
while the Kullback-Leibler divergence is
K =
∑
s
as
R log2
(
as
qs
) ≈ 12 ln 2 1R∑
s
(as−qs)2
qs
+ . . . , (14)
(For that matter, the dual Kullback-Leibler divergence also has the same leading-order Taylor expansion:
K˜ =
∑
s
qs
R log2
(
qs
as
) ≈ 12 ln 2 1R∑
s
(as−qs)2
qs
+ . . . , (15)
but this functional is disfavored on other grounds compared to primal relative entropy K).
Of course, we are inclined to turn this argument around and assert that the Webster and Huntington
optimands are mere rational-function approximations to the more fundamental relative entropy. This
result is an important if often under-appreciated reason why the chi-squared statistic χ2 =
∑
s
(as−qs)2
qs
appearing on the right-hand side of these expansions has been so widely used in statistical goodness-of-fit
tests: χ2 turns out to be an approximation to the Kullback-Leibler divergence K, or, equivalently, to the
log-likelihood statistic under multinomial sampling.
But in addition to its more compelling theoretical motivation, the entropic method enjoys an important
additional advantage over either the Webster or Huntington methods, by virtue of supplying a definitive
normalization for the global measure of representational proportionality, which, given the populations
p across the S states, allows us not only to choose an optimal apportionment a given a fixed choice
for R, but also to objectively compare apportionments across different numbers of total representatives,
and therefore to assess simultaneously the choice of house size R along with the proposed distribution
of these seats.
That is, for a prescribed value of R, the entropic, Webster, and Huntington methods often lead to
the same or similar constrained optimum a when a “good” apportionment exists for which a ≈ q,
but notice that their respective objective functions, as conventionally defined, all impose very different
scaling behavior with respect to R itself. Only the relative entropy K provides a well-justified absolute
measure of the total inequity in representation across all P individuals, one that can be used to compare
the overall quality of proposed apportionments as R is varied. More will be said about this below, in
Section 5.1.
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4.3.2. Sequential Optimization and Recursive Optimization
All three of these apportionment methods also share additional fundamental properties33. Notice that
their respective objective functions can be re-written as
UH =
1
R
∑
s
asd¯
2
s − D¯2 = 1R
∑
s
p2s
as
− D¯2, (16a)
UW =
1
P
∑
s
ps
1
d¯2s
− 1
D¯2
= 1P
∑
s
a2s
ps
− 1
D¯2
, (16b)
K = log D¯− 1R
∑
s
as log d¯s = log D¯− 1R
∑
s
as log
ps
as
, (16c)
which in each case is of the general form
U(a,p, R, S) = ζ(R,S, P )
S∑
s=1
ψ(as, ps) + η(R,S, P ), (17)
where P =
∑
s
ps and R =
∑
s
aa as usual, but any one contribution ψ(as, ps) for the sth state does not
depend explicitly on R, S, or P , nor on the values of as′ or ps′ for s
′ 6= s.
This decomposability has two very appealing consequences. It is shown in Appendix H that any appor-
tionment method that can be formulated via constrained optimization of an additive, discretely-convex
function may be implemented via a “greedy” algorithm, where individual seats are allotted in succession
by local optimization. But in general, the qs that appear in such an objective function must be frozen
at their “final” values determined by p and the total number R of seats to be apportioned. It follows
that intermediate stages of the greedy optimization procedure do not necessarily correspond to optimal
apportionments of fewer than R seats. However, if the objective function assumes the form (17), for the
purposes of determining the optimal apportionments a that minimize U given fixed populations p, the
pre-factor ζ(R,S, P ) and the offset η(R,S, P ) are irrelevant, and can be dropped. But then the function∑S
s=1 ψ(as, ps) being optimized has no explicit dependence on R, so during the greedy allocation, the
intermediate stages do yield the optimal apportionments for successive house sizes up to final total R.
In other words, this structural feature of the objective functions (together with convexity) implies that
the optimal apportionments according to any of these three methods can be generated sequentially. That
is, the optimal apportionment of (R+∆R) seats can be found first by finding the optimal apportionment
of R seats, then, continuing from this assignment, allotting the remaining ∆R seats by locally optimizing
the same measure.
Second, the apportionments resulting from optimization of objective function of this form will satisfy
a certain sort of recursive self-consistency : suppose the optimal apportionment a for R seats across
all S states is found. If we arbitrarily split the states into two (or more) subsets, and re-perform the
optimization within each subset separately, while constraining the sub-total of seats within each subset to
be equal to the sum of seats assigned altogether to those states in the aforementioned global optimization,
then the resulting optimal apportionment will be unchanged.
Neither of these properties necessarily holds for objective functions that cannot be written in the
form (17), for example with the minimax criteria of the Adams or Jefferson methods, or the distance-
from-quota function associated with the Hamilton-Vinton method, or, say, any optimand of the form
Uαβ =
1
R
∑
s
as
∣∣d¯βs − D¯β |α for α 6= 2 and β 6= 0.
33 However, these three methods are not unique in this respect. Various other methods, such as the dual entropic method,
will also enjoy these same properties.
18
4.4. Equivalent Formulations of Entropic Apportionment
Although we have argued that global (constrained) optimization is the most natural mathematical
framework for apportionment, and have verified an efficient algorithm to find the exact optimum in
the case of entropic apportionment, it may prove reassuring that the entropic apportionment method
can also be formulated and implemented explicitly either as a ranking method or as a divisor method.
Actually, in our greedy optimization algorithm we already have the makings of an equivalent ranking
method. For any specified house size R, minimizing K = ∑
s
as
R log
as
qs
=
∑
s
as
R log
as/R
ps/P
is equivalent to
maximizing
∑
s
as log
ps
as
. As shown in Appendix H, this optimal apportionment can be generated by
assigning the seats one by one, to the state which will lead to the largest increase in
∑
s
a′s log(ps/a
′
s)
compared to the previous seat counts. That is, we assign the next seat to the state with the largest
increment to
(a′s + 1) log
ps
a′s+1
− a′s log psas = log
[(
ps
a′s+1
)a′s+1( ps
as
)−a′s] = log pa′s+1s a′sa′s
p
a′s
s (a′s+1)
a′s+1
= log
psa
′
s
a′s
(a′s+1)
a′s+1
, (18)
and since the logarithm is monotonic, this is equivalent to a standard ranking method that awards seats
in decreasing order of the ranking index
ρ(a′s, ps, P,R) ∝ e psa
′
s
a′s
(a′s+1)
a′s+1
, (19)
where we have included an overall factor of the Napier-Euler number e = 2.71828 . . . anticipating a
connection to the quotient rounding rule to be introduced momentarily. As we have just seen, along the
way to the final target house size R, this algorithm automatically generates optimal apportionments for
all house sizes ranging from
S∑
s=1
λs (just equal to S for the U.S. Congressional case) up to R, inclusive.
These ranking indices can also be re-written as
ρ(as, ps) =
ps
I(as, as + 1) , (20)
where I(as, as + 1) is the so-called identric mean of the successive integers as and as + 1, namely
I(as, as + 1) = 1e (as+1)
as+1
aass
. (21)
Then, by interpreting the ranking index ρ(as, ps) as the largest value D
? for the divisor D at which the
quotient Qs =
ps
D would be rounded up to exactly (as + 1), we see that the entropic method is also
equivalent to a divisor method using the identric mean θ(Qs) = I(bQsc, dQse) as the rounding threshold
for quotients.34
4.5. More Maximum Entropy
Actually, once we embrace the maximum entropy principle for assigning prior probability distributions,
we can apply it successively at various levels in order to better illuminate the thinking underlying the
proposed apportionment rule.
The basic idea is in effect to work hierarchically (and backwards), inferring maximum entropy distri-
butions conditional on the problem parameters, some of which are as yet undetermined, then inferring
these parameters by further entropy maximization.35
34 Agnew [56] also offers a proof of this equivalence, but his argument does not mention the convex nature of the optimiza-
tion, and so strictly speaking can only demonstrate that the identric-mean divisor and ranking methods lead to a local
minimum of the relative entropy. But in fact the constrained optimumso obtained is global.
35 Finding parameterized probability distributions by maximizing entropy conditional on information not yet known is a
common tactic in Bayesian statistical theory [61, 62].
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State populations for apportionment p are assumed fixed throughout any one apportionment task. We
then presume, counterfactually at this stage, that also (a1, . . . , aS), and hence R, are somehow known.
Consider first the space of R Congressional seats, To assign the most equitable probability distribution
over representatives, we can maximize the entropy, subject to no constraints other than the assumptions
of normalization of the probabilities over the R possibilities.36 Unsurprisingly, the result is just a uniform
distribution assigning equal probabilities
ρsk =
1
R (22)
to all representatives, indexed by a (s, k) pair for k = 1, . . . , as and s = 1, . . . , k.
Next consider distributions over the P represented persons. The unconstrained maximum entropy dis-
tribution µsn ( over the set of all represented individuals for n = 1, . . . , ps, and s = 1, . . . , S) will also
be a uniform distribution, with probability 1P per person, but this does not account for the fact that
individuals are to be represented through Congressional delegates. If we add the minimal additional
constraint that the total weight of representation of the population within any state must equal the
representational share in Congress of that state’s delegation,
ps∑
s=1
µsn =
as∑
k=1
ρsk =
as∑
k=1
1
R =
as
R , (23)
then the result is, again not surprisingly, a piecewise uniform distribution,
µsn =
1
ps
as
S∑
s′=1
as′
= 1ps
as
R =
1
R
1
d¯s
, (24)
equal for all persons (indexed by n) within the sth state.37
But now we can maximize the entropy once more, this time with respect to the (a1, . . . , as) parameters,
in order to find the optimal apportionment assuming a fixed value of R.
Extending this idea, we could then also maximize entropy with respect to R itself, and/or with respect
to possible district partitioning, ideas to be explored in the next section.
5. BEYOND MERE APPORTIONMENT: EVALUATING THE FAIRNESS OF HOUSE
SIZES AND DISTRICT SIZES
A great advantage of our entropic approach is that it allows use of the very same information-theoretic
measure of uniformity to assess or compare different proposed apportionments of a fixed total of R seats,
but also to evaluate different choices for the size of the House itself, or the sizes of districts within states,
and can even compare apportionments across time.
36 It turns out that non-negativity of probabilities will be satisfied automatically upon optimization, and need not be
imposed as an explicit constraint.
37 Here we are using “rho” for the representatives, and “mu” for the masses.
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5.1. Choosing the House Size
Besides generating optimal apportionments a for any given R, the output of the entropic apportionment
algorithm also provides a principled and meaningful way to compare possible apportionments across
different house sizes (all for the same populations p). As R is varied, and a chosen optimally at each
value of R under consideration, a smaller value of the relative entropy K, or equivalently, a larger value
of the Shannon entropy S, indicates objectively a more fair apportionment overall.
Equivalently, according to our entropic criterion, different values of R are to be preferred (at least in
terms of representational equity, if not necessarily institutional efficiency) to the extent that the ratio
between the arithmetic and geometric means of district sizes across states is made closer to unity.
While other apportionment optimands such as the Huntington-Hill or Webster-Wilcox figures-of-merit
arguably could be deployed to select R, we would seem to lack any principle way to fixe the R-dependence
in the pre-factor, which would not effect the apportionment a for given R, but would effect the choice
of R itself.
Obviously, practical and institutional concerns are paramount when addressing the question of House
size, but conventionally, a variety of mathematical suggestions for optimization have been considered.
For instance:
1. When using a quota method, one can choose a nominal House size R0, calculate quotas, and then
round all quotas based on the chosen rule, leading to a final House size R close but not necessarily
exactly equal to R. However, this begs the question of how to choose R0 in the first place.
2. When using a divisor rule, one can adopt a divisor D representing a nominal target for the nominal
district size, then calculate a without further iteration, resulting in an average district size D¯ close
but not not necessarily equal to D. But we are left wondering how to adopt an initial choice of D.
3. Invoke the “Wyoming” rule, or smallest-entitled-unit rule: since every state is required to receive
at least one representative, it might seem plausible to try to choose R so that the D¯ = PR is as
close as possible to the population pmin = min
s
[ps] of the least populated state [75]. While not a
terrible idea, this has a minimax feel, and does not actually attempt to account in any sense for
disproportionality summed or averaged over all state populations.
4. Use a “Rhode Island,” or most-over-represented rule: sometimes a small-ish state with more than
one representative can be over-represented to a greater extent than the smallest state (as measured,
say, by the differences between D¯s and D¯). So we could try to choose R iteratively, in order to
minimize the maximum degree of over-representation. But this minimax strategy emphasizes over-
representation over under-representation, and ignores variations in average district size which do
not affect the most-over represented state.
5. Use the cube root rule: Taagepera [76, 77] found an empirical power-law relationship between the
overall size of the population of a country and the size of its “lower-house” national assembly, where
approximately R ∼ P 1/3. Using a very simple model based on the ideas of representatives as “in-
terest aggregators,” and efficient balancing of representative-constituent versus inter-representative
communication channels, he was able to motivate a scaling relation of the form
R ≈ (2αP ) 13 (25)
in the typical limit for which P  R, and where α represents the “politically active” fraction of
the population, which might be taken to be the average proportion of the population which are
literate adults.38 But before we get too excited, observe that there is appreciable scatter in the
empirical record, and that almost all data look somewhat linear on a log-log plot.
38 Based on U.S. Census estimates, about 77% of the US population is aged 18 or older and about 86% is literate. So as
of 2017, this would suggest an optimal House size of about R ≈ 754.
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FIG. 1. Trend in discrimination information (in bits) as a function of House size, from R = 50 to R = 1 000, for
the 2000 U.S census data. Vertical scale is cut off to highlight behavior at larger R. At the prescribed house size
of R = 435, the Kullback-Leibler divergence is K = 0.00140531, but nearby local optima happen to do better,
particularly R = 418 (corresponding to K = 0.00130027) or R = 453 (K = 0.00110856), as well as significantly
larger Houses such as R = 624 (K = 0.00105713), and R = 978 (K = 0.000333297).
But entropy offers a principle way to choose R (within some range deemed practical) without introducing
additional ad hoc assumptions. This use of the entropy is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the relative
entropy K as a function of house size for the 2000 U.S. Census data. There is evident a general downward
trend as a function of increasing R, for the simple reason that it is typically easier to approximate rational
ratios when we have bigger denominators to work with. But the improvement is far from monotonic, and
certain house sizes perform better on the entropic measure of fairness than nearby choices. For example,
a somewhat smaller house size of R = 418 or a somewhat larger House size R = 453 does better than
the currently mandated House size of R = 435, while still larger House sizes such as R = 635 or R = 978
do better still.39
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FIG. 2. Trend in discrimination information (in bits) as a function of House size R, for the artificial populations
in the example of Table X in Appendix K, which can be found on page 144. Notice the “magic numbers” leading
to especially low values of relative entropy at values of R where all of the low-population states are assigned
the same number of seats. For example, while K = 0.0216786 at the specified house size R = 102, the relative
entropy drops to K = 0.0000160278 at R = 161.
39 A further advantage of a larger House size would be less distortion from democratic “one person-one vote” principles
in the Electoral College, since a larger number of Electoral College votes earned by House membership would dilute
those granted by Senate membership. Because the current arrangement greatly favors some rural, Republican-leaning
states, we do not anticipate great interest in expanding the House from the presently constituted Congress. There is also
currently afoot a popular movement involving the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact which sets forth rules for
awarding electoral college votes that, if adopted by the legislatures of sufficient states, would guarantee victory for the
popular vote winner regardless of how other states would assign their electoral college votes. Signed by several moderate
to large “bluer” (Democratic-leaning) states, this movement also appears stalled as of 2017, since in order to take effect,
some smaller states and traditional “swing” states would have to voluntarily sacrifice their exaggerated influence enjoyed
under the current system.
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Differences can be even more dramatic in artificial examples, as shown in Figures 2 and 3. We see that
certain house sizes can lead to especially good apportionments, because for fixed populations, certain
whole numbers divide more proportionally, with fewer “leftover” seats that lead to a mismatch.
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FIG. 3. Trend in discrimination information (in bits) as a function of House size R, for the artificial populations
in the example summarized in Table XI on page 145 in Appendix K. Again notice the “magic numbers” leading
to especially low values of relative entropy at values of R for which all of the low-population states are assigned
the same number of seats. For example, while K = 0.0219509 at the specified house size R = 98, the relative
entropy drops to K = .00000303316 at R = 125.
Therefore, in principle the most sensible approach to apportionment would not fix R in advance, but
explore apportionments over some range of R values acceptable to stakeholders and consistent with
upper and lower bound constraints,40 and adopt ex post the choice leading to the smallest value of K
within the agreed-upon range. Arbitrarily fixing the House size at R = 435 is sub-optimal, particularly
as the overall national population grows and shifts, and is widely recognized as introducing significant
distortion—both malrepresentation across states, and average under-representation (over-sized districts)
compared to world-wide democratic norms.41
5.2. Entropic Quantities in Context
In choosing amongst different possible apportionments for fixed values of the house size R and fixed
population counts p, the sign of the difference in K is all-important, but the magnitude of the difference
in K is really irrelevant; if a better apportionment with a smaller value of K (and consistent with all
constraints) is achievable, then there is no justifiable reason not to adopt it, no matter how small the
improvement in the value of K.42
But if using the relative entropy K to compare, for instance, apportionments across different values of R,
questions inevitably arise as to the meaning or importance of some given difference in the values of the
respective relative entropies K, since increasing or decreasing the total number of seats will inevitably
impose some exogenous economic or political costs, that must be balanced against the goal of maximal
proportionality.
Admittedly, no definitive answers can be offered, since the issues will involve not just the equity of
representation as quantified in the entropy, but also expected utility incorporating other sorts of logistical,
administrative, institutional, and political costs and benefits. But we can say a bit more about what
40 This was in fact not uncommon practice in early Congressional apportionments in the United States.
41 Again, we do not anticipate that the Republican party will take action any time soon to correct the exaggerated influence
of states like Wyoming and North Dakota. On the other hand, Democratic-leaning Rhode Island is very over-represented,
so perhaps there remains some political room to maneuver on this issue. See Appendix B.2 for further discussion.
42 Of course, below some level, small differences in the value of K across different apportionments might be comparable
to those attributable to the probable uncertainties or likely temporal variations in the values for the population counts
themselves. But Constitutionally speaking, the certified census totals are to be taken as exact for the purposes of
apportionment.
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numerical values for relative entropy or entropy are typical, and what a difference might mean, while
highlighting that what might look like a small absolute difference can have a clear information-theoretic
consequence.
5.2.1. Some Orders of Magnitude and Expected Scaling Relations for Relative Entropies of Apportionment
To get a rough idea of typical numerical scales, we can ignore disparities between very large and small
states, and just assume that qs ∼ O(RS ) for every s.
Using the fundamental logarithm inequality, but recalling we are measuring entropies in bits, we can
write
0 ≤ K ≤ 1ln 2 1R
S∑
s=1
as
(
as
qs
− 1) = 1ln 2{ S∑
s=1
1
R
a2s
qs
− 1
}
. (26)
For an arbitrary (non-optimized) apportionment, we might estimate a2s by assuming a multinomial
distribution (as if the seats are randomly assigned to the states, regardless of their populations), so that
a2s ∼ R 1S (1− 1S ) + R
2
S2 , (27)
and so
0 ≤ K . 1ln 2
{
1
RS
R 1S (1− 1S )+R
2
S2
R
S
− 1} = 1ln 2{S−1R }, (28)
which is independent of the total population P , but approximately scales inversely with the average
number of seats per state.
Instead, for an optimized or nearly optimized apportionment, we would of course anticipate a smaller
value for K, which we may attempt to estimate using the Taylor expansion43 of Equation (14). In the
multi-representative (i.e., R S > 1) limit, we can assume |as − qs| ∼ O( 12 ) on average, so that:
K ≈ 12 ln 2 1R
S∑
s=1
(as−qs)2
qs
∼ 12 ln 2 1RS
( 12 )
2
R
S
∼ 18 ln 2 S
2
R2 , (29)
which is again independent of the overall population P , and small compared to unity when R  S,
scaling inversely with the square of the average number of representatives per state.
In the opposite limit, where 1 ≤ R S (which could happen in party-list type voting systems), so that
generically qs ∼ O(RS ) 1, we would expect O(R) out of the S states to have O(1) seats and O(S −R)
to have 0 seats, and hence
K ∼ 12 ln 2 1R
{
R (1)
2
R
S
+ (S −R) (RS )2R
S
} ≈ 12 ln 2{1 + SR − RS } ≈ 12 ln 2 SR , (30)
suggesting that in the limit of very few seats, the optimal apportionment cannot do much better than
an arbitrary apportionment—perhaps a factor of two or so.
In between the large R and small-R limits, approximate scaling laws are a bit harder to deduce, but we
can roughly extrapolate.
Another approximation for the scaling of K may be derived from Pinsker’s inequality, which (again
recalling we are measuring entropies in bits) says that
√
ln 2K ≥ 1√
2
S∑
s=1
ps∑
n=1
|asR 1ps − 1P | = 1√2
S∑
s=1
ps∑
n=1
1
P |asqs − 1|. (31)
43 Actually, the Taylor expansion (14) and the upper bound (26) would lead to similar estimates (within a factor of two or
so), since we can use
∑
s
as =
∑
s
qs = R to write
1
R
∑
s
as
(as
qs
− 1) = ∑
s
(as−qs)2
qs
.
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When R S > 1, the right-hand side is expected to be about
1√
2
S∑
s=1
ps∑
n=1
1
P |asqs − 1| = 1√2
S∑
s=1
ps∑
n=1
1
P
|as−qs|
qs
∼ 1√
2
S PS
1
P
1/2
R/S =
1
2
√
2
S
R , (32)
from which we can estimate
K & 18 ln 2 S
2
R2 , (33)
identical to the estimate based on the Taylor expansion.
In the opposite limit where 1 ≤ R S, we have
1√
2
S∑
s=1
ps∑
n=1
1
P |asqs − 1| ∼ 1√2
[
R 1S | SR − 1|+ (S −R) 1S |−1||
]
= 1√
2
[
1− RS + 1− RS
]
, (34)
so that instead
K & 2ln 2
[
1− RS
]2
, (35)
which is smaller than the corresponding Taylor series estimate, around O(1) rather than O( SR ), but keep
in mind that this is only a rough estimate for what is itself only a lower bound.
We may also be interested in the typical magnitude of the change ∆K in K under the smallest possible
shift in an apportionment, namely the exchange of one representative between a pair of states. In the
case where 1 ≤ S  R and the apportionments are not too far from optimal, a Taylor expansion suggests
that
|∆K| & 1ln 2 SR2 , (36)
which is smaller by a factor of O(S−1) than the value of K itself. In the opposite limit where 1 ≤ R S,
and most of the apportionments will be either 0 or 1, the typical difference would be instead
|∆K| & 1ln 2
√
S
R
1√
P
, (37)
supposing that the population is divided randomly between states.
Under an increment ∆R in the House size (where we assume |∆R| . R), we can estimate a characteristic
magnitude in the change in K from the estimate for K itself, leading to
|∆K| ∼ 1ln 2 O
(
S2
R2
∆R
R
)
(38)
in the case where 1 ≤ S  R and the apportionments are both near optimal, or
|∆K| ∼ 1ln 2 O
(
S
R
∆R
R
)
(39)
when instead 1 ≤ S  R and the apportionments are near optimal.
5.2.2. Small Differences Can Still Be Important Differences
As an illustrative example, consider again the case of the 2000 U.S. Census, under different hypothetical
values for R. Recall that the relative entropy was K = 0.00140531 for the currently prescribed House
size of R = 435, but K = 0.00110856 at a somewhat larger size R = 453, for a difference of only
∆S = −∆K ≈ 1.9 · 10−4 bits, which is certainly small compared to unity in any conventional sense.44
But should this difference ∆K matter?
44 Note also that these entropies are about a factor of two smaller than the estimate supplied by equation (29), which turns
out to be K ∼ 0.002383 bits.
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We might first think to look at lower and upper bounds, since the magnitude of the difference between
relative entropies can be no larger than the difference between their upper and lower bounds. All
relative entropies are bounded below by zero, but available upper bounds (associated with least-uniform
distributions) are so weak as to be next to useless in assessing or comparing near-optimal (most uniform)
distributions, In the current example, we know that the relative entropy K cannot exceed log2 P =
28.0682 bits, and can only approach this bound to the extent that all of the probability is concentrated
on a single (dictatorial) individual. Recognizing that all individuals within a state must be treated equally
for the purposes of apportionment, the upper bound is reduced to K ≤ 9.1502 bits45, and imposing the
Constitutional limits on each state’s apportionment further reduces this to K ≤ 3.7241 bits46. But this
remains orders of magnitude greater than the relative entropies and relative entropy differences in which
are interested.
Another point of comparison might be the U.S. Senate. With California and Wyoming each getting two
Senators each, the resulting level of representational disproportionality in the Senate ought to register
as egregious by almost any measure, so should definitely provide an upper bound on what counts as
significantly unequal. Calculating the relative entropy between direct polling of individuals and Senate-
mediated polling, we find using the same 2000 U.S. Census data that KS = 0.69424 bits. This is less
than one bit but still still orders of magnitude larger than the differences in relative entropy for different
House sizes.
A different approach will be needed. Remember that the relative entropy K represents an informational
inefficiency per polling of one individual. But in, say, the 2004 U.S. election (towards the middle of
the census/reapportionment cycle), on the order of V ≈ 1.2 · 108 voters cast ballots, so we take that as
a conservative estimate for the number of politically interested citizens whose opinions we imagine are
to be polled (say under independent sampling with replacement) on important issues. Suppose we also
conservatively estimate that Congress votes on about 5 issues per year of broad concern to the American
populace,47 or some C10 ≈ (5)(10) = 50 decisions over a 10-year census/reapportionment cycle.
So the total amount of discrimination information between polling in a direct democracy and polling
mediated through Congressional representatives would be something like
HD ∼ V C10 ∆S = 1.15 · 106 bits. (40)
But what should we make of this, or to what should it be compared?
Relative to the total polling information of around V C10 ∼ 6.1 ·109 bits of polling information (assuming
binary opinions on yes-or-no-votes), this is a tiny amount of “misinformation” due to distorted polling
probabilities. But perhaps a better comparison is to the actual amount of information required to specify
the votes of members of the House, no larger than C10R ∼ 2.2 · 103 bits, or even the mere C10 ∼ 50 bits
of information regarding actual legislative outcomes.
Another way to think about these numbers is in terms of the combinatorics of the imagined sampling
frequency distributions over the decadal span. The actual difference ∆K means for every way one
can generate a polling sample agreeing with the frequency distribution expected for indirect, Congress-
mediated sampling, there are about 21.15·10
6 ≈ 103.46·105 more ways to generate a sample agreeing with
that frequency distribution expected from direct, uniform sampling.
A third approach involves thinking about statistical discrimination information. Suppose a statistician
were shown only the frequency distribution (i.e., who was sampled, how many times) from (what would
only later be revealed to be) the ten-year indirect (Congress-mediated) sample, and asked if this sample
originated from the directed or indirect sampling method. The expected weight of evidence in favor of
the indirect sampling hypothesis would be about 3.46 · 106 decibels. In comparison, about 30 dB would
typically be considered reasonable evidence in favor of a hypothesis, and 100 dB as extremely strong
evidence.48
45 Compare this to our estimate from Equation (28), which is K . 12.5226 bits.
46 This tighter bound can be calculated by giving each state one seat, then assigning as many seats as possible to the
smallest states inn order, while ensuring that d¯s ≥ Dmin.
47 Some could regard this as a significant underestimate. Others, perhaps looking at the productivity in recent Congresses,
might think this number is, if anything, too high.
48 For non-Bayesian readers, note that 30 dB in weight of evidence would, very roughly speaking, correspond in a typical
frequentist null hypothesis significance test (NHST) to a p-value of about p = 0.0001, where in many disciplines p = 0.01
or even p = 0.05 is often held as the threshold for reporting a “statistically significant” result. In elementary particle
physics, with more stringent conventions, the threshold for reporting “evidence for” a new particle is typically p = 0.003,
or about 25 dB, while the standard for “discovery” of a particle is p = 0.0000003, or about 65 dB. A weight of evidence
of 3.46 · 106 dB would correspond to a p-value of about p ≈ 10−3.46·105 , which is ridiculously small by any reasonable
statistical standard.
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How small would the difference need to be before it might be disregarded, statistically speaking? Con-
ventionally, a change of about 3 dB is considered a just-noticeable difference in log-odds, while a change
of about 30 dB in weight of evidence is typically considered strong evidence. taking the threshold some-
where between these limits, in the current example a difference in K might be considered ignorable
somewhere between |∆K| ∼ 1.6 · 10−10 bits and |∆K| ∼ 1.6 · 10−9 bits, much smaller than the observed
difference quoted above, and smaller even that the smallest change in K that could be anticipated given
the populations, so effectively any observable change in K would be regarded as statistically significant.49
5.3. Entropy and Districting
In cases involving apportionment and districting coming before the Federal courts, and in other legal
debates [4, 5, 7, 9, 12–14, 17, 20–25, 28, 37, 38, 41, 42, 45, 46, 51, 53–55, 78, 79], scholars, plaintiffs,
and judges have all invoked various quantitative measures of inequality regarding district sizes (either
within states or across states), such as the variance, or absolute or relative differences between largest
and smallest districts.50 But it remains difficult to justify any one of these traditional statistics over
the alternatives, at the level of districts themselves. Instead, we should be thinking, not about variation
in district sizes per se, but about inequalities in the weight of representation afforded individuals, as
a consequence of these differences in district sizes, and once again the natural way to measure these
differences is via relative entropy. Only at this later stage of assessment, where apportionments have
been made and specific district boundaries have been proposed, such that we can unambiguously as-
sign censused individuals to specific districts, we should use polling probabilities based on the actually
proposed district partition rather than the within-state averages.
5.3.1. Optimization of District Sizes
The Kullback-Leibler divergence between the direct (uniform) and indirect (representative-mediated)
polling probability distributions given proposed districting information would be
Kd =
S∑
s=1
as∑
k=1
dsk∑
i=1
pisk log
[
pisk
1
P
]
=
S∑
s=1
as∑
k=1
dsk∑
i=1
1
R
1
dsk
log
[ 1
R
1
dsk
1
P
]
= logP +
S∑
s=1
as∑
k=1
dsk∑
i=1
1
R
1
dsk
log
[
1
R
1
dsk
]
, (41)
where the sum is taken over all represented individuals with each (proposed) district of each state. Since
all individuals within a given district are still presumed to have equal weights of representation, this
simplifies to
Kd =
S∑
s=1
as∑
k=1
1
R log
[
D¯
dsk
]
= log[D¯]− 1R
S∑
s=1
as∑
k=1
log[dsk]
= log[D¯]− log
[ S∏
s=1
as∏
k=1
d
1
R
sk
]
= log
[
D¯( S∏
s=1
as∏
k=1
dsk
) 1
R
]
.
(42)
For a given apportionment a, this means that uniformity in the distribution of weight of representation
is improved to the extent that the geometric mean of the district sizes can be made as large as possible.
Not surprisingly, this constrained optimum is achieved when the districts are chosen to be nearly as
equal in size as possible, with each encompassing a whole number of individuals. See Appendix I
49 It is an oft-repeated truism that statistical significance is not the same thing as practical significance. But here, we are
primarily concerned with inequities in sampling information and concomitant distortion of political influence, so in a
sense messaging and information are precisely what are at issue. But additionally, the probability that even the smallest
change in an apportionment (the addition or removal of a seat, or a shift in a seat form one state to another) will lead
to an actual substantial differences in who gets represented by whom, and by which party, or what constituent services
are provided to what individuals, or what legislation is passed, is difficult to calculate, but will clearly be close to unity.
Minimal changes in apportionment can produce large changes in expected utility amongst represented individuals, so in
this sense any difference in our figure-of-merit that could motivate a shift in apportionment ought to be considered as
potentially significant.
50 Litigation regarding gerrymandering has also addressed many other demographic factors besides just the sizes of districts,
but these issues will be discussed elsewhere.
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(page 135 ff.) for a simple proof. That is, in the very best case realizable, the sth state would have
ηs = ps mod as = as(d¯s − bd¯sc
)
districts of size dd¯se, and (as − ηs) districts of size bd¯sc. But the
more important feature of relative entropy is not that it judges equal or nearly equal sized districts to
be best—presumably everybody already believed that—but rather that it provides a principled way to
quantify deviations from this ideal, for the purposes of assessing possible district boundaries proposed
within particular states, or for comparing within-state inequities in districting to cross-state inequities
due to the apportionment itself, for example in order to better inform the debate on optimal House size.
5.3.2. Entropy Chains Using Increasingly Detailed District-Level Information
It may be useful to consider a sequence of Shannon entropies associated with a hierarchy of polling
probability distributions, all defined similarly, except that each uses successively more complete or
accurate information about the districting, and therefore each successive entropy is constrained to be
smaller than its predecessor.
At the most uniform end of the hierarchy, Smax still corresponds to the maximum possible entropy,
associated with uniform polling probabilities p¯i = 1P =
1
R
1
D¯
across all individuals:
Smax = −
S∑
s=1
ps∑
n=1
1
P log[
1
P ] =
S∑
s=1
ps
P log[P ] = −
S∑
s=1
as
R log
[
1
R
1
D¯
]
= logP. (43)
Mathematically, this is as if each individual acts as his or her own representative, like in a direct
democracy.
Next we add constraints demanding that each state receive some whole number of representatives (pos-
sibly between specified lower and upper bounds), while the total number of apportioned representatives
sums to some specified value R. Let a∗ be the apportionment maximizing the entropy (or equivalently
minimizing the relative entropy) subject to these constraints. District partitions within states are yet to
be determined, so polling probabilities are still to be based on state-level average district sizes d¯∗s =
ps
a∗s
.
Then the corresponding polling probabilities are pi∗sn =
a∗s
R
1
P =
1
R
1
d¯∗s
, where d∗s =
ps
a∗s
, and the Shannon
entropy becomes
Sa∗ = −
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s=1
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a∗s
R
1
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log
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R
1
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]
= −
S∑
s=1
a∗s
R log
[
1
R
1
d¯∗s
]
= Smax −Ka∗ , (44)
and must satisfy Sa∗ ≤ Smax, where the inequality will be strict unless every state’s apportionment a∗s
is exactly equal to the corresponding state quota qs, which is wildly unlikely when P  R, except in
factitious examples where values for R and all of the ps′ are carefully chosen to produce integral quotas.
Any other feasible apportionment a satisfying the same constraints yields instead an entropy
Sa = −
S∑
s=1
ps∑
n=1
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R
1
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log
[
as
R
1
ps
]
= −
S∑
s=1
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R log
[
1
R
1
d¯s
]
= Smax −Ka, (45)
where d¯s =
ps
as
is the state-level average district size based on the chosen (but possibly sub-optimal)
apportionment a. Because a∗ was chosen optimally, it must be the case that Sa ≤ Sa∗, where the
equality will be strict unless a = a∗, or else a tie arose, so that a is just as good as a∗.
Next, once a feasible (and possibly but not necessarily, optimal) apportionment a is adopted, state
populations can be partitioned into districts. Suppose the districts are chosen to be of optimal size
d†sk, in the sense of maximizing the entropy subject to the additional constraints that the sth state
population is divided into exactly as mutually exclusive and exhaustive districts each containing a whole
number of represented individuals from that state. With polling stratified by these districts, the polling
probabilities become pi†ski =
1
R
1
d†sk
, and the entropy is
Sd† = −
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1
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, (46)
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where it must be the case that S†d ≤ Sa necessarily, and the inequality will be strict unless every state
population ps is exactly divisible by the corresponding as (i.e., ηs = 0 for all s = 1, . . . , S), so that
districts within each state can be chosen to be exactly equal in size, which is also very unlikely to
happen in actual practice.
If a different (but still mutually exclusive and exhaustive) district partitioning is used within the states,
possibly of sub-optimal sizes dsk, then the polling probabilities are instead piski =
1
R
1
dsk
, and the corre-
sponding entropy is
Sd = −
S∑
s=1
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1
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log
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1
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]
= −
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1
R log
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1
R
1
dsk
]
, (47)
where Sd ≤ S†d necessarily, and the inequality will be strict unless the district sizes are chosen to be as
nearly equal as possible (i.e., dsk = d
†
sk under some consistent choice of the labeling k for districts.
51) In
practice, the districts need not be chosen quite so fastidiously, and variations in district sizes much larger
than ±1 person are tolerated by the Courts, so optimal district sizes tends to happen only in states that
have a single (“at large”) district. Since this last entropy (47) is a well-defined Shannon entropy over a
finite number of possibilities, it also satisfies 0 ≤ Sd, with equality if and only if the population consists
of only one inhabitant in one state, in which case there would be nothing to apportion.
Altogether, these various Shannon entropies will satisfy the chain of inequalities
0 ≤ Sd ≤ Sd† ≤ Sa ≤ S∗a ≤ Smax (48)
always, and
0 < Sd < Sd† < Sa ≤ S∗a < Smax (49)
typically.
So when faced with a question as to whether a variation in the sizes of a certain state’s districts should
be acceptable, Courts might look at that state’s contribution to the entropy deficit (Sd† − Sd) (the
part actually under the control of the states), compared to say its contribution to the deficit (Smax −
Sd†) = Kd† arising from the nature of the apportionment itself. Some conventional standard might be
adopted specifying that the former could not introduce significantly more entropy loss than the latter,
for instance. Otherwise it could be reasonably argued that the sub-optimal districting is squandering
whatever potential level of equity was achieved by the apportionment itself.
5.3.3. Intra-State Entropies
Actually, if we are focusing on districts within individual states, it perhaps makes better sense to ef-
fectively re-normalize the entropies by conditioning on the separate state-level polling outcomes, rather
than quantifying each contribution to the overall national-level entropy. That is, we can define the
sequence of state-conditional entropies:
Ss = −
ps∑
n=1
1
ps
log 1ps = log ps, (50a)
Sd†s = −
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i=1
1
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log 1
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1
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logbd¯sc, (50b)
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]
= log[as] +
1
as
as∑
k=1
log dsk, (50c)
51 In order to meaningfully compare district sizes, we might, for example, demand that for each state s, the size of the
districts are sequenced in non-decreasing order with respect to the index k.
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which can be related to intra-state relative entropies (relative that is, to an intra-state uniform distri-
bution),
Kd†s = Ss − Sd†s =
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but also may be related to the national-level entropies via the recursivity property of Shannon entropy:
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which in each case corresponds to an entropy associated with choosing amongst states, plus the average
across states of the conditional entropy regarding the sampling of individuals within each state.
So a state’s adoption of district sizes could be judged based on whether (Sd†s − Sds) = (Kds − Kd†s) is
sufficiently small (or at least not too large) compared to (Ss − Sd†s) = Kd†s itself, by some convention.
We could also “grade on a curve,” and look at the equality of representation afforded within say, Cal-
ifornia compared to Colorado or Connecticut. But here it would still seem to make sense to remove
from the relative entropy the component beyond the control of states themselves. In addition, there is
another ambiguity which we will address below, as to whether we would then compare on a per-capita
or overall basis.
5.3.4. Some Orders of Magnitude for Intra-State Entropies
At the intra-state level, what sort of values for Kds might we expect? Using again the Pinsker inequality
and the fundamental logarithm inequality, we may infer
1
2 ln 2
[ as∑
k=1
dsk∑
i=1
∣∣ 1
asdsk
− 1ps
∣∣]2 ≤ Kds ≤ 1ln 2 as∑
k=1
dsk∑
i=1
1
asdsk
(
ps
asdsk
− 1), (53)
which simplifies to
1
2 ln 2
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1
as
∣∣1− dsk
d¯s
∣∣]2 ≤ Kds ≤ 1ln 2 as∑
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1
as
(
d¯s
dsk
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since all inhabitants of the same district share the same weight of representation. Assuming that the
fractional variation in district size is small, i.e., |dsk−d¯s|
d¯s
∼ O(fs) 1, we estimate
0 ≤ 12 ln 2 |fs|2 . Kds . 1ln 2 1√as |fs|, (55)
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where on the right-hand side we incorporated the fact that the variations in district size are expected to
be small in magnitude, but of opposite sign with more or less equal probability.
Note that fs = 0 if as = 1 (or if at-large representation were employed for states with as > 1, but this
currently disallowed by statute), but otherwise Courts typically tolerate some moderately small values
for the relative variation fs—small, that is, compared to unity, but perhaps larger than the minimum
possible, which would be O(as/ps). Of course from our point of view, imposing an acceptable tolerance
on relative variations in the dsk, then considering the effects on Kds , gets things backwards. Instead,
Courts could adopt directly a limit on Kds .
5.4. Comparing Across Different Populations
We have seen how to use the relative entropy to score different proposed apportionments a given a
prescribed House size R and population counts p, to compare optimal apportionments under different
house sizes R but again for the same fixed population distribution p, and to assess different possible
partitions of a given state population ps into as districts of sizes dsk.
But there are also cases where we will wish to use the entropy or relative relative to facilitate comparison
of the equity of apportionments in distinct populations. For example, in the previous section, we saw
how we might want to compare the distributions of district sizes in different states.
Or, we might also seek to compare the overall apportionments with the U.S. in different years. On
the one hand, such comparisons lie strictly beyond the scope of the apportionment problem itself, since
whether Congressional representation was fairly chosen in the past should not, as a matter of logical
or ethical principle, affect the problem of finding the best apportionment in the present. On the other
hand, in, any political debate over whether the House of Representatives should be expanded from its
current size, inevitably it will be asked whether a proposed apportionment in 2020 would be more or
less fair than was the apportionment made in 1920.
Unlike assessments within a fixed population, these sorts of judgements can have no definitive answer
until we agree further on fair terms of comparison. Do we care about the absolute number of affected
people, weighted by their degree of misrepresentation, since the total utility or disutility of political
decisions made by a (possibly unrepresentative) government will likely scale proportionally to the size of
the affected population? Or do we care most about the typical or average per-capita level of distortion
of democratic voice resulting from an apportionment and/or districting, which might provide a better
measure of intrinsic disproportionality amongst individuals making up the populations of very different
sizes?
Different situations might involve different goals and tradeoffs, so no definitive answer seems possible,
yet in either case entropies quantify something important.
in Section 5.2.1, we learned that both typical and optimized values for the relative entropy K depend
(at the national level) on S and R but not explicitly on P , while in Section 5.3.4, we saw that realistic
choices of district sizes will lead to intra-state relative entropies Kds that are either independent of ps
or tend to decrease with ps.
Even though Ka is based on probability distributions over a space of P polling possibilities, by using a
relative entropy we have effectively removed the contribution scaling with logP . Likewise, Kds is based
on distributions over ps possibilities, but, as a relative entropy, does not tend to grow with ps. The
relative entropy always measures the net “democratic distortion” involved, or difference in information
gained, in one instance of polling of one representative individual, either directly or indirectly via the
representatives.
That is to say, Ka and Kds in effect already represent per-person average measures of representational
inequity, and should not be normalized further. So at the national level, if we are primarily concerned
with the quality of individual representation, we should focus on Ka; if we are more concerned with the
total amount of inequity, then we can look at the quantity P Ka. Similarly, at the intra-state level, we
could look at Kds or ∆Kds as an individual measure, and psKds of ps ∆Kds as a cumulative measure.
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5.5. Apportionment Based on District-Conditioned Entropies?
To make optimal apportionments, we are advocating use of the relative entropy to compare a uniform or
ideal polling distribution to an indirect or Congress-mediated distribution. At the stage of assigning seats
(and/or assessing the total number of seats), the size and constitution of Congressional districts remain
undetermined, so in inferring the indirect distribution, we use for within-state polling the maximum
entropy probability distributions consistent with knowing a and p but not the exact demographic make-
up of all districts, which is mathematically equivalent to assuming either: (i) effective districts of average
within-state size, given the apportionment a; (ii) weight of representation of each state’s Congressional
delegation shared equally amongst the states represented population, (iii) at-large representation, or (iv)
the use averaging over the possible district partitions compatible with the proposed apportionment.
So in effect we are using the relative entropy of an averaged polling distribution, since we cannot foretell
the actual partition of each state’s population. A natural question arises as to whether to use instead
the average of the relative entropy rather than the relative entropy of the averaged distribution.52 But
in order to determine the former, we would need to choose for each state a probability distribution over
possible district partitions, but the Constitution effectively precludes use of any information about the
states other than their populations—including information about their propensities for drawing district
boundaries.
One possible exception might be entertained—if some federal statute required all states to adopt best-
cast district boundaries, such that the size of the subsequent districts could be inferred with certainty
from ps and as. Even then, we would still not know which particular individuals would be assigned
to which districts, and accounting for this uncertainty would still average out variation and result in
uniform intra-state polling probabilities.53 It could be argued that even if the assignment of individuals
to districts would remain uncertain, we could still predict what the value of the entropy would become
at the post-districting once the districts were drawn to best-case standards, so perhaps the associated
entropy could be used at the pre-districting stage to select the apportionment a.
We remain dubious of this idea even in the unlikely event that district sizes would ever be so narrowly
constrained by law—when proposing and evaluating different apportionments, it seem most natural and
most fair to continue to spread the weight of representation of a Congressional delegate uniformly over
the state’s population. But fortunately it would make little difference in practice. As shown in Appendix
H, this variant of the relative entropy can be optimized using the same “greedy” algorithm as the district-
average entropy, while Appendix J (beginning on page 137) verifies that for realistic parameters relevant
to U.S. demographics, the difference between this prospective entropy presuming best-case district-sizes
and that based on average-district sizes would be very small, and unlikely to change judgements as to
the optimal apportionment or optimal House size.
6. CONCLUSION
Debate as to how best to assign Congressional seats to states based on populations, or how best to
assign parliamentary seats to parties based on votes, or how to resolve any number of related problems
involving fair allocation of integral rewards based on non-integral desserts, has been ongoing literally for
centuries, and we can hardly expect it to subside soon. Nonetheless, we have endeavored to make the case
that the most natural approach is based on maximum entropy, the same principle used by physicists
wanting to make the most justifiable predictions of thermodynamic systems, statisticians wishing to
assign probability distribution in the most unbiased manner, and engineers wishing to make optimal use
of a communication channel. Grounded in information theory, entropic apportionment takes seriously,
indeed almost literally, the idea of trying to give an equal say to those represented.
52 Convexity ensures that the average of the relative entropies across different intra-state polling distributions is bounded
from below by the entropy of the average of the these distributions, but in general we do not know ahead of time how
close these entropies will be.
53 Recall that the entropy or relative entropies involve a sum over s and n, where (s, n) is meant to uniquely index a
particular, named individual within the sth state, so even if the sizes of the districts can be predicted, the assignment
of this individual to a district cannot be known before the actual boundaries are drawn.
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“To apportion,” as understood by Daniel Webster,54 “is to distribute by right measure, to set off in just
parts, to assign in due and proper proportion,” but added, “that which cannot be done perfectly must
be done in a manner as near perfection as can be.” Entropy provide a way to precisely and meaningfully
quantify departures from perfect proportionality.
We began with three underlying principles guiding the choice of apportionment method: Uniformity of
individual representation, Universality of apportionment methodology, and Uniqueness of the resulting
algorithm, and its output (at least in the absence of ties due to accident or symmetry). We argued
that these desiderata restrict viable methodologies to variational principles, involving constrained global
optimization of some figure-of-merit which measures the equity or uniformity of the Congress-mediated
weights of representation across all represented individuals, or equivalently the mismatch between these
indirect weights of representation asR
1
ps
, and the uniform weights of representation, 1P , associated with
an ideal direct democracy.
But such weights of representation must be nonnegative for every individual, and will be additive over
any group of individuals, and can be interpreted in terms of polling probabilities. The natural measure
of uniformity for any such distribution is the relative entropy between the indirect and direct weights
of representation, also equal here to the deficit in Shannon entropy of the indirect distribution, com-
pared to that of the direct distribution. Optimal apportionments therefore minimize relative entropy, or
equivalently maximize Shannon entropy, subject to suitable constraints on the total number of seats to
be apportioned as well as lower and upper bounds on each state’s allotment. The resulting method of
entropic apportionment enjoys not only an in-principle mathematical justification but very reasonable
in-practice performance, on both real-world census data and artificial test cases, similar to the recom-
mendations of the widely-recommended Huntington or Webster methods. In fact, the figures-of-merit
associated with both of these historic methods can be viewed rational-function approximations to the
more fundamental relative entropy measure.
These three methods share (non-exclusively) various features. Each figure-of-merit can be written in
terms of the weights of representation across individuals, which we regard as more fundamental than
either the average districts sizes or the state-quotas, but can also be re-expressed in terms of either of
the latter set of variables if desired, or explicitly in terms of only the apportionments a, the population
counts p, and the number of seats R, as required by the Constitution. Like all global optimization
methods, they not only can single out the optimal apportionment, but can be used to compare or rank
any feasible apportionments. By relying on optimization of an additive, convex objective function, these
methods can be implemented via a simple “greedy” algorithm which assigns seats sequentially based on
an easy-to-assess local optimization criterion. However, if desired, any of these optimization methods
can also be reformulated as a divisor or ranking method. Because of additional structural properties
enjoyed by these objective functions, the greedy allocation automatically builds optimal allocations for
all House sizes up through the final value R, and is also self-consistent under sub-division, in the sense
that if the apportionment procedure were repeated on any subset of the states, allocating the same
sub-total of seats those states received in the full apportionment, each state would end up with the same
number of seats as it did before.
Unlike the Huntington-Hill or Webster-Wilcox methods, however, entropy provides an unambiguous
choice for the normalization of the figure-of-merit with respect to R, so if desired, also allows us to assess
or choose an optimal House size along with the optimal apportionment of these seats to the various
states. Subsequent to apportionment itself and a proposed choice of intra-state district boundaries, the
same relative entropy can also objectively measure the degree of inequity in the size of Congressional
districts.
Relative entropies can also be decomposed in a natural way into between-group and within-group con-
tributions. So if of interest, we can also separately quantify inequities due successively to: (i) the
constraints that each state must receive a whole number of representatives within prescribed bounds;
(ii) some states possibly receiving sub-optimal numbers of seats; (iii) the requirement that Congressional
districts partition the state population into contiguous, non-overlapping regions each a whole number
of represented individuals; and (iv) variation in the sizes of proposed districts beyond the unavoidable
54 As quoted in reference [80].
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minimum. Numerical values for entropies can be interpreted in terms of: the information cost due
to the mismatch inherent in presuming (i.e., “coding” for) democratic equality but actually employing
representative government; or equivalently as the deficit in surprisal experienced or uncertainty resolved
relative to a state of maximal surprise (upon choosing an individual at random) versus choosing via
Congressional delegations; or the difficulty of statistically discriminating samples drawn by polling from
the indirect versus direct probability distributions.
In reflecting on the Congressional apportionment problem, legal philosopher, First Amendment scholar,
and civil rights advocate Zechariah Chafee, Jr. once noted [4] that “the preservation of a respect for the
law will in the long run be best obtained by the adoption of the plan which is least likely to produce
a sense of unfairness in those who are forced to obey legislation.” While public perception is hard to
predict, and perhaps harder to direct or correct, we can say that, in a precise information-theoretic sense,
entropic apportionments are least likely to be detected as unfair by those who are asked to distinguish.
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Appendix A: BACKGROUND AND LEGAL CONTEXT
A.1. The House of Representatives, the Census, Apportionment, and Districting
In the framing of the U.S. Constitution [66], the “Great Compromise” provided the United States with
a bicameral legislature, in which all states receive exactly equal representation in the Senate regardless
of relative population, but representation “according to their respective numbers” of inhabitants in the
House of Representatives, usually taken to mean that representatives are to be apportioned amongst the
states at least approximately in direct proportion to their represented populations, which in turn are to
be determined by “actual enumeration” in a decennial census.55 Representatives are to be elected every
two years “by the People” of the state in question.56 Given our federal system of government, implicit in
Article I is the underlying assumption that each member of Congress represent people within one and only
one state, and therefore that each state be granted a whole number of representatives exclusive to that
state. In addition, the Constitution requires that every state is to be given at least one representative, but
otherwise no more than one representative for every thirty thousand represented residents. For states
with more than one representative, current statute further requires that each representative actually
represent exclusively a subset of the state’s population residing within a contiguous geographic district,
but this has not always been the case.
In regards to both federal governance and mathematical analysis, this decennial Constitutional obligation
raises a number of interesting questions, including how to “best” achieve the following:
0. obtain official and hopefully accurate enumerations (census) of the populations of the various states
relevant for the purposes of apportionment;
1. decide on the total number of congressional representatives to serve in the House of
Representatives or an acceptable range of sizes, until the next apportionment;
2. apportion these representatives amongst the several states, within allowed bounds, ac-
cording to the “respective numbers” of inhabitants;
3. for single-member district-based representation within states, determine the allowed sizes (or ac-
ceptable range of sizes) of each congressional district;
4. and choose constituencies within each state for each representative, typically in the form of con-
tiguous but non-overlapping and exhaustive geographic residential districts;
where each decision must remain compatible with requirements or constraints imposed by the U.S.
Constitution, and where deciding on the precise meaning of “best” in each of these interrelated, if
ultimately distinct, tasks has engendered an extensive and sometimes contentious debate.
Every decade, a census—now conducted by the Census Bureau within the Commerce Department—
precedes the reapportionment of representatives, and has of late created its own controversies, especially
regarding the legal and practical meanings of the phrase “actual enumeration,” and the possible role,
if any, for so-called imputation, meaning the use of sampling and/or other statistical methods to help
arrive at more reliable counts for the represented populations57 of each state which are to be used for
the apportionment of Congressional seats.58
55 Representatives themselves must be inhabitants of the state represented at the time of election, must be U.S. Citizens,
and must be at least twenty-five years of age at the start of their service.
56 Currently, at minimum all residents of the corresponding U.S. state who are adult (i.e., eighteen years of age or over)
citizens and free of felony convictions are entitled to vote for congressional representatives. The rights to vote of adult
citizens with felony convictions vary by state, and also depend on whether the individual is incarcerated, on probation,
on parole, or unconditionally released.
57 Here what we will call “represented populations” refers to what the Census Bureau officially terms “populations for
apportionment,” namely the number of people that, under Constitutional requirements and current state and federal
laws and regulations, should count toward Congressional apportionment—specifically, the total number of people who
are deemed to usually or customarily reside in the state in question around the time the census is completed and are
subject to U.S. jurisdiction, plus federal employees working oversees whose employing agencies declare that state as the
employees’ permanent residence, plus any spouses and dependents of such employees.
58 Since, Constitutionally speaking, only U.S. states are entitled to voting representatives in Congress, the represented
population does not include residents of the District of Columbia or of U.S. overseas territories, which now typically
send to Congress non-voting delegates who lack full voting rights on the House floor but are often granted certain
privileges at the committee level under House rules. Under current law and executive branch policy, consistent with
current Constitutional interpretation as to legislative and executive discretion, the populations for apportionment also
exclude U.S. citizens living oversees who are not federal employees or their immediate family members, as well as
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For the purposes of discussing apportionment itself as a distinct optimization problem, we sidestep the
census/sampling debates,59 and simply assume that essentially exact, or at least officially accepted,
counts of represented populations within states are known from the most recent census. That is, we
assume “step 0” above has been achieved successfully. The actual reapportionment of representatives
following the census is decided by the sitting Congress, which ostensibly has wide latitude in principle and
legal precedent in its choice of assignment methodology, apart form the above Constitutional constraints
as interpreted by the Courts. Compared to other western democracies, the U.S. is somewhat unusual
both in the level of involvement of the legislative branch itself in deciding issues concerning the subsequent
apportionment of its own representatives, as well as in the frequent willingness of the judicial branch to
intervene directly in these issues, and it is in this context that we suggest a new principle with some
mathematical claim to greater fairness.
Here we primarily address the technical aspects of this inter-state apportionment problem, namely, how
to assign a whole number of representatives to each state in a manner that in some sense may be regarded
as “best.” By this we mean a definite algorithm that is consistent with common sense and Constitutional
requirements, is objective and transparent in its application; and whose output is arguably maximally
“fair” or “representative” according to some sensible definition. By deliberate choice, we mostly—but
not completely—ignore the essential but overtly political issue, as to whether any particular method
would likely be adopted by the existing Congress,60 especially if considered after a census is completed,
when the consequences for all states of any proposed procedure could be predicted.
Apart from the requirements mentioned above and a few other hints mentioned in passing, the Constitu-
tion otherwise remains essentially silent on the details of how voters are to choose their representatives, or
exactly whom individual representatives are to represent within a state, or how they are to be represented
when the state is accorded more than one representative. But Congressional statue has circumscribed
state discretion in many of these areas. In principle, at least, one might envision any number of complex
schemes, including forms of collective, multi-member, or at-large representation, where each voter within
a state might contribute to the selection of several or even all the state’s representatives, who would
then represent these constituents to some degree.
However, though not explicitly required by the Constitution, all states with multiple representatives are
currently required by statute to use a partitioned representation scheme, whereby each state’s popula-
tion is divided into mutually exclusive and exhaustive, geographically contiguous but non-overlapping
single-member districts, equal in number to the states apportionment of congressional seats, and each
representative is selected by, and then represents, his or her individual district within the state. The
thinking seems to be that, with such a system, representatives may be more effective and more ac-
countable in some sense if each answers to a smaller and clearly-defined constituency with some shared
interests, that voters in turn need only inform themselves about a smaller number of candidates, and/or
perhaps that such a partitioned system may be easier to administer. It is not entirely clear whether the
choice of geographically-contiguous boundaries is done to simplify districting, campaigning, and/or vot-
ing, to reduce opportunities for overt gerrymandering,61 or else to reflect a sincere (if perhaps debatable)
expectation that shared voter concerns and experiences are correlated more strongly with geographic
proximity than any other obvious demographic factors, such as party affiliation, type of employment, or
socioeconomic status.
In any case, the reliance on (geographic) districting, and therefore periodic redistricting, creates an
additional intra-state apportionment problem, as to exactly how to partition the states population into
districts. Here, we also largely ignore the politically-charged question of specifically which people to
include in which district, or equivalently where to draw the district boundaries,62 but we do find that
temporary tourists to the U.S., and individuals living within the U.S. but who are not subject to its jurisdiction, namely
those foreign nationals with diplomatic status. The federal government grants limited Native American tribal sovereignty
under the notion of “domestic dependent nations” but now also recognizes all native Americans as U.S. citizens. In
particular, although Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution states that “Representatives and direct Taxes
shall be apportioned among the several States ... excluding Indians not taxed,” since the time of the Revenue and
Indian Citizenship Acts of 1924, all Native Americans born within the territorial U.S. are citizens. (At the time, almost
two-thirds of Native Americans were already citizens by right as the result of previous laws and treaties, although of
course efforts at effective disenfranchisement were not uncommon). Thus, Native Americans living within the fifty U.S.
States are now subject to federal taxation and also counted for apportionment.
59 However, in passing we cannot resist venturing one opinion in this ongoing imputation controversy: namely, that we
find it somewhat incomprehensible to imagine that the likes of Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, John Adams,
or James Madison, if they were alive today, would seriously object to the use of careful statistical techniques if these
methods could be expected to improve the accuracy and/or precision of population estimates.
60 Particularly our current Legislative branch....
61 Clearly, the current system fails spectacularly at this.
62 In particular, debate continues as to the extent to which certain districts may be chosen deliberately with “majorities of
minorities,” to better ensure that certain minority interests are represented somewhere and to comply with the Voting
Rights Act, or whether districts should be chosen to the extent possible with a balance of interests and party affiliations
42
the prior question of how many people should be assigned to each district within each state should not
and cannot be completely separated from the question of how many seats each state should receive.
In addition, fair apportionment of representatives may depend on how representatives actually cast votes
in the House, or how their votes are counted. Historically, each full representative has been given one
equal, binary vote in a majoritarian (or sometimes super-majoritarian) legislative system, but if ,as some
have suggested, multiple voting or weighted voting were to be used, such a scheme might compensate,
in a certain sense, for discrepancies in apportionment itself. However, the Constitutionality of any such
weighted voting schemes would be highly questionable, and in any event would not seem to stand an
appreciable chance of adoption in practice, as many representatives would have to willingly surrender
influence. More is said about this below, but we remain extremely dubious of these suggestions.
Finally, although we focus here on apportionment in the context of partitioned representation and in
particular single-member districts, note that the general method we advocate could easily accommodate
multi-member districts, collective representation, or hybrid representational models.
A.2. Represented Populations Versus Voting Populations
There has been some debate, both historically and recently, about exactly whom Representatives are
to represent. Partly this may be due to inaccurate language. In the jurisprudence concerning the
Equal Protection clause, one often hears of the “one person, one vote” principle. But in the context of
Congressional apportionment, we have argued that this might be more accurately described as the “One
Person, One Voice” principle. The U.S. Constitution is unambiguous in requiring that Representatives
are to be allocated based on the represented populations of the states,63 not their respective numbers of
actual voters, or eligible voters, or registered voters, or adults, or U.S. citizens, etc. This was reaffirmed
in the 14th Amendment, because in the debate preceding its ratification, Congress explicitly considered
and rejected proposals to instead allocate seats to states on the basis of voter populations. Although
the actual case focused on on districting for state-level legislatures, this principle was re-affirmed by
the Supreme Court in the recent Evenwel v. Abbott decision [81], where Justice Ginsburg,64 writing for
the majority, asserted that “The Framers recognized that use of a total-population baseline served the
principle of representational equality.... this Court recognized in Wesberry ... the Constitution’s plain
objective of making equal representation for equal numbers of people the fundamental goal for the House
of Representatives.” She goes on to say:
Settled practice confirms what constitutional history and prior decisions strongly sug-
gest. Adopting voter-eligible apportionment as constitutional command would upset a
well-functioning approach to districting that all 50 States and countless local jurisdictions
have long followed. As the Framers of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment
comprehended, representatives serve all residents, not just those eligible to vote. Nonvot-
ers have an important stake in many policy debates and in receiving constituent services.
By ensuring that each representative is subject to requests and suggestions from the same
number of constituents, total-population apportionment promotes equitable and effective
representation
In the Federalist Papers [68], James Madison declared that “it is a fundamental principle of the proposed
constitution that ... the aggregate number of representatives allotted to the several states, is to be ...
founded on the aggregate number of inhabitants,” while “the right of choosing this allotted number in
to encourage a vigorous competition of ideas. In practice, we currently see evidence in the U.S. of very significant
gerrymandering at the level of Congressional districting, specifically the consequences of overt “cracking” (dispersing a
group of voters into several districts to prevent them from reaching an actual majority), “packing” (combining as many
like-minded voters into one district as possible to allow them to win small numbers of seats with large majorities but
prevent them from affecting elections in other districts, which can be won by smaller majorities), and “stacking” (grouping
an apparent majority of lower-income, lower-education, younger, or otherwise lower-turnout voters into districts with
more-educated, wealthier, whiter, or older voters who tend to turn out in greater numbers). Discussion continues as
to how to better detect, quantify, and limit gerrymandering at the Congressional level by parties controlling the state
legislature or other bodies responsible for the re-districting.
63 Again, the population of a state is now understood to be the nominally permanent population of that state under
U.S. jurisdiction excluding certain felons, as determined by the most recent census, or more specifically what are called
populations for apportionment.
64 Now known across the internet as “The Notorious R.B.G.” thanks to Shana Knizhnik....
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each state, is to be exercised by such part of the inhabitants, as the state itself may designate.” That is,
the total number of inhabitants were to form the basis for allotting apportioning representatives, even
though only some of those inhabitants might be eligible to participate in the choice of said representa-
tives.65 Alexander Hamilton declared: “There can be no truer principle than this—that every individual
of the community at large has an equal right to the protection of government.”
In Congressional debate surrounding the 14th Amendment, Representative James Blain argued [81],
“no one will deny that population is the true basis of representation; for ... non-voting classes may
have as vital an interest in the legislation of the country as those who actually deposit the ballot.” (Of
course, others have attempted to deny this, hence the extensive debate, but the side favoring a total-
population basis won out over those favoring voter-eligible populations). Introducing the final version
of the Amendment on the Senate floor, Senator Jacob Howard declared,
the ‘basis of representation is numbers... ; that is, the whole population except untaxed
Indians and per-sons excluded by the State laws for rebellion or other crime... The committee
adopted numbers as the most just and satisfactory basis, and this is the principle upon which
the Constitution itself was originally framed, that the basis of representation should depend
upon numbers; and such, I think, after all, is the safest and most secure principle upon which
the Government can rest. Numbers, not voters; numbers, not property; this is the theory of
the Constitution.
And in its famous Westbury [82] decision, the Court ruled, “The debates at the Convention make at least
one fact abundantly clear: that when the delegates agreed that the House should represent people, they
intended that in allocating Congressmen [sic.] the number assigned to each state should be determined
solely by the number of inhabitants ... While it may not be possible to draw congressional districts with
mathematical precision, that is no excuse for ignoring our Constitution’s plain objective of making equal
representation for equal numbers of people the fundamental goal for the House of Representatives.”
So despite some weak arguments to the contrary,66 it should be clear the Representatives are expected
to represent all inhabitants of their districts, not just those who voted for them, or those who voted
at all, or those who could have voted, or those enjoying full citizenship.67 Likewise, all inhabitants are
entitled to representation, and indeed to equal representation to whatever extent possible, whether they
can or do vote. This is what we shall mean by the One Person, One Voice principle, and it very much
informs our choice of apportionment method.
65 Again, at the time of ratification and for almost a century thereafter, certain inhabitants, namely slaves, were counted
only as three-fifths of a person. And the 13th, 14th, 15th, and 19th Amendments have now further restricted the ability
of states to limit those who are entitled to vote for the representatives.
66 See, for example, reference [53].
67 Currently, the most obvious difference between those individuals who who are counted in deciding how many represen-
tatives each state receives, and those individuals who actually get to vote, include legal minors and resident aliens, as
well as certain felons. Historically, the most hypocritical of such democratic discrepancies, articulated in the infamous
“Three-Fifths” compromise,” was finally overturned by the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments, while the other notably
egregious instance, that of women’s suffrage, was finally rectified in the 19th Amendment.
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Appendix B: SOME MATHEMATICAL NOTATIONS AND DEFINITIONS
Here we define and explicate in more detail various quantities and symbolic notation used throughout
this text.
B.1. Populations for Apportionment
Following standard if a bit sloppy convention, we use “population” to refer either to some identified
collection of persons (i.e., the populace of a country, state, or district, regarded as a set or an ordered
sequence), or to the number of such individuals therein (i.e., the population count). Hopefully the
intended meaning will be clear from context.
Let ps denote the represented population (count),
68 also known officially as the population for appor-
tionment, as determined by the most recent U.S. Census, of the sth state out of a total of S states, for
s = 1, . . . , S, where of course S = 50 currently.69 The total represented population across all states is
then given by the sum
P ≡
S∑
s=1
ps, (B1)
which, again, actually excludes some people residing within the territorial U.S., but also includes some
federal workers and their dependents living abroad. The average state population is then just p¯ = P/S.
A non-trivial apportionment problem arises when representatives are to be divided across multiple states,
and presumably every such state houses a non-vanishing fraction of the total population.70 So in actual
practice the represented populations of relevant states may be assumed to satisfy the inequalities
0 < pmin ≡ min
s
[
p1, . . . , pS
] ≤ ps ≤ pmax ≡ max
s
[p1, . . . , pS ] < P, (B2)
for all s = 1, . . . , S.
For notational efficiency, we also collect the states’ represented populations into an ordered S-tuple:
p = (p1, . . . , pS), Within the sth state, all ps represented persons may be indexed (without regard to
district membership) by n = 1, . . . , ps, using some lexicographic or other ordering convention.
Constitutionally speaking, one further adjustment to the populations for apportionment could in prin-
ciple arise. Section 2 of the 14th Amendment declares:71
But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice
President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers
of a state, or the members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants
of such state, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way
abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation
therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear
to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such state.
68 These are the individuals residing in or otherwise legally associated with the various states at the time of the most recent
census, as outlined above.. In between censuses, of course people are born and die, move between states or districts,
change their legal residency or citizenship, etc. So we do not mean to imply that, going forward, representatives only
represent the individuals contributing to the count ps, but rather, that these were the ones upon which the amount of
representation was decided.
69 Note once again that under the U.S. Constitution, U.S. territories and the District of Columbia have no voting members
in the Senate or House. They may be granted non-voting observers, and via the 23rd Amendment, Washington, D.C.
has been granted (currently three) votes in the Electoral College.
70 Although not technically forbidden by the U.S. Constitution, a completely unpopulated territory, if there were still, or
ever, such a region under U.S. jurisdiction, would presumably never be admitted into the Union as a separate state—there
would be nobody to represent, and nobody to represent them.
71 This clause was included out of a concerns that, with the voiding of the Three-Fifths Compromise, southern states
would earn more Congressional representation, but would continue to disenfranchise their (adult male) African-American
populations. In fact, even though southern States continued to deploy various pretexts to suppress the African-American
vote, this clause was never invoked, and now the 1965 Voting Rights Act technically makes such denials illegal. Evidently,
the 19th Amendment included no similar clause for women because it more explicitly denied states the ability to abridge
the right to vote based on sex.
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This seems to mean more than just disallowing states from counting disenfranchised inhabitants towards
apportionment. If σs is the ratio of adult male non-felon citizens residing within the sth state who are
denied the right to vote in federal elections, divided by the total number of adult male72 residents of
that state, then the total population for apportionment is to be reduced from ps to p
′
s = (1− σs)ps.
B.2. Apportioned Congressional Representatives
The apportionment as of the sth state is the whole number congressional of representatives or “seats”
in the U.S. House of Representatives legally assigned or allotted to that state, for a total House size of
R ≡
S∑
s=1
as (B3)
voting representatives in all.
Additionally, the U.S. Constitution (Article I, Section 2) would appear to require that
1 ≤ as ≤ max
[
1, bps/Dminc
]
for s = 1, . . . , S, (B4)
where Dmin = 30000 is in effect a mandated minimum representation ratio, or equivalently a minimum
district size for any states with multiple representatives. This in turn implies that the total number of
voting representatives R to be apportioned must lie within some range
Rlb ≤ R ≤ Rup, (B5)
where Constitutionally-implied lower and upper bounds on the House size R are given respectively by
the number of states
Rlb = S, (B6)
and by
Rub =
S∑
s=1
max
[
1, bps/Dminc
]
, (B7)
regardless of how the representatives are otherwise apportioned. Currently it is the case that ps  Dmin
for all s = 1, . . . , S, so that S < Rub ≤ bP/Dminc. Of course, for parliamentary reasons (e.g., expectation
of more efficient conduction of House business), or out of political calculation, or simply institutional
inertia or tradition, the actual number of voting representatives R may be partially or completely
constrained prior to their actual apportionment, to some smaller interval:
S ≤ Rmin ≤ R ≤ Rmax ≤ Rub. (B8)
Since 1911,73 Congress has in fact decreed that Rmin= R = Rmax = 435, although nothing but convention
or precedent requires that this exact if arbitrary total be enshrined in law.74 Because, Constitutionally
72 Here, “adult male” meant a male 21 years of age or older, but the 26th Amendment denied states the ability to violate
voting rights of citizens in a federal election based on age, for anyone 18 years or older, but did not explicitly update
this clause, and again the 19th Amendment extended voting rights to women also without replacing this clause. So
technically, it appears that if a state were to deny the right to vote on grounds other than age or sex to certain non-felon
citizens who happened to be in the 18–20 age range, then the population for apportionment would not be penalized. Of
course any such overt disenfranchisement could run afoul of statutory constraints such as the Voting Rights Act.
73 Apart from a brief interlude when Hawaii and Alaska first became states.
74 In fact, a very strong argument can (and has) been made [49, 77, 78, 83–85] that freezing the House size at 435, over
a period of history during which the population of the U.S. has essentially tripled, leads to significant distortions from
the ideal of proportional representation, and growing malapportionment. This number has been fixed by the Permanent
Apportionment Act of 1929, which itself was a belated attempt to resolve a crisis following the 1920 Census, when rural
and nativist representatives in the U.S. House and Senate, concerned over support for Prohibition and the influence of
“urban” and “foreign” influence (sound familiar?) of America’s rapidly growing cities, simply ignored Constitutional
mandates and blocked reapportionment based on the population counts revealing increased urbanization. As of the 2010
Census, the U.S. House of Representatives had about one representative for every 710000 people, one of the highest ratios
amongst ant popularly-elected national assemblies or parliaments, and over 23 times higher than the Constitutionally
mandated minimum. And because of the mandated minimum of one representative per state, large differential changes
in state populations coupled with a fixed House size has led to a situation where the relative variation in district
sizes between large and small states has become considerably greater than any judicially tolerated variation of district
sizes within states. However, it tends to be the lower-density, rural, Republican-leaning stares which benefit from this
malapportionment, so we should not expect improvements any time soon. Choice of House size is also discussed in
Section 5.1 .
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speaking, each state is also entitled to at least one representative, it follows that for any feasible choice
of R, the sth state’s allotment will necessarily lie in the range
1 = λs ≤ as ≤ us = max
[
1, bps/Dminc
]
(B9)
for all s = 1, . . . , S, where we have introduced the lower bound λs = 1 and upper bound us on the sth
state’s possible apportionments.75 In current practice, with the House size fixed at R = 435 and state
populations what they are, the upper bounds are not terribly relevant, but the lower bounds very much
are.
The overall average delegation size, or average number of representatives per state, is of course just
a¯ = RS . For later convenience, we can also define an ordered S-tuple of apportionments a = (a1, . . . , aS),
referred to as the apportionment vector. Similarly, we can define λ = (λ1, . . . , λS) and u = (u1, . . . , uS),
as the S-tuples of allowed lower and upper bounds.
B.3. Congressional Constituencies
B.3.1. District-Based Representation
With standard partitioned representation, or equivalently single-member district-based representation, the
kth congressional representative in the sth state is to represent exclusively the inhabitants of a district
(entirely within the state) in which reside a whole number dsk of represented individuals. The districts
are assumed to contain exclusive and exhaustive sub-populations, each sending one representative to the
House,76 so that the population of any state is decomposed as:
ps =
as∑
k=1
dsk. (B10)
Mathematical and Constitutional constraints will further imply that
min[ps,Dmin] ≤ dsk ≤ ps − (as − 1)Dmin. (B11)
Currently, all U.S. Congressional districts are much larger (by a factor of 20 or more) than the allowed
minimum, such that dsk  Dmin.
Nationwide, the overall average congressional district size may be defined as
D¯ =
1
R
S∑
s=1
as∑
k=1
dsk =
1
R
S∑
s=1
ps =
P
R
, (B12)
while the intra-state average district sizes are
d¯s =
1
as
as∑
k=1
dsk =
ps
as
, (B13)
and will satisfy
min
[
ps,Dmin
] ≤ d¯s ≤ ps for all s = 1, . . . , S. (B14)
Note that neither the national average D¯ nor the intra-state averages d¯s are whole numbers in gen-
eral, although it must be the case that
S∑
s=1
as∑
k=1
d¯s =
S∑
s=1
as d¯s = R D¯ = P . The average number of
representatives per state can also be written as a¯ = p¯
D¯
.
75 Actually, for Congressional apportionment, we can impose possibly tighter upper bounds, namely us =
min
[
max
[
1, bps/Dminc
]
, R − S + 1
]
, but this is unnecessary if we are already imposing the lower bunds. For party-
list apportionment problems, we could instead relax these bounds, setting λs = 0 and λu = R, which are then always
satisfied and hence ignorable.
76 Represented individuals living abroad are associated with their permanent or previous congressional district.
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We will typically use k = 1, . . . , as to index the Congressional districts within a state. Represented
individuals within the kth district of the sth state will be indexed by i = 1, . . . , dsk.
In the context of party-based representation, what we have called the average district size D¯ is in-
stead known as the Hare quota or simple quota (not to be confused with the exact state quotas for
representatives, to be defined below), named after British political scientist Thomas Hare.77 The Hare
quota measures the ideal number of persons (or valid votes, in party-list representation) required to
“deserve” one representative, and populations (or vote counts) are sometimes expressed in units of of
Hare quotas.78
For later convenience, we may also define for each state a district residual
ηs = ps mod as = as
(
ps
as
− b psas c
)
= as
(
d¯s − bd¯sc
)
(B15)
as the minimal number of individuals left over if we try to divide the sth state’s represented population
into exactly as equally-populated districts. Obviously each ηs must be a nonnegative integer satisfying
0 ≤ ηs < as, while
ps = asd¯s = asbd¯sc+ ηs (B16)
for each s = 1, . . . , S.
B.3.2. District Sizes versus Congressional Constituencies
Like with “population,” a reference to a “district” can mean either the size of the district (number of
represented persons), or the actual identity of the district—the set of represented persons residing within
or otherwise legally assigned to the district at the time of the census. Suppose that all represented persons
(at the time of the census). We have assumed that represented persons within the sth state are indexed
uniquely by n for n = 1, . . . , ps.
79 Once district boundaries are drawn, we also assume that districts
within the sth state may be unambiguously indexed by k for k = 1, . . . , k, and that using the census
data and the adopted district boundaries, each censused individual can be unambiguously assigned80
to a district via some mapping k = K(n, s), such that the censused residents can be partitioned into
exclusive and exhaustive Congressional constituencies Csk = {(s, n) : K(n, s) = k}, where the cardinality
of the set Csk is just the corresponding district size dsk: |Csk | = dsk. Intra-district indices i = 1, . . . , dsk
can then be uniquely assigned to represented individuals within any district (s, k), by some specified
one-to-one mapping.81
B.3.3. At-Large Representation and Other Representation Schemes
Historically, a few states instead sometimes chose to elect representatives from the state at large, leading
to non-partitioned or state-wide representation.82 In order to also accommodate this possibility within
a uniform notation, we may define effective district sizes d˜sk, where
d˜sk =
{
dsk if representation is district-based
d¯s =
ps
as
if representation is at-large
, (B17)
77 Modifications of this sort of quota are also encountered in the literature and arise in various proportional representation
and apportionment schemes. For example, in our notation, the Hagenbach-Bischoff quota is P
R+1
, and the Droop quota
is given by P
R+1
+ 1, but we will not make use of them here.
78 In the apportionment context, populations measured in units of the Hare quota will be numerically equal to the exact
state quotas defined below....
79 That is, we presume some invertible mapping or lookup table between the ordered pair of indices (s, n) and some
collection of distinguishing legal information unambiguously singling out an individual, such as full name, date and place
of birth, residential addresses at time of census, Social Security Number if available, biometric data, etc.
80 For example, as of the 2010 Census, the author resided in the CA-13.
81 For example, a simple convention would assign i = 1 to the smallest n in the district, i = 2 to the next smallest, etc.
82 The Constitution is largely silent on how representation is handled within states, except for demanding that Representa-
tives are to be elected by the people of the state, and equal protection requirements that have been interpreted to demand
that districts be closely matched in size when partitioned representation is used. By statute, at-large representation has
been explicitly allowed or disallowed at various points in U.S. history, but mostly the latter. Most recently, as of 2006,
states with two or more apportioned representatives must be partitioned into geographically contiguous, exclusive and
exhaustive districts within the state, each of whose voters elects a single representative. So currently, the only “at-large”
members are those from states with only a single representative. Equivalently, we can interpret the latter scenario in
terms district-based representation, but where the state in question has only a single district covering the state as a
whole.
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in effect adopting the convention, in the case of at-large representation, of formally “dividing” the
population ps into as “virtual” districts each of effective size d˜sk = d¯s, even though in actual practice
these would not be actual geographic or administrative units and would need have no demographic
reality nor any direct political significance, nor indeed necessarily even be associated with an integral
number of persons.
Of course, hybrid representation schemes can be envisioned in principle—for example, some districts
could have multiple representatives, or districts could be grouped into meta-districts with their represen-
tatives, or the state could have some other combination of district-based and at-large representation.83.
Because these sorts of hybrid representational systems would seem to be somewhat exotic politically, and
to our knowledge have not been used historically in the U.S., and are currently disallowed by statute,
we will not pursue specific ideas further here, but if circumstances arose, the current methodology could
easily be generalized to allow for more elaborate or esoteric representation scenarios.
We also collect the average district sizes into d¯ = (d¯1, . . . , d¯S), and the state-level districts sizes into a
nested sequence of S as-dimensional ordered tuples ds = (ds 1, . . . , ds as), and finally embed the latter
into an array D with dimensions S × max
s
[
as
]
, zero-padded as necessary, such that [D]sk = dsk for S
and k in the allowed ranges, and zero otherwise.
B.4. State Quotas
For the sth state, the corresponding state-level quota qs, also called the exact quota or the standard quota
of representatives, is the ideal number of representatives to which the sth state is entitled assuming a
total of R representatives and a goal of exactly proportionality in representation in the absence of other
constraints. That is, the state-level quota qs is determined by the condition
qs
R
=
ps
P
, (B18)
which says that the proportion of representatives “deserved” by a state is equal to the proportion of
that state’s population relative to the whole population. The sth state’s quota can be expressed in any
of the forms
qs ≡ ps
P
R =
R
P
ps =
ps
D¯
, (B19)
and will satisfy
0 ≤ qs ≤ R for each s = 1, . . . , S, (B20)
where the inequalities are strict in the usual case when the state’s population satisfies 0 < ps < P
strictly. As with other state-level quantities, we can collect the quotas into the S-tuple q = (q1, . . . , qS).
In this context, D¯ is also known as the standard divisor, because D¯ provides the ideal ratio of represented
persons per representative and is the starting point for so-called divisor methods for apportionment,
discussed in Appendix D.
In general, the quotas qs will not be exact integers—this is the principle reason why we face an appor-
tionment problem—although the quotas of various states are necessarily in rational ratio to each other,
qs
qs′
= psps′
, and it must be the case that
S∑
s=1
qs =
S∑
s=1
as = R exactly.
Given an apportionment, the ratios asqs , or their reciprocals
qs
as
, measure the relative deviation between
the actual and ideal levels of representation for each state. For example, the average within-state district
sizes are related to the national average district size by
d¯s =
ps
as
=
qs
as
D¯. (B21)
83 Political obstacles aside, it might be worth re-considering some of these schemes. For example, having fewer districts
but with multiple representatives could, under certain voting rules (such as instant-runoff), greatly reduce effects of
gerrymandering.
49
Following standard terminology, we also define the lower quota bqsc as the floor84 of the quota qs, meaning
the lower quota is defined as the exact quota rounded down to the nearest integer, and similarly we define
the upper quota dqse as the ceiling85 of the quota, which is to say the exact quota rounded up to the
nearest integer. The lower and upper quota are integers bracketing (non-strictly) the exact quota,
bqsc ≤ qs ≤ dqse, (B22)
and will differ by exactly one representative, except in the unlikely event that the quota itself is an exact
integer, in which case the lower, upper, and exact quotas all coincide.
One declares an apportionment to satisfy lower quota if and only if as ≥ bqsc for all s = 1, . . . , S, and
to satisfy upper quota if and only if as ≤ dqse for all s = 1, . . . , S. The apportionment is said to satisfy
quota or be on quota if and only if bqsc ≤ as ≤ dqse for all s = 1, . . . , S, so that every state receives
a whole number of representatives equal to either its lower or upper quota, and therefore a number of
representatives within less than one representative of its exact quota.86 Otherwise, the apportionment
is said to be off quota or to violate quota, for one or more states.
Despite Balinski and Young having once referred to the state-level quota as a “fundamental measure of
fairness,” [86], and elsewhere declaring that “any apportionment should satisfy quota” [80], we contend
that violation of quota is not problematic per se, because states do not have rights to House members;
rather, the people of the various states do87. Satisfying quota is simply not a necessary or even ap-
propriate criterion. Of course, the quotas themselves are just state populations expressed in units of
the average district size, so quotas will obviously play some indirect role in any apportionment method.
We will want apportionments to be close to quotas in some sense, but we need not obsess over whether
the state-level apportionments are all within one unit or less of their respective quotas. Whether an
off-quota apportionment will be better than an on-quota one must depend on the absolute number of
people affected.
B.5. “Fair” Shares
The notion of a state’s so-called fair share of representatives is closely related to the quota, but explicitly
takes into account the Constitutionally-mandated lower bound, and, when actually relevant, the upper
bound. That is, since the Constitution entitles the people of each state to at least one representative, if
the quota for a small state happens to fall below unity, then, so the argument goes, the quota itself can no
longer be considered the state’s “fair share,” if by fair we were to mean what the Constitution demands
or suggests. Rather, the fair share of representatives would be exactly unity for this state. Likewise,
for any states whose quotas lie above their allowed upper bounds, fair shares should coincide with the
mandated upper bounds. And fair shares for all other states are to be determined self-consistently
by dividing up the remaining seats in an ostensibly self-consistent manner, based on the ratios of the
remaining state populations.
We are altogether skeptical of the utility or even sensibility of this notion, because the concept seems to
deliberately conflate the representation to which a state is legally entitled and what would be morally or
democratically “fair” from the perspective of equal representation. Nonetheless, we will briefly describe
the determination of the fair shares as articulated by Balinski and Young.
The fair shares Fs, s = 1, . . . , S may be defined and calculated recursively. First, exact quotas q1, . . . , qS
are calculated for all states, using the fractional populations p1/P, . . . , pS/P multiplied by the full
congressional house size R. If any state’s quota falls below that state’s allowed lower bound λs, then it
is assigned the lower bound as its fair share, or else if its quota lies above the allowed upper bound us,
84 The floor of a nonnegative real number is the largest integer less than or equal to that number.
85 The ceiling of a nonnegative real number is the smallest integer greater than or equal to that number.
86 Since the number of representatives is necessarily an integer while the exact quota is generically not, a better terminology
might have been “near quota,” but we conform to conventional usage, and the phrase “near quota” has taken on a
different meaning. Also note that the “on quota” condition is equivalent to the constraints that |as − qs| < 1 for all
s = 1, . . . , S. Notice that this definition does not permit any wiggle room in the unlikely case that qs does happen to be
an exact integer, since then the upper and lower quotas would coincide, rather than differ by one representative. A more
forgiving definition might have been instead: |rs − qs| ≤ 1 for all s, but again we shall stick with the more restrictive,
but conventional notion.
87 Following the 17th Amendment enacted during America’s Progressive era, Senators are now also elected by the people
of the respective states, but in the Senate there is of course no possibility nor expectation of equality of representation
amongst inhabitants, but rather equality between states.
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its fair share is taken to be us. Then only for the remaining states, adjusted quotas q
′
s = psR
′/P ′ are
calculated using the fractional populations ps/P
′ relative to the aggregate population P ′ of the only the
remaining states whose fair shares have not yet been determined, multiplied by the remaining available
seats R′ which were not allotted as fair shares previously. Then, if any of these adjusted quotas are at or
out of mandated bounds, those states are assigned integral fair shares equal to the appropriate bound,
and the process is repeated, obtaining further modified quotas q′′s , etc, until all states have either been
assigned a lower or upper bound as a fair share, or else some non-integral fair share lying strictly within
the allowed bounds.
Fair shares can also be calculated iteratively rather than recursively. The fair share of a state may be
expressed simply as
Fs = median[λs, α qs, us], (B23)
where the common scale factor α > 0 is to be chosen self-consistently (via iterative trial and error), so
that
S∑
s=1
Fs = R exactly.
Analogous to the terminology introduced for state quotas, we can compare the apportionments as to
bFsc and dFse and speak of apportionments either satisfying or violating fair share, or just lower fair
share, or just upper fair share, for one or more states.
Balinski and Young (in [26]) identify the fair shares with the “states’ exact entitlements” and assert that
“if the [fair] shares are all integers, then they must constitute the unique acceptable apportionment.”
Many authors, including this one, would disagree. To our thinking, the fair shares greatly over-emphasize
the role payed by the lower/upper bounds constraints, and can deviate far too much from actual pro-
portionality to be called “fair” in any democratic sense. If because of a mandated lower bound some
state must receive more than its quota of seats, then some other state must receive less than its quota,
but this does not mean that, democratically speaking, the people of the under-represented state were
any less entitled to their due proportion of representatives.
B.6. Weight of Representation and Related Notions
B.6.1. Voting Strength
Effective voting strengths, voting weights, voting power indices, etc., can and have been defined in a
number of distinct ways in various approaches to analyzing elections, governance, and collective choice.
Several commonly-used measures of voting strength [27, 30, 43, 48] attempt to quantify the probability
that any one individual could change the outcome in an election. This is the basic idea behind the
Penrose-Banzhaf-Coleman power index, for example, and also underlies recent analyses of elections by
statistician Andrew Gelman. A related idea, used to define the Shapley-Shubik power index, is to assess
the fraction of possible voting patterns in which the individual could be said to cast the deciding vote.
However, these estimates are largely based on extremely over-simplified probabilistic models of voter
preferences, and for typical national elections would lead to probabilities that are so small that we may
have very little intuition as to how to meaningfully assess asymmetries in these numbers.
More importantly, these quantities are intended to measure voting power, and are not really relevant
in the present context, because Congressional apportionment is to be made in proportion to numbers
of represented inhabitants, not just voting constituents, and representatives are to represent voters and
non-voters alike.
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B.6.2. Representational Surplus and Deficiency
In the literature on Congressional apportionment, a notion of representational surplus [37] (of the state
with the smallest average district size as compared to the state with the largest average district size)
has been defined as follows:
S (a,p) = amo − amu pmopmu , (B24)
where pmo is the population of the most over-represented state (with the smallest average district size)
and amo is its (actual or proposed) number of representatives, while pmu is the population of the most
under-represented state (associated with the largest average district size), with amu its allotted number
of seats.
Similarly, the representational deficiency has been defined as
D(a,p) = amu − amo pmupmo . (B25)
From our perspective, these are both also very state-centric rather than inhabitant-focused notions, and
do not appear entirely natural from the perspective of the democratic rights of an individual inhabitant.
B.6.3. Shares of a Representative
The reciprocals of the district sizes give the individual shares of a representative, meaning the aver-
age (typically fractional) number of representatives per represented inhabitant of that district. If the
districting partition were known, the intra-state values would be given by:
S˜sk =
1
d˜sk
=
{
Ssk =
1
dsk
if representation is single-member-district-based
1
d¯s
= asps if representation is at-large
(B26)
for all represented individuals within the kth (real or virtual) district of the sth state. Before the
districting partition is established, we make use of the statewide average share of a representative, which
is just
S¯s =
1
d¯s
=
as
ps
=
as
qs
R
P
=
as
qs
1
D¯
, (B27)
per person, while
S¯ =
S∑
s=1
ps
as
ps
S∑
s=1
ps
=
R
P
=
1
D¯
(B28)
is the overall national average share of a representative.
When summed over all individuals within all districts, such shares will of course sum to the total number
of representatives:
S∑
s=1
as∑
k=1
dsk∑
i=1
S˜sk =
S∑
s=1
as∑
k=1
1 =
S∑
s=1
as = R. (B29)
For any given apportionment, associated individuals could be considered under-represented to the extent
that S˜sk < S¯, and over-represented if S˜sk > S¯.
Notice that more uniform probabilities can arise not because of positive information regarding near
equality of district sizes, but ignorance over possible assignments of represented persons to districts, in
the face of which are distributions must be taken to be permutation symmetric.
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B.6.4. Normalized Representational Shares, Weights of Representation, and Polling Probabilities
These shares of a representative rightly focus on the legitimate interests of represented individuals rather
than supposed entitlements of states. But it will be useful to first renormalize, then re-interpret these
shares.
a. Weights of Representation: Simply by dividing by the total House size R, we can renormalize so
as to obtain (normalized) shares of representation, or representational shares for short, given by
w˜sk =
S˜sk
R =
{
wski =
1
Rdsk
if representation is single-member-district-based
w¯s =
1
Rd¯s
if representation is at-large
(B30)
for every represented individual within the kth (real or virtual) district within the sth state. They are
nonnegative rational numbers summing to unity:
S∑
s=1
as∑
k=1
ps∑
i=1
w˜sk = 1, (B31)
and directly reflect the (relative) weight of representation across individuals within the various states.
In order to avoid confusion with the unnormalized shares of a representative, we will mostly employ this
latter terminology, or the variant representational weights.
Note that evaluating the representational weights w˜sk presumes knowledge of any district partitioning,
while the quantity
w¯s =
1
Rd¯s
=
1
R
as
ps
=
as
R
1
ps
=
as
qs
1
P
(B32)
may be interpreted as the state-level average weight of representation (averaged across all represented
inhabitants of the sth state), and
w¯ =
1
RD¯
=
1
P
(B33)
is the overall national average weight of representation, equal to the average fraction of the total repre-
sented population associated with a single individual.
Throughout our approach to optimal apportionment, the over-arching goal will entail equalizing the
individual weights of representation as much as possible, or equivalently minimizing deviations from the
democratic ideal value of w¯, consistent with Constitutional constraints, and in a quantifiably precise and
defensible sense.
b. Polling Probabilities: in order to motivate what we regard as the correct measure of representational
equality, we shall highlight a more fundamental way to understand these weights of representation,
explicitly as probabilities. In order to emphasize the probabilistic interpretation, we will introduce a
parallel notation.
Because our main concern is with assessing and balancing democratic influence, we can naturally think
about effective sampling or polling probabilities, as if we were to elicit the opinion of the public on some
matter before the legislature, hopefully in some maximally unbiased way. In an ideal direct democracy,
every represented individual would have an equal probability
p¯i = 1P = w¯ (B34)
of being the individual surveyed in any given instance. We will call these the democratically ideal
polling probabilities or the direct polling probabilities, as if we were participating in a direct democracy,
This uniform probability distribution may be associated with uniform random sampling across all P
represented individuals, irrespective of state or district of residency.
If instead this “voice of the people” is to be filtered through Congress, the analogous weight may be
taken to be the probability of polling an individual in a two-stage process, whereby first a Congressional
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Representative is randomly selected, then a represented individual is randomly chosen within the sub-
population associated with that Representative. That is to say, in effect we first sample Representatives
from states, then sub-sample individuals represented by the chosen delegate.
Uniform sampling of Congress means that each representative has an equal probability 1R being selected,
corresponding to a probability
as∑
k=1
1
R =
as
R for the sth state’s delegation overall. But to infer the ap-
propriate intra-state polling probabilities, and thereby the overall sampling probabilities for individuals,
we must take care to specify what is known (or assumed) or not, regarding the apportionment and
districting.88
First consider the simplest case, that of at-large representation, where the entire state population is
collectively represented by the entire delegation of that state. If the apportionments (and populations
on which they are based) are specified, then the overall indirect polling probabilities are the same for all
represented inhabitants of that state, namely
pisn =
as
R
1
ps
=
1
R
1
d¯s
=
as
qs
1
P
= w¯s. (B35)
Note that pisn ≥ 0, and
S∑
s=1
pS∑
n=1
pisn =
S∑
s=1
as
R = 1, so these constitute a well-defined (nonnegative and
normalized) probability distribution over the possible polling outcomes of individual (censused) persons.
But what if instead we knew the actual population counts p, and the actual apportionments a, but not
the identities of who89 actually resides in which state? Then for an arbitrarily chosen individual, the
polling probability under this state of knowledge must account for all possible assignments of this person
to the various states:
S∑
s=1
ps
P
ps∑
n=1
pisn =
∑
s
ps
P
as
R
1
ps
=
1
P
1
R
∑
s
as =
1
P
= w¯, (B36)
where the probability that any particular represented individual chosen at random inhabits the sth state
(knowing nothing except the state populations counts) would be ps/P . So under these conditions the
polling probabilities would all revert to the uniform direct-democracy values.
Now consider the case of (single-member) district-based representation. If not only the apportionments
a, but the assignments of particular individuals to particular districts within particular states were
somehow known, then the polling probabilities would be
piski =
1
R
1
dsk
= wsk (B37)
for the ith individual within the kth district of the sth state. These are of course also nonnegative and
sum to unity:
S∑
s=1
as∑
k=1
dsk∑
i=1
piski = 1.
But during the apportionment procedure itself, that is, at the stage when seats are assigned to states,
we cannot really know who will end up in what district, or even exactly how many people will be in
each district, so we should sum over all relevant possibilities, accounting for the fact that, in the absence
of further information, the probability of an arbitrary resident of a state ending up in a given district
should be taken to be proportional to the size of that district. The resulting probability becomes
p¯isk =
∑
{Csk}
P(C11, . . . , C1a1 , . . . , CS1, . . . , CSas |a,p, I)
as∑
k=1
dsk
ps
1
R
1
dsk
=
as
ps
1
R
=
as
qs
1
P
= w¯s, (B38)
whatever the choice for the probability distribution over possible choices of Congressional constituencies,
as long as the latter is nonnegative and normalized.
88 In the Bayesian framework adopted here [61, 62, 87, 88], all probabilities are understood as conditional probabilities,
interpreted as consistent degrees of belief, based on some definite if partial background information. Probabilities are
interpreted not as states of an objectively stochastic Nature, but as states of mind, or at least as prescriptions for a
rational mind in the face of uncertainty.
89 That is, we explicitly lack knowledge as to which specific, named individuals live in which states.
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If we gain (or assume) additional information about the exact sizes of the districts, and retain
knowledge of who resides in which state but not who resides in which district, then the distribu-
tion P(C11, . . . , C1a1 , . . . , CS1, . . . , CSas |a,p, I) concentrates probability mass on partitions consistent
with these sub-totals, but nothing else changes, so we still arrive at the probabilities p¯isk. If instead
we know the population counts but do not even know who resides in which state, then once again the
probabilities would revert back to p¯i even if we could predict the district sizes.
These various polling distributions can also be motivated and derived using the Principle of Maximum
Entropy, which is what we use to select the apportionment a itself—refer to Appendix F below for some
background, and the main text (Section 4) for details on this approach.
It is of course a truism of American politics that in actual practice, different represented individuals
within each state or district may effectively wield very different degrees and kinds of influence over the
political process, or may enjoy very different levels of access to or responsiveness from their representative.
Ought they be assigned different weights of representation? In the real world, representatives tend to
make more time for those constituents who write bigger checks, or those who might mobilize more voters,
or those whose ideologies resonate with the politician or party. However, building this realization into
our rules for apportionment would be antithetical to the “One Person, One Voice” principle enshrined
in 14th Amendment jurisprudence and political discourse, would otherwise be unpalatable to almost
everyone, and would be effectively impossible to quantify in any precise way. For the purposes of inter-
state apportionment, we see no justifiable and Constitutional alternative but to presume a best case in
which all members of a district or sub-population are in effect equally represented by their representative.
Indeed, for the purposes of Congressional apportionment, democratic principles in general and the 14th
Amendment in particular would seem to demand this presumption (or perhaps just pretense) of even-
handedness.90
90 On the other hand, it has even been suggested (see for example [89]) that we could account for residual differences in
district sizes by weighting the votes of the Congressional Representatives themselves. With freedom to choose these
weighs arbitrarily, the argument goes that we could compensate for any inequities in apportionment of representatives to
states or in differences in actual or effective sizes of congressional districts within or across states. Polling probabilities
would then also be chosen proportional to the same weights. However, we cannot take this idea seriously. Unequal
voting rights or voting weights in Congress would appear dubious Constitutionally, and certainly problematic politically,
and it seems highly unlikely that any such scheme would ever be considered under House rules. Various phrases like
“concurrence of two-thirds” (Article I, Section 5), “the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House” (ibid.), and “two
thirds of that House” (Article I, Section 7) would all seem to implicitly presume that congressional representatives are
to enjoy equally-weighted, binary votes on legislative matters. And regardless of whether allowed by the Constitution,
it seems extremely unlikely that Congress would actually adopt such an unwieldy procedure for the sake of any sort of
argued theoretical fairness. In terms of day-to-day operations, would variable weighting hold only for votes on legislation
on the House floor, or also in committees? Since half of all Congressional districts must fall below average in size, which of
the corresponding Representatives would voluntarily vote to change House rules so as to assume less influence than their
colleagues in larger districts? And regardless of influence over floor votes, Congressional representatives with greater
than average district sizes do not have any more time or resources to provide constituent services, which are often at
least as important to their constituents as their voting patterns. This idea must be dismissed as impractical, or even
nonsensical.
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Appendix C: PROBLEMS AND “PARADOXES” OF APPORTIONMENT
Historically, realization of various “paradoxes” of apportionment [18, 23, 46, 67] has played a large role
in the debate over methodology. Of course, as the long as a proposed assignment a = (a1, . . . , aS) is
feasible, consisting of a non-negative integral number of seats allotted to each state, and satisfying all
needed constraints, there can be nothing truly paradoxical in a strict logical sense. What is meant is
that the outcome may be ostensibly counterintuitive or undesirable based on some intuition or other
criteria of fairness not built into the apportionment method itself.
To better situate these so-called paradoxes, we begin with some natural-sounding criteria which are
not difficult for an apportionment strategy to satisfy. Indeed, essentially any of the (non-lottery-based)
schemes that have been proposed will satisfy the following desirable consistency properties:
a. Permutation Symmetry : if the population counts (or equivalently, state labels) are permuted, then
the corresponding permutation of the seat assignments must be an acceptable apportionment under
the method;
b. Population Consistency : no state can receive fewer representatives than another state with a strictly
smaller population (unless their minimum acceptable apportionments favor the smaller state and force
this behavior);
c. Ceteris Paribus Monotonicity : if the populations of all states but one are fixed, then the number of
representatives apportioned to that state will be a non-decreasing function of the state’s population;
d. Homogeneity : if the populations of all states are increased in fixed proportion, then the apportion-
ments for a fixed house size can remain unchanged—that is, the apportionments a for the populations
p and αp should be (or in the presence of ties, can be) the same, for any nonnegative constant α;
e. Perfect Proportionality : if it happens that there exists a feasible apportionment for which a ∝ p
exactly, then the method should assign such an apportionment.
But here are some properties that might sound nearly as plausible or as desirable as those above, but
which apportionment schemes may or may not satisfy:
i. House Monotonicity : If the total house size is increased (keeping all state populations fixed), no
state’s apportionment should decrease;
ii. Population-Pair Monotonicity : under a change in populations, if a state A’s relative population
increase (percentage change since the previous census) exceeds that of state B, then state A should
not lose seats while state B holds steady or gains seats;91
iii. New-State Consistency : If a new state is added with (non-negative) population pS+1, bringing the
total population from P to P ′ = P + pS+1, then there exists some nonnegative increase ∆R to the
previous house size R, close to pS+1P R, such that the apportionment rule applied to R
′ = R + ∆R
seats delivers ∆R representatives to the new state while leaving the apportionments of all other
states unchanged;
iv. Quota Non-Violation: each state receives a number of representatives equal either to its lower quota
or upper quota (unless otherwise required by lower or upper bound constraints);
v. Fair Share Non-Violation: the apportionment satisfies bFsc ≤ as ≤ dFse, or equivalently |as −Fs| <
1, for all states s = 1, . . . , S;
91 Balinski and Young [80, 86] offer a slightly different definition of what they refer to as population monotonicity: supposing
populations p for S states lead to an apportionment a and populations p˜ for S˜ states lead to an apportionment a˜, if for
any pair of states s and s′ it is the case that p˜s ≥ ps but p˜s′ ≤ ps′ and at least one of the inequalities is strict, then (i)
a˜s ≥ as and/or (ii) a˜s′ ≤ as′ . But if the apportionment method is also homogeneous, then this basically says that no
state that grows relative to a second state gives up seats to the second state.
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vi. Near Fair Shareness: no transfer of a seat between any pair of states can bring both states nearer
their fair shares in absolute value; that is, there is no pair of states s and s′ such that Fs− (as−1) <
as −Fs and as′ + 1−Fs′ < Fs′ − as;
vii. Avoidance of Strategic Splitting : there is no incentive for a state (or party, etc.) to split into two or
more sub-groups in the expectation of increasing the total number of allotted seats.
How serious should we take violations of any of these latter properties? Many methods can violate quota
or fair share in principle, though no U.S. Congressional apportionment has done so practice. Certainly
opinions differ as to the importance of satisfying quota or fair share. Many, including this author, would
remain entirely nonplussed.
Most apportionment algorithms that enjoy anything resembling decent proportional accuracy and avoid
significant large-state bias may be subject to some extent to risks of strategic splitting, but this is more
of a potential problem with party-list systems than Congressional apportionment.92 The idea is that a
large party might divide into smaller parties, in such a way that each party would have just enough votes
to get a seat, by whichever method is in use. But taking advantage of such in-principle opportunities
would typically require very accurate prediction of expected vote totals.
Historically, it has been violation of properties (i.), (ii.), or (iii.) that were regarded as “paradoxes,”
although no such violations actually lead to inconsistencies in any single-case apportionment; rather, one
must look at proposed apportionments under different House sizes, trends from past apportionments,
or different (counterfactual) population distributions to observe the surprising behavior associated with
violating any of these three properties. From our point of view, these so-called paradoxes are all rooted
in presumptions about the entitlements of states, rather than rights of representation of individuals, so
we are not as bothered as some commentators—though admittedly, violation of House Monotonicity in
particular (known as the “Alabama Paradox,” as discussed next) would trouble the intuition. In any
case, the entropic apportionment method advocated here is automatically immune to all three.
C.1. The Alabama Paradox
A violation of House Monotonicity is known as the Alabama Paradox, and first surfaced after the 1870
Census, regarding the number of seats to be received by Alabama via Hamilton’s method, under different
house size scenarios. It was discovered by C.W. Seaton, chief clerk of the U.S. Census Office. The paradox
arises when, given fixed populations, an increase in the total number of proposed representatives would
lead to a decrease in the number of representatives apportioned to some particular state.
This is in our view the most serious of the so-called paradoxes of apportionment, but also the easi-
est to avoid once quota methods are eschewed. Some prominent authors are nonplussed even by this
“paradox”—Birkhoff for example [16] contends that “there is no real reason for requiring apportionment
to be house-monotone. The objective should be to minimize inequity.” Though we are certainly sympa-
thetic to the idea of minimizing inequity above all else, our proposed method for doing so will also and
automatically maintain house monotonicity, so we can have our cake and eat it too on this issue.
C.2. The Population Paradox
The Population Paradox refers to a violation of Population-Pair Monotonicity, and first arose around
1900, when it was discovered that Virginia had grown faster in relative terms than Maine since the
previous census, in the sense that the ratio of the population of Virginia compared to Maryland in-
creased,93 but nonetheless Virginia lost a seat and Maryland gained a seat compared to the previous
apportionment, using the very same House size.
92 Only one existing U.S. state has ever split, when West Virginia separated from Virginia, and that was in the context of
secession and the Civil War, not over apportionment concerns. According to the Constitution, splitting of states would
require approval of both the state involved and the U.S. Congress as a whole.
93 If pv and pm denote the previous (nonnegative) populations of Virginia and Maryland, and p′v and p′m their more recent
populations, note that
p′m−pm
pm
>
p′v−pv
pv
if and only if
p′m
pm
>
p′v
pv
, and if and only if
p′m
p′v
> pm
pv
.
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C.3. The New State Paradox
The New State Paradox was discovered in 1907, when Oklahoma became a state. The paradox arose
when the addition of this new state, together with its expected share of additional congressional seats
(expected, that is, by almost any of the measures considered, given its population and the previous
apportionments of existing states), with the intent to leave all apportionments to other states unchanged,
nonetheless affected the number of seats apportioned to other states, with Maine gaining a seat and New
York losing a seat.
C.4. Balinski-Young Impossibility Theorem
Kenneth Arrow famously proved, and others have elaborated [30, 43, 47, 48] how no voting scheme can
be perfectly democratic, in the sense of possessing all of the plausible properties we might want in a fair
procedure for social choice. Since voting and apportionment are closely related, it is not surprising that
any one apportionment scheme cannot exhibit all of the plausible properties that have been suggested
or advocated for fair allocation.
In particular, in 1982, Balinski and Young [23] proved an impossibility result for apportionment. Specif-
ically, with three or more states, they showed that either an apportionment method can violate quota,
or else it will be susceptible to the Alabama and/or Population paradoxes. Indeed, the quota and
population-pair-monotonicity criteria are mutually incompatible.
Again, we are unpersuaded by arguments for maintaining quota, so are not terribly bothered by this
impossibility result.
C.5. Bias
In the apportionment literature, the concept of bias refers to some identifiable property of certain
states, or membership in some identifiable subset of states, being correlated (in some sense) with greater
under-representation or over-representation (in some sense). Since the only features of states which are
supposed to enter the apportionment algorithm are the populations counts themselves, bias in relation
to the size of states has been widely discussed, though in principle other properties of the populations
could also be associated with bias.94
There are several different senses in which methods have been judged for bias against large or small
states. Balinski and Young [80] first define bias towards small/large states in a comparative sense
between apportionment schemes. In their approach, an apportionment method A is said to favor large
states over another method B if: apportionment A gives as least as many seats at some House size R′ to
the larger of any pair of states as does method B under a possibly different House size R, whenever the
total seats allotted by A to this pair of states at House size R′ is equal to the total number allotted by
B at house size R. A method favors large states in an absolute sense if the method favors large states
over any rival method.
This is notion is actually both overly strong and overly narrow. More generally, we can think in terms of
the probabilities or tendencies of ending up over-represented. For instance, a method can be send to have
a bias towards large states (or against small states) when ps > p
′
s implies that P(as > qs) > P(as′ > qs′).
Bias towards small states (or against large states) is defined in an analogous but opposite manner. Since
results will depend on the entire distribution of populations across states, this sort of bias is typically
investigated via Monte Carlo simulations, where bias towards large states manifests in a noticeable
positive correlation between states’ population size and the chance of being over-represented.
94 For example, whether populations are even or odd, or prime or composite (or more generally, with many divisors or
few), could effect tendencies for states to end up over-represented or under-represented.
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Other definitions of bias might focus instead on the relative degree of over-representation as−qsqs , or
the relative deviation in average district sizes, d¯s−D¯
D¯
= ( qsas − 1), but the plethora of possibilities to
define or measure bias perhaps hints at the very ad hocness and mis-focus of the concept. From our
perspective, the above notions of bias towards small/large states privilege the states, rather than the
people. At minimum, a better measure would directly involve deviations in the weights of representation
of individuals, because we ought to be concerned with disproportionate representation of people, nor
states. More could be said about this, but there is a deeper sense in which the whole notion of post-facto
signatures of bias towards some identified group of states involves moving the motivational goalpost. As
Balinski and Young [67] point out,
Nevertheless given any method it is an almost irresistible temptation to analyze particular
numerical solutions by adding and subtracting different combinations of the numbers to show
that the method is in some peculiar sense unfair to certain groups of states. Thus one may
question whether a particular solution gives more than a just share to the ‘larger’ states versus
the ‘smaller’ states (or the ‘middle’ states) or to the North versus the South, or to the states
with large fractions versus those with small fractions, and so forth. These investigations
may generally be called ones of ‘bias’ and they purport to establish empirically that certain
‘new’ principles are violated; principles which by the very nature of the case are different
from those already agreed upon as defining the method. For the notion of bias to even make
sense, a normative principle must be postulated; one may then ask what methods (if any)
satisfy this principle instead of other principles.
That is to say, if one is going to be bothered if actual results of an apportionment end up possessing a
purportedly undesirable feature, or lack a favorable one, then presumably one should have built into the
apportionment method some reward or penalty enforcing adherence to (or avoidance of, as the case may
be) this property, instead of relying on whatever principles were used to motivate adoption of a method.
After all, some states are destined to receive less than their exact quota of seats, and others more, and
the point of a principled apportionment method is to obviate ad hoc or self-serving arguments after the
fact as to why various states have been unfairly treated.
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Appendix D: A TYPOLOGY OF APPORTIONMENT METHODS
Apportionment rules can be categorized in various ways, and often any one method can be interpreted or
implemented in more than one way. One useful high-level classification is between quota methods, divisor
methods, ranking methods, and optimization methods, though there is significant overlap between these.
To better delineate and differentiate methodologies, we take a closer look at a seemingly elementary
mathematical procedure which underlies many apportionment algorithms, as well as much of the political
debate surrounding apportionment: that of rounding real numbers to integers.
D.1. Rounding Functions and Rounding Thresholds
In a nutshell, the apportionment problem is one of rounding, of mapping fractions to whole numbers
in some way which is considered most equitable, or at least satisfactorily fair. Since the fundamental
problem of apportionment comes down to mapping rational numbers to integers, rounding functions are
central to many apportionment methods.
In fact, both the so-called quota and divisor apportionment methods may be defined by a choice of a
divisor D, or target district size, and a rounding rule. By rounding function ξ(x) we shall mean here
a function which projects nonnegative real numbers into nonnegative integers in some sensible fashion.
Intuitively, any well-defined rounding function ξ : {x ∈ R|x ≥ 0} → N ought to possess the following
elementary characteristics:
i. monotonicity : 0 ≤ x ≤ y implies 0 ≤ ξ(x) ≤ ξ(y);
ii. idempotency : ξ
(
ξ(x)
)
= ξ(x);
iii. proximateness: ξ(x) ∈ {bxc, dxe}.
Together these imply that along the nonnegative real axis, the value of a rounding function jumps by
exactly one integer exactly once within each unit interval, but is otherwise flat. Simple examples of
rounding functions include: the floor function (always rounding x down to bxc), the ceiling function
(always rounding x up to dxe), and standard rounding to the nearest integer.95
Equivalently, a rounding function may be uniquely defined by the discrete locations where it jumps.
That is, we can generate a rounding rule by specifying an associated rounding threshold96 denoted by
θ(x), that should satisfy, for all x ≥ 0, the following properties:
a. bxc ≤ θ(x) ≤ dxe;
b. θ(x) is non-decreasing;
c. θ(x) is piecewise smooth,
such that any nonnegative x is rounded down to the floor bxc or up to the ceiling dxe depending on
whether x is less than or greater than the threshold θ(x), respectively (with some further deterministic
or randomized convention in the case where x = θ(x) exactly but bxc < dxe strictly):
ξ(x) =
{
bxc if x < θ(x)
dxe if x > θ(x) . (D1)
95 In this case, an additional convention must be adopted for what to do precisely at the midpoint between two integers—
randomization seem a reasonable choice.
96 What we call the rounding threshold θ(x) is also referred to as a rounding cutoff, breakpoint, rounding criterion, round-up
point, or critical fraction.
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Typically θ(x) is chosen as some simple function of bxc and dxe, such as the minimum, maximum,
arithmetic mean, geometric mean, quadratic mean,97 harmonic mean,98 etc.
Of course, in certain apportionment methods, the choice of rounding threshold may have to depend on
additional parameters besides the number x to be rounded itself, particularly when we want to impose
some sort of collective constraint on the rounded values, such as limit on their sum.
D.2. Quota Rules
As the name suggests, quota methods [23, 67] are engineered to satisfy quota, and deliver to each state
either its lower quota or upper quota (unless the rounded quota itself lies outside prescribed bounds, in
which case the assignment must be shifted to saturate the relevant bound).
In a pure quota method, each state is assigned either its lower quota or upper quota by rounding the
exact quota qs up or down. If the total house size is fixed ahead of time, the rounding must depend on
some sort of prioritization criterion across the states, in order that the total number of representatives
achieves its predetermined target. Note that each state is to appear at most once on any such actual or
implicit prioritization list, so can only receive at most one seat more than its lower quota. If the total
number of seats is not fixed precisely in advance, then a uniform rounding rule could be applied to all
states, leading however to a House size that may differ from the original target used to calculate the
quotas.
With additional lower or upper bound constraints, a pure quota method must be modified: either a state
is instead assigned the closest boundary value if the rounded quota lies outside the allowed range, or
else one works with the fair shares rather than the original exact quotas, and the rounding algorithm is
applied only to those states with fractional fair shares in order to assign remaining seats, in which case
the method might be better described as a fair-share method rather than a quota method.
Many quota methods are prone to the trifecta of Alabama, Population, and New State paradoxes. There
is one quota method (introduced by Balinski and Young, and described below) which avoids the Alabama
paradox, but all quota methods remain susceptible to the Population Paradox.
As to the desirability of quota methods, we find ourselves in agreement with Huntington [69] on this
point, who asserted “it is a common misconception that in a good apportionment the actual assignment
should not differ from the exact quota by more than one whole unit,” and also concur with Edelman
[42] (p. 338), who wrote
Should we really be concerned with how close a state is to quota? If the Court’s concern is
adherence to “one person, one vote,” then the relevant unit of analysis is the representation
of citizens, not the total representation of the state. Under this inquiry, the state has no real
claim at all....
and
Further buttressing this argument is the federal statue requiring states to elect their repre-
sentatives by single-member districts. This not only removes from the states the decision
of how to elect the representatives, but ties each representative to a sub-population of the
state, rather than the state itself. This makes it difficult to view representatives as being
representatives of the state qua state, rather than as a representative of those people within
the district.
97 So far as we know, an apportionment method based on root-mean-square rounding has never been advocated seriously.
98 Given x ≥ 0 and y ≥ 0, the arithmetic mean of the pair is defined as A(x, y) = 1
2
(x + y), the geometric mean is
G(x, y) = exp[ 1
2
(lnx + ln y)
]
=
√
xy, the harmonic mean is H(x, y) = [ 1
2
(x−1 + y−1)
]−1
= 2xy
x+y
, and the quadratic
mean (root-mean-squared) is Q(x, y) = [ 1
2
(x2 + y2)
]1/2
. For nonnegative arguments these means satisfy the chain
of inequalities min[x, y] ≤ H(x, y) ≤ G(x, y) ≤ A(x, y) ≤ Q(x, y) ≤ max[x, y], with equality for strictly positive
arguments if and only if x = y. If either argument vanishes (xy = 0) then min[x, y] = H(x, y) = G(x, y) = 0,
while A(x, y) = Q(x, y) = 0 if and only if both arguments vanish (x = y = 0).
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From the perspective of proportionality alone, we see no particular reason to worry more about satisfying
quotas for individual states rather than any other identifiable partitions of the population. But it can
be impossible to satisfy quotas at both the level of single states and groups of states. See Table XIII in
Appendix K for a simple example.
Furthermore, seats awarded to any one state cannot always be determined by that state’s quota alone.
Table XII in Appendix K presents a simple example were, or a fixed house size, the difference in assign-
ments to State B does not arise from any differences in B’s quota but instead depends on small shifts
in population amongst other states.
From our perspective, the problem with quota methods is not their propensity for “paradoxes,” but the
misguided goal itself. Directly or indirectly, all methods with any pretense to proportionality end up
using the exact quotas as apportionment targets in some sense,99 but fastidious insistence on assigning
seats by rounding exact quotas seems rooted in the idea of states being entitled to seats, rather than
the people of the various states deserving equal representation.
D.3. Divisor Methods
Quota methods are based on rounding the exact quotas qs = ps/D¯ calculated using the standard divisor
D¯ but adjusting the rounding procedure depending on some prioritization rule. In contrast, divisor
methods [23, 56, 90] instead use a fixed rounding method for all states, but adjust the divisor as necessary
to achieve the target House size.
Given some modified or “sliding” divisor D which can differ somewhat from the standard divisor D¯,
we first define Qs = ps/D for s = 1, . . . , S, referred to as the modified quotas, pseudo-quotas, or else
quotients.100 These quotients are then rounded up to dQse or down to bQsc based on the adopted
rounding rule (and replaced if necessary by a prescribed lower or upper bound if the results would
otherwise lie outside the mandated range), then D may be adjusted and the process repeated until the
total number of seats thereby assigned is exactly equal to some predetermined target.
In a traditional divisor method, the output of the rounding rule for each state depends only on the value
of Qs = ps/D for that state itself. In a so-called generalized divisor method, the rounding function
can also depend parametrically on the total number of states S and/or the total House size R—but not
directly on the populations of other states. Either type will be referred to as a divisor rule here.
In practice, typically one can begin with the choice D = D¯, and adjust iteratively as needed by trial and
error, increasing D if too many seats were tentatively assigned, and decreasing D if too few seats were
assigned. However, we can also implement a divisor algorithm starting with a very large D  D¯, leading
to a minimal number of assignments consistent with any prescribed lower bounds, then decreasing D
gradually as the number of seats tentatively apportioned increases one by one (with some randomization
or other convention adopted in the unlikely event of exact ties). As long as R is consistent with the lower
and upper bound constraints, and we use a properly-defined rounding function (with suitable allowance
for exact ties), this sort of implementation guarantees that there will always be a range of values for
D that produce an apportionment with exactly R seats, and that the resulting apportionments will be
identical (apart from exact ties) for any choice of the sliding divisor D within this range.
It may seem counterintuitive to make use of a divisor D other than the overall average district size
D¯, and then have to adjust it iteratively.101 However, when divisor methods were first suggested, the
House size typically was not fixed in advance. Instead, a target value for D would be chosen, resulting
in apportionments a obtained by rounding the quotients, and the total House size R =
∑
s
as would fall
where it may. The resulting national average D¯ = P/R would tend to be near but not in general exactly
equal to the originally chosen target size D.
99 After all, the exact quotas are simply the state populations, measured in units of the average district size D¯.
100 We will follow the latter convention, to avoid confusion with the exact state quotas.
101 The divisor D essentially becomes a maximum allowable intra-state average district size, in the absence of lower or upper
bound constraints.
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Any consistent divisor method can sometimes violate quota even in the absence of lower or upper bound
constraints, but is guaranteed to be house monotone. Additionally, pair-population monotonicity will
always be satisfied by an apportionment rule if and only if the rule is equivalent to a traditional or
generalized divisor method [23] .
D.4. Ranking and Prioritization Methods
In ranking or prioritization methods, each state receives some initial allotment of seats a′s0 , then the
remaining seats are doled out one at a time, based on the relative values of some ranking index 102
ρ(a′s, ps, P,R,R
′), which determine the priority for the next seat to be distributed, given the seat counts
a′s assigned up to that point, the state’s population ps, and possibly the total population P , total
number of seats to be apportioned R, and the number R′ apportioned so far. That is, at each stage,
the state with the largest value of the prioritization score or ranking index ρ(a′s, ps;P,R,R
′) receives
the next seat, then its cumulative apportionment and incremental ranking are updated, and the process
is continued until all seats have been distributed. In the absence of symmetry-breaking lower/upper
bound constraints, note that permutation invariance demands that the same functional form of ranking
function ρ(a, p, P,R.R′) should be used for all states.
Both divisor methods and quota methods can be interpreted or implemented as ranking methods. For
quota methods, we have already seen how which of the quotas are rounded up or down must depend on
a prioritization list, if the total house size is to be fixed ahead of time. As for divisor methods, By again
imagining a procedure involving gradually decreasing the sliding divisor D as seats are assigned one by
one, we can see directly how to translate between a divisor rounding rule and an equivalent ranking
index: ρ(a′s, ps, P,R,R
′) can be set equal to the largest value of the divisor D at which the quotient Qs
would be rounded up to a′s + 1. (Here, the ranking index must be expressible as a function of a
′
s and ps
only).
Certain ranking methods automatically guarantee that each state receives at least one seat,103 but in
general representational lower/upper bound constraints will need to be enforced explicitly. Any state
that has achieved its upper bound can be subsequently re-assigned a low priority score ensuring it never
receives further seats. To enforce nontrivial lower bound constraints, some ranking methods assign to
states their lower bounds initially. In other approaches, states all start out without any seats, but
if any states would end up below their allowed minimums, priorities are modified in the final stages
so that the last assigned seats are shifted to the states that would otherwise fall below allowed lower
bounds. For ranking functions ρ(a, p;P,R,R′) which are monotonically decreasing functions of a, the
final apportionments will not depend on which of these modifications (i.e., shifting the initial versus final
assignments) is used to enforce the constraints (although the path taken to the final allocation might
differ). Essentially all ranking functions that have been suggested enjoy this rank-monotonicity property,
because if the ranking function is intended to reflect which state most “deserves” the next seat, intuition
suggests that a state should deserve its first seat more than its second seat, etc.
Other variants of ranking-based apportionment are possible. For example, “fair shares” can be deter-
mined, and the ranking-based allocation can be used to distribute remaining seats only to those states
with non-integral fair shares.
102 Confusingly, some sources instead refer to the ranking indices as quotients as well, because in many methods they take
the simple form ρ = ps
χ(a′s)
, for some function χ(a) for which a ≤ χ(a) ≤ a + 1. But it is the χ(a), and not the ρ, that
are most closely related to the quotients used in a divisor method. The ranking index ρ itself is instead more closely
related to the divisor D.
103 Authors disagree on whether this property should be regarded as a feature or a bug. We consider it a definite strike
against any apportionment method, which ought to be directly applicable, without ad hoc modification, to cases where
the lower bound constraints may differ from unity. For example, in party-list elections, the minimum is often intentionally
left at zero to avoid assigning seats to parties with very small support. Either one employs a method that does not
automatically assign one seat, or else all parties below a certain threshold of support must be explicitly excluded before
apportionment. Also, explicit constraints on minimal apportionments may exceed one. For example, before 1988 when
France switched to single-member constituencies, their National Assembly required at least two deputies from each
department.
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D.5. Optimization Methods
Optimization-based apportionment methods include Pareto optimization, local hill-climbing, (con-
strained) global searches, etc. Although in principle any apportionment method can be cast a posteriori
as some sort of global optimization method, this framing may not always be natural in practice; and
conversely, not just any optimization principle will lead to a tractable integer programming problem that
can be implemented with straightforward algorithms. However, most of the traditional apportionment
methods that have been proposed do admit a natural formulation in terms of the optimization of some
simple objective function.
D.5.1. Pairwise Comparison
The mathematician E.V. Huntington [69] investigated a class of of methods based on a notion of stability
under pairwise comparison, or what we might also call pairwise Pareto optimality. The idea is to find
an apportionment for which any further switching of a seat from one state to another cannot improve
fairness according to some adopted comparison criterion.
Specifically, the sth state is said to be over-represented (in an absolute sense) if as > qs, or equivalently
if d¯s < D¯, and under-represented if as < qs, or equivalently d¯s > D¯. But for any pair of states, we may
say that state o is over-represented relative to state u, or compared to state u, if and only if state o has
higher average share of representation than state u, or equivalently if and only if state o has a smaller
intra-state average district size than state u:
state o is over-represented relative to state u if and only if aopo >
au
pu
, or equivalently, d¯o < d¯u,
and likewise, state u is under-represented relative to state o whenever state o is over-represented relative
to state u.
Huntington introduced the notion of a so-called fairness test, or comparative test of inequality, associated
with a comparison function T (ao, po, au, pu) which, for any pair of states o and u, is equal to zero if and
only if ao/po = au/pu and positive if and only if ao/po > au/pu, and whose deviation from zero is taken
to quantify the extent to which state o is over-represented relative to state u. The larger the value of
T (ao, po, au, pu), the more unfair we are to regard the gap in the shares of representation of the oth and
uth states, or the greater we are to regard the mismatch in the representation afforded to the two states.
An apportionment is said to be stable with respect to a given fairness test if and only if, for every pair of
states, switching one representative from the relatively over-represented state (assuming it is not at its
lower bound) to the relatively under-represented state (assuming it is not already at its upper bound)
would reverse the order of per-capita representation but also increase, or leave unchanged, the degree of
unfairness, i.e.,
T (au + 1, pu, ao − 1, po) ≥ T (ao, po, au, pu) (D2)
for every pair of states for which both ao/po > au/pu and the proposed swap would be compatible with
the lower/upper bound constraints. In a pairwise comparison-based approach, an apportionment would
be considered permissible if and only if it satisfies all constraints (i.e., lower/upper bounds and total
House size) and is stable with respect to all feasible exchanges of one seat between any pair of states, a
feasible swap being a swap that would not violate any of the constraints.
However, it is not immediately clear that equalization in the relative representation between two states
cannot worsen the relation between one of these states and a third state, and in fact not all reasonable-
looking choices for a fairness test T (ao, po, au, pu) necessarily lead to unique, stable apportionments,
even in the absence of ties resulting from commensurate populations. Some choices of the measure can
result in intransitive orderings where apportionment aA is judged more fair than aB , aB is more fair
than aC , but aC is more fair than aA. Huntington called a comparison method workable if immune
to such inconsistencies. And though pairwise comparisons are perhaps useful for characterizing or
comparing apportionments, comparison tests do not directly lead to constructive algorithms, but must
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be implemented in practice as divisor or ranking methods. In fact, Huntington showed how various
simple choices for T (ao, po, au, pu) involving rational functions of ao and au lead to the five traditional
divisor methods. Further, Huntington suggested, it appears incorrectly, that these were the only workable
pairwise comparison methods.
Huntington contended that these sort of pairwise fairness tests reflect mathematically what inevitably
occurs politically after any apportionment is proposed: namely, that Congressional delegates or other
state politicians calculate average intra-state district sizes, and if their district size is larger than that of
some other state, raise the question of whether perhaps a seat should be transferred to their state. “The
size of the House being fixed,” Huntington contended [70], “the debate always comes down, in the last
analysis, to this question: ‘should or should not such a transfer be made?”’ But from our perspective, this
attitude (i) again risks overemphasizing the prerogatives of states over the rights of people, and (ii) blurs
the fact that both mathematical and moral calculations should be distinct, to the maximum extent
possible, from any inevitable but purely political maneuverings. Just because this is how individual
states will frame their criticism does not necessarily mean that pairwise comparisons offer the best way
to assert or resolve questions of fairness. And of course, (iii) neither Huntington’s family of fairness
measures, with which he characterized the five traditional divisor methods, nor the particular choice of
fairness test he favored, leading to the Method of Equal Proportions, provides the only notion or even
the most natural notion of a (local) optimality that might be invoked, notwithstanding the fact that his
framework has been extremely influential and has tended to dominate much of the subsequent discussion
of apportionment methods in Congress and within the Census Bureau. In particular, global optima must
also be local optima, so any of the global optimization methods mentioned below can a fortiori also be
used to assess fairness of possible swaps of seats between states. Although such comparisons induced by
a global figure-of-merit cannot always be formulated naturally as fairness tests in the precise sense that
Huntington defined them, they can claim to measure deviations from global optimality, which would
seem to be even better than mere pairwise Pareto optimality.
D.5.2. Pairwise Consistency
Balinski and Young [67, 91] situate Huntington’s pairwise comparison methods within a certain sub-class
of ranking methods104 defined iteratively as follows. Letting ρ(a, p) be a ranking index that assumes the
same functional form for all states and that depends only on that state’s population and apportionment
so far, and letting a′s(ps, R
′) denote the current allocation of seats to the sth state out of a total of R′
seats allocated so far based on this ranking index, the apportionment rule is:
1. a′s
(
ps,
∑
s
λs
)
= λs, for s = 1, . . . , S
2. if s∗(R′) is some one state for which ρ
(
as∗(R′)(ps∗(R′), R′), ps∗(R′)
) ≥ ρ(as(ps, R′), ps) for every s =
1, . . . , S, then a′s∗(R′)
(
ps∗(R′), R
′ + 1
)
= a′s∗(R′)
(
ps∗(R′), R
′)+ 1, and a′s′(ps′ , R′ + 1) = a′s′(ps′ , R′)
for all s′ 6= s∗(R′).
Such methods are clearly House monotone, and are also pairwise-consistent in the sense that: (i) as
the House size is incremented by one seat, the decision as to which state within any pair of states
deserves the seat depends only on the respective populations of these two states and the number of
seats already allocated to each of these two states (and possibly on the total P and R), but not on
the individual populations of or current apportionments to the other states; and (ii) any ties based on
the comparisons lead to equally acceptable apportionments. In fact, they proved the converse, namely
that the only methods that are both House monotone and pairwise-consistent in this sense can be
interpreted as ranking methods of the sort just described. Balinski and Young consider this property to
be a fundamental feature of any reasonable apportionment procedure, dictated by common sense. The
entropic apportionment method will always be pairwise consistent in this sense.
104 They call such methods Huntington methods, not to be confused with the Huntington method of equal proportions,
which is one member of this class).
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D.5.3. Global Optimization Methods
It seems what we really want is not an apportionment which is somehow minimally unfair with respect
to feasible swaps of one seat between any pair of states, but one which is globally optimal under any
feasible exchanges of any seats amongst any number of states. Some authors have referred to this as
minimizing a total error or total inequity of apportionment.
As the terminology suggests, global optimization methods seek a (constrained) global optimum of some
so-called figure-of-merit, variational potential, or objective function,105 either maximizing a global fairness
function Φ(a;p, R) which measures the overall degree of proportionality, uniformity, or equality of the
proposed apportionment a given the populations p, or equivalently, minimizing some unfairness or
inequity function U(a;p, R) which provides a total measure of overall disproportionality, inequality, or
deviation between the proposed apportionment a and the ideal or perfectly fair allocation.
Mathematically, the choice of maximizing fairness or minimizing unfairness is purely a matter of conve-
nience or convention, since the measures can usually be related by
U(a;p, R) = −Φ(a;p, R) + constant. (D3)
Typically, the chosen objective function will not incorporate directly any penalties for violating the
constraints, so optimization is to be performed subject to additional explicit constraints on the total
number of representatives and allowed minimum and maximum allocations for each state.
While we often speak of the global constrained optimum, in some cases we ought to refer more accurately
to a global constrained optimum, since some population distributions for which the (p1, . . . , pS) are not
relatively prime can admit non-unique optima for certain choices of R, between which we must choose by
some convention—typically at random. However, such instances will be rare for non-artificial examples,
particularly if we have some freedom in adjusting R sensibly.
In principle, any deterministic (but for ties) apportionment method must be equivalent to the optimiza-
tion of some objective function defined over possible assignments of seats. Given a finite house size R
and a finite number of states S with finite populations p, there are a (possibly large but) finite number
of possible apportionments, and each possibility can be assigned some numerical score which picks out
as optimal the apportionment(s) generated by the desired rule or procedure. But it may not be practical
to construct such a function explicitly, justify it naturally, or optimize it efficiently.106
Nonetheless, undoubtedly to many physicists, engineers, and statisticians, just this sort of variational
principle approach will definitely seem the most obvious and natural way to frame and solve an ap-
portionment problem. Any actual apportionment thereby obtained will by construction be guaranteed
to be the “best” possible given the populations and constraints, and attention can turn to motivating,
deriving, or justifying the best definition of “best.” The debate thereby shifts from what sort of ap-
portionments might be generated in various individual cases, which can be hard to assess directly or
compare at the margins, or from what properties are to be maintained or which “paradoxes” are to be
avoided (given that impossibility theorems dictate that no method can possess all properties that have
been considered desirable), to the fundamental question of what sort of overarching principle of balance,
equity, equality, uniformity, fairness, or proportionality in apportionments we ought to maintain. The
subsequent output of the algorithm is then to be accepted wherever it may fall. Thus it is somewhat
surprising that relatively little of the historical or contemporary literature has actually focused on such
a global variational framework, given its advantages and its generality.
Indeed, global optimization approaches have been criticized by Balinski and Young [26] and others
on the grounds that “choice of objective function remains ad hoc.” But any of the apportionment
approaches described above also rely on particular choices for rounding methods, ranking indices, or
105 Figure-of-merit is a general term often used when the optimum corresponds to a maximum. Variational potential
is often encountered in physics when the optimum corresponds to a minimum. Objective function is a more general
terminology common in operations research, where the goal or objective is to optimize this function. In economics
and decision theory, one usually speaks of maximizing a utility function, reward function, profit function, or fitness
function, or of minimizing a loss function or regret function or cost function. The terminology of a scoring rule is also
used in economics, statistics, decision theory, psychology, and other fields when eliciting probabilistic predictions. In
mathematics, one often refers simply to a maximand, minimand, or optimand.
106 Indeed, a good optimization method will reverse this logic, and not just pick out one optimal apportionment, but provide
a meaningful way to quantify deviations between a proposed apportionment and an ideal, or to compare or rank different
proposed apportionments.
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pairwise comparison tests. At least with a global optimization method, it is clear exactly what we
are choosing—namely, a universal notion of overall fairness, proportionality, uniformity, or equality of
representation of the proposed apportionment. Of course, any number of such measures of equity of
representation might be invoked, so some further axioms, desiderata, or characterizations need to be
put forward justifying a particular choice of function. The intent throughout this paper is of course to
advocate for one particular functional form, based on information theoretic entropy, which we contend
is the most natural and defensible way to measure equity of apportionments.
“Intuitively, ‘minimizing inequity’ is what the apportionment problem is all about,” Balinski and Young
[67] elsewhere admit. “The real problem is to determine what ‘inequity’ means.” We agree, but will
argue that there is unique way to define the overall level of inequity in this context. They continue,
the axiomatic approach to apportionment proceeds by making a choice concerning the prin-
ciples which any fair apportionment should satisfy, and then identifying that method (or
methods) that satisfy the principles. The advantage of beginning with agreed-upon fair-
ness principles is that subsequent squabbles over particular numbers resulting from these
principles are avoided.
We concur, with one modification, or at least change of emphasis As emphasized above, we need not
and should not impose the sorts of principles Balinski and Young have in mind directly at the level
of the apportionment procedure itself—many such principles have been suggested and debated, not all
can be satisfied simultaneously, and it is difficult to know how to separate out the compelling from
the merely plausible or the largely ad hoc. Instead, we contend that the optimal apportionment should
indeed literally minimize (subject to constraints) a global measure of inequity in the weights of individual
representation, and then impose suitable properties on this measure that pick out a unique functional
form. Here we depart partly but sharply from the contentions of Balinski and Young [67], who assert:
The lessons of history clearly point to the necessity of arriving at a fundamental understand-
ing of the properties of methods. Put in other terms, political apportionment must be based
on principles of fair division rather than on ad hoc choices of measures of inequity. Thus
axiomatics finds a political role!
On the contrary, its precisely the role of (hopefully compelling) “principles of fair division” to uniquely
characterize a non ad hoc quantification of fairness of distribution, and optimal apportionments will
then by definition optimize this measure (subject to required constraints). In our view, some pretty
fundamental principles do single out an essentially unique measure of inequity, and the apportionment
method associated with minimizing this measure inherits various “good” properties from the figure-of-
merit.
Many of the historic apportionment methods turn out to be equivalent to minimizing (subject to con-
straints on lower/upper bounds and total seats) an objective function of additive form
U(a;p, R) =
S∑
s=1
ψ(as; qs, R, P ), (D4)
in which the global measure of apportionment inequity simply accumulates separate contributions from
each state’s proposed assignment. Furthermore, such an optimization method is automatically pairwise
consistent—whether a swap of a seat between a pair of states will be judged advantageous does not
depend on the details how the remaining population or seats are distributed amongst other states not
involved in the proposed swap.107
Permutation invariance108 dictates that the summand ψ(a; q;R,P ) should assume the same functional
form for all states. If the variational principle is to do its job, the value of U(a;p, R) should increase as a
107 To be clear, this does not mean that one state’s quota by itself determines its final optimal apportionment—one state’s
optimal apportionment can still depend on shifts in population between other states, because of the nature of the
constraints. See Table XII in Appendix K for an example.
108 Which is arguably demanded by the Constitution, and certainly by basic intuitions of democratic fairness....
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deviates in feasible directions from q in some prescribed sense, but beyond that, any further mathematical
properties should be derived or defended.109 The exact choice for ψ(a; q,R, P ) must of course be justified,
and certainly not all reasonable-looking measures will lead to efficient computational algorithms. But
as we will show, if ψ(a; q,R, P ) additionally satisfies a certain natural discrete convexity condition, then
(constrained) global optimization is straightforwardly achieved by a simple greedy algorithm, leading to
an equivalent ranking or divisor method that additionally is guaranteed to be House monotone and free
of the other historic “paradoxes.”
Additionally, for several of the prominent variational methods, the functions ψ(a; q,R, P ) can be chosen
to be of a form which depends only on a and p = qRP . In these cases, the greedy optimization has
two further features, namely that: (i) it is recursively consistent when the apportionment problem is
sub-divided, and (ii) it automatically constructs optimal apportionments for all House sizes up to the
specified R. See Appendix H for details.
Huntington [69] specifically criticized the use of such additive objective functions not just for arbitrariness
but on the grounds that “a total or average error may be reasonably small, while at the same time the
error affecting some particular state may be shockingly large; and a gross injustice done to a particular
state could hardly be successfully defended on the grounds that ‘on the average’ the others states are
fairly treated.” This criticism strikes us as particularly surprising given that all of the “workable”
comparison methods Huntington himself studied, including his own favored Equal Proportions method,
can be derived from exactly these sorts of variational principles with additive objective functions. But as
an alternative, Huntington and others have also mentioned minimax criteria, resulting in apportionment
rules of the type
a = arg min
a
max
s
ζ(as, qs;R,P ), (D5)
or
a = arg min
a
max
s,s′
γ(as, qs; as′ , qs′ ;R,P ), (D6)
where we are to minimize the maximum value of of some discrepancy measure across all states or all
pairs of states, subject as usual to constraints on the value of R and the lower and upper bounds on
each as.
We tend to be a bit skeptical of the minimax approach. If the goal is to apportion representatives across
the entire partitioned population, it is most natural to do this so as to achieve a global (constrained)
optimum in some accepted measure of proportionality or equity that is sensitive to the populations
of, and seat assignments granted to all states, not just the most under-represented or over-represented
states. Contra Huntington, the whole point is that we must balance inevitable tradeoffs in assigning
seats to one state versus to any of the others. And with a sensible choice of a convex, additive global
equity function satisfying permutation symmetry, and conforming to prescribed constraints on the total
house size R and lower bounds λs, it will simply be the case that the resulting constrained optima
automatically avoid the sort of “gross injustice” feared by Huntington.
Furthermore, minimax criteria seem especially unappealing in the apportionment context, because such
measures are essentially insensitive to how disproportionality of representation is spread amongst those
states which happen not to be the most misrepresented.110 Nor will such minimax methods necessarily
lead to unique solutions even in the case of completely non-commensurate (i.e., relatively prime) popu-
lation counts, so in the end a minimax rule must often be supplemented with secondary criteria to break
what would otherwise be many ties.111
109 Note that we do not actually require that ψ(a; q,R, P ) have a absolute minimum at a = q in the absence of constraints.
The budget on
∑
s as may play an essential role here in shifting the location of the optimum, as is the case when using
relative entropy.
110 Minimax rules are commonly encountered in decision theory, where pessimists might want to act so as to minimize the
cost of the worst possible outcome. But in decision theory contexts, possible choices are typically mutually exclusive
and possible outcomes are mutually exclusive, so only one scenario unfolds, and in some situations we might be justified
in focusing on containing the risks of the worst-case scenario. But in the apportionment problem, all states receive some
seat assignment, so worrying about none but the most under-represented and/or over-represented state does not seem
sensible.
111 That being said, certain choices of convex minimax criteria, combined with a constraint on the total number of repre-
sentatives, can lead to unique apportionments. Hamilton’s method is such an case.
68
D.5.4. Geometric Interpretations
Apportionment methods, particularly when derived via optimization or variational principles, can often
be understood geometrically. In particular, the exact quotas q can be though of as an S-dimensional
vector constrained to lie on a hyperplane defined by R −∑
s
qs = 0. In any allowed apportionment, the
exact quota vector q is to be replaced with some lattice point, i.e., an S-dimensional vector a with all
nonnegative integer components but which also lies on the same feasible hyperplane as q.
Many of the well-known methods to be described in Appendix E below have reasonably simple geometric
interpretations, For example, the Hamilton-Vinton Method chooses the lattice point closest to q on the
feasible hyperplane (and which also assigns at least one representative to each state), where “closest”
is measured in the usual Euclidean L2 metric (or in fact for any Lµ metric with µ ≥ 1). The Webster
Method chooses the lattice point on the feasible hyperplane nearest to the line that passes through both
the origin and q (and which also assigns at least one representative to each state), again measured in
the Euclidean metric. And it turns out that the Huntington-Hill method, currently mandated by federal
statute, is equivalent to finding the closest feasible point to the exact quota in the Hilbert projective
metric:
h(a, q) = log max
s,s′
asqs′
as′qs
, (D7)
assuming all components as and qs are positive.
While this geometric language may help us visualize the operation of some apportionment rule, it does
not necessarily help us adjudicate between competing methods, because a posteriori any number of
metrics or geometries can be imposed arbitrarily on the space of apportionment vectors, and it is not at
all obvious a priori which is the most natural structure. As Balinski and Young [67] note, “to say it is
desirable to ‘minimize the length of the inequity vector in [some] Euclidean S-space’ begs the question.”
Indeed, our contention in this paper is that we should really look not directly in the space of quotas
and apportionments but rather in the space of polling probability distributions, or normalized weights
of representation across all individuals. While the relative entropy provides the most natural measure
of discrepancy or divergence in such a space of distributions, it is well known that it does not describe
a true metric, because in general it is not symmetric and does not satisfy the triangle inequality. But
in comparing a proposed distribution to an ideal distribution, symmetry is already broken, so a metric
structure is not required, only some appropriate notion of divergence between distributions, or perhaps
of projection of an ideal distribution onto the feasible sub-space of realizable distributions consistent
with constraints.
D.6. Lottery Methods
All methods discusses so far are deterministic in the absence of some randomized tie-braking. In contrast,
various lottery-based or randomized apportionment methods have been suggested [92] because they can
ensure proportionality “on average” or “in the long run.” Of course many different randomized methods
can achieve expected proportionality in the statistical sense, so further criteria, such as minimizing
variance, must be invoked to single out a particular strategy. For example, one could imagine constructing
(or simulating on a computer) a roulette wheel having S slots with widths proportional to the state
populations. The wheel could be spun R times, and seats assigned by where the ball lands. A better
(or at least lower-variance) alternative would be to first give each state the integer part of its quota (or
fair share) and then only use the roulette wheel to allocate the additional seats, with the slot widths
proportional to the states’ fractional remainders of the quotas (or of the fair shares). Or, one could
imagine placing colored marbles into an urn (specifically, ps marbles of the sth color for the sth state),
and drawing R marbles with or without replacement.
But the job of any apportionment scheme is to make the best singe-case assignment of seats for the
actual set of populations obtained, not in some imagined long-run repetition of random draws. And
randomized methods can violate fundamental desiderata of fairness, with smaller states receiving more
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representatives than strictly larger states. Our own intuition rebels at the use of randomization where
not necessary.
Of course there can arise situations where some sort of randomization may be unavoidable, in order
to break certain ties. In various methods relying on ranking or prioritization or optimization, there is
always a possibility of an exact tie, for particular population ratios. Sometimes this can be resolved
by a further deterministic rule, for example dictating that in the case of a tie in a quota or ranking
method, the seat always goes to the larger state. But any proposed scheme should be able to work
unambiguously in a hypothetical case where two or more states happen to have exactly the same popu-
lations, but must receive an unequal number of representatives. If for instance we ever must apportion
an odd number of seats amongst an even number of states of exactly equal population, there is really
no other fair option but randomization, unless it is permissible to go back and change the House size
to avoid the incommensurability altogether. Using some other characterization of the states, such as
their lexicographic ordering, not only strikes us as arbitrary and unsatisfying, but should probably be
regarded as un-Constitutional, violating the “according to their respective numbers” clause which would
seem to implicitly preclude use of any information about the states apart from their population counts,
in making decisions about apportionment.
In short, our sense is that randomization should be avoided altogether, except where it becomes essential.
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Appendix E: SOME SPECIFIC APPORTIONMENT METHODS
For comparison and context, here we provide descriptions and discussions of several methods that have
been actually used, or seriously suggested, for apportionment in the U.S. House of Representatives.
While this catalog is not meant to be exhaustive, it does cover most methods that have been employed
or debated historically or discussed more recently:
E.1. Hamilton Method
(Introduced by Alexander Hamilton, 1792; also known as the Method of Largest Fractions, the Method
of Greatest Remainders, or the Method of Largest Fractional Remainders).
Initially, each state is assigned its lower quota bqsc, then the states are sorted in order of decreasing
values of the (qs − bqsc), and, going down the list of states, an additional representative is assigned to
each state in order of these fractional remainders, until a total of R representatives have been assigned.
(Exact ties at the cutoff may have to be broken by some other criterion. For example, under a tie the
extra representative can be given to the larger state. In the off-chance of states with exactly the same
populations, such ties should be broken with a coin flip or other randomized choice).
In the absence of ties, the Hamilton Method can also be thought of as rounding to the nearest integer
after shifting the exact quotas qs by a common offset:
as = bqs + ∆H + 12c, (E1)
where ∆H is a state-independent constant chosen self-consistently so that
S∑
s=1
as = R.
In terms of a global variational principle, Hamilton’s method minimizes
UH(a;p, R; `) =
S∑
s=1
∣∣as − qs∣∣` (E2)
for any fixed constant ` ≥ 1 defining a choice of norm.
Birkhoff [16] introduced the notion of what he called binary fairness, which insists that it should not be
possible to transfer a representative from a state s to a state s′ and reduce |as − qs| + |as′ − qs′ |. But
looking at the figure-of-merit (E2) for the case ` = 1, we can see that Hamilton’s method will be the
only apportionment method satisfying this binary fairness principle. The principle itself strikes us as ad
hoc and state-centric, so are not bothered by violations of it.
A proposed apportionment based on Hamilton’s Method led to the very first U.S. presidential veto, by
George Washington in 1792. However, Hamilton’s method was used subsequently starting in the 1850
census, but by the early 1880’s its many serious flaws became too apparent to ignore.112 Hamilton’s
method can be subject to any and all of the Alabama Paradox, the Population Paradox, and the New
States Paradox. In its original formulation, this method can also assign zero seats to a small state, but
can be modified in the obvious way (see below) to incorporate constraints involving lower and/or upper
bounds.
More critically from our perspective, like all quota methods, Hamilton’s method overemphasizes the
idea that it is states that are entitled to representatives, rather than people from the various states.
And at least at first glance, rounding based only on the fractional parts of the quotas might seem to
ignore the absolute numbers of persons who thereby become under-represented or over-represented in
112 Sorry, Hamilton fans, or Hamilton fans.
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the population. On the other hand, choosing ` = 1, we notice that the Hamilton apportionment also
follows from minimizing the equivalent expression:
UH(a;p, R, 1) =
1
P
S∑
s=1
ps
∣∣ 1
d¯s
− 1
D¯
∣∣, (E3)
which is the average over all represented individuals of the absolute deviation of the (intra-state average)
shares of a representative from the democratic ideal. So whether or not Hamilton’s method accounts
for the number of individuals affected by the rounding might seem to depend on the form in which the
variational principle is written. One moral might be that neither the mere plausibility of a proposed
inequity function, nor perhaps the appearance of implausibility in one particular mathematical form,
will be sufficient to make a principled choice: we shall require deeper desiderata than mere reasonable
appearance if we are to pick out a unique objective function to optimize.
It is not hard to see that the Hamilton apportionment also follows from the minimax solution to
min
a
max
s
|as − qs|, subject to constraints on the non-negativity of all allotments as, and also on the
total house size
∑S
s=1 as = R.
E.2. Hamilton-Vinton Method
(Also known simply as Vinton’s Method, the Hare-Niemeyer method or else, somewhat confusingly,
occasionally by any one of the other names associated with Hamilton’s original method, such as the
Method of Greatest Remainders).
The original Hamilton Method was rediscovered by Vinton but adjusted to accommodate the requirement
that each state receive at least one representative but no more than a specified maximum. Any states
with zero lower quotas are placed at the top of the priority list before the remaining representatives are
apportioned. (And any states which are already at their upper bounds can be moved to the bottom of
the list).
More generally, we can start each state out with a′s = max
[
λs, bqsc
]
representatives, then round up the
states with largest values of (qs − a′s). These are automatically negative for those states whose quotas
are below the minimal apportionments, ostensibly placing these states at the bottom of the priority
list. Likewise, states whose upper quotas would lie above the prescribed upper bound can be given low
priority.
However, apart from incorporating lower/upper bound constraints, Vinton’s Method otherwise suffers
from the same shortcomings as the pure Hamilton Method, including susceptibility to the Alabama
paradox.
E.3. Lowndes Method
(Suggested by William Lowndes, a Representative from South Carolina, in 1822. Also known as the
Method of Largest Relative Fractions).
This is similar to the Hamilton-Vinton Method, except that after an initial assignment given by a′s =
max
[
λs, bqsc
]
, states are sorted in order of decreasing values of the relative fractional parts (qs−a′s)/bqsc,
and the remaining seats are awarded in this order. This too can be easily modified to incorporate upper
bound constraints.
Lowndes argued that, at the margin, an extra seat was much more valuable to a small state (with
fewer representatives) than a larger state (which presumably already has many representatives). While
undoubtedly a larger delegation is more valuable politically in terms of the state’s overall influence in
Congress and the Electoral College, clearly the point is to assign seats based on fairness to the people,
not political value to a state.
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Originally devised to try to maintain quota but reduce perceived bias against small states, the Lowndes
Method is still prone to the Alabama paradox.
E.4. Modified Vinton Method
After the Alabama paradox came to light, various (unsuccessful) attempts were made to modify the
Hamilton-Vinton method to produce an apportionment rule that both satisfied quota and was house
monotone. For example, what became known as the Modified Vinton Method based prioritization in
rounding on (qs − bqsc)/ps rather than on (qs − bqsc) as in the original Vinton method. However, this
failed to immunize against the Alabama paradox.
E.5. Hill’s Quota Method
(Discussed by J.A. Hill in 1910, according to [91]. Also known as the Method of Alternating Ratios.
Not to be confused with the Huntington-Hill Method described below).
Each state is initially assigned a′s = max
[
λs, bqsc
]
representatives. Remaining seats are distributed one
at a time based on a priority ranking of states by ps√
a′s(a′s+1)
, until the specified house size is reached.
States that would receive more than their upper bound can instead be pushed to the bottom of the list.
The method satisfies quota in the absence of lower bound constraints, but is susceptible to the Alabama
paradox.
E.6. Balinski-Young Quota Method
In 1974, mathematicians M. Balinski and H. Young [80, 86] proposed a method which (i) satisfies quota (if
the quota lies within the allowed lower and upper bounds), (ii) is immune to the Alabama paradox, and
(iii) is consistent under the accumulation of seats, in the sense that, as the house size is increased, relative
claims for an extra seat between two eligible states depend only upon their respective populations and
their current apportionments (and possibly the total population and house size), but not the individual
populations of other states.
Their method is most easily described and implemented as a ranking method, where all states start off
with no seats, and seats are assigned one by one. If a′s is the sth state’s allotment of seats at a given
stage at which a total of R′ seats have been assigned so far, where 0 < R′ < R, remaining seats are
assigned one at a time based on a priority list ranking states in decreasing order of psa′s+1
, amongst all
states which are deemed currently eligible to receive the next seat, in the sense that a′s ≤ psP (R′ + 1),
which is to say, the state has not yet exceeded what would be its upper quota for a house size of R′+ 1.
Though not obvious, it turns out this rule will also guarantee each state at minimum its lower quota of
seats.
Instead of using quotas, Balinski and Young actually came to advocate using a variant of this method
based on fair shares, applying the ranking method described above to any and all states whose fair shares
turned out to be non-integral.113
113 Later, they recanted and seemed to end up endorsing Webster’s method.
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E.7. Randomized Quota Method
As mentioned above, all methods may need to be augmented with some sort of randomization in the
case of certain ties that cannot be broken by any objective standard, for example where an odd number
of representatives must be apportioned to a pair of states with exactly equal populations, for there
is then no non-arbitrary deterministic criteria to decide between them. But some methods relay on
randomization more generally.
To generate a quota method which is unbiased between large and small states, a randomized rounding
schemes has been suggested, where each state’s quota qs is independently and at random rounded up
with probability qs − bqsc, and down otherwise, and the overall random assignment across all states is
simply repeated until the total number of apportioned representatives first agrees with the target house
size R.
However, in any one realization, this procedure could give more representatives to some state than to a
strictly more populous state, which is hard to justify based on any sort of assurances of fair behavior in
the long run. Again, whenever possible, an apportionment method really should be deterministic.
E.8. Jefferson Method
(Suggested by Thomas Jefferson, in 1792; also known as the Method of Greatest Divisors, the Modified
Lower Quota Method, the Method of d’Hondt, or the Hagenbach-Bischoff Method. Used for the United
State Congress until 1840).
Jefferson’s Method was the first of many divisor methods. Jefferson’s method tentatively assigns each
state bQsc representatives, where Qs = ps/D, and then adjusts the divisor D as necessary, always round-
ing down the quotients calculated using the modified divisor, until the total number of representatives
assigned is exactly R.
Jefferson publicly argued that the fractional remainders of the Qs were simply “unprovided for” by the
Constitution, so should be dropped.114
This pure Jeffersonian strategy does not ensure that each state receive at least one representative, so
the last representatives assigned as D is decreased from a large initial value would have to be shifted
to the states without representatives. (More generally, enough seats can be shifted to ensure that each
state receives any consistent prescribed lower bound λs, and no state exceeds its upper bound us).
Interpreted instead as a ranking method, the Jefferson Method (modified to ensure each state’s represen-
tation falls within allowed bounds) is equivalent to the following iterative process: begin by giving each
state its minimum allowed number of representatives (for U.S. Congressional seats, one for each state) so
as to take care of the lower bounds from the start. Maintain a list of states in decreasing order of psa′s+1
,
where a′s is the state’s allotment of seats at the current iteration; remove any states which have reached
their upper bound; and assign additional representatives from this list in decreasing order, incrementing
the selected a′s and re-sorting after each assignment. Note that the ranking score
ps
a′s+1
would be the
average district size within the sth state if the next representative were to be awarded to that state.
As a pairwise comparison method, the Jefferson method is equivalent to seeking apportionments which
are stable with respect to the fairness test
T (ao, po, au, pu) = ao
pu
po
− au = ao quqo − au, (E4)
which, to our taste, lacks a certain symmetry, and certainly any obvious rationale, compared to other
possible comparison tests.
114 Perhaps more likely, he privately surmised that the method would tend to favor large states like Virginia.
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The Jefferson method can violate upper quota, but never lower quota in the absence of lower bound
constraints, and in fact is the only divisor method guaranteed to satisfy lower fair share. It is also the
only divisor method which can be said to be immune to the temptations of strategic splitting. But as
widely acknowledged, it is heavily biased in favor of larger states, in the sense that a large state with a
quotient of, say, Qs = 50.1 would be rounded down to as = 50, involving a small relative change, but a
small state with a quotient of Qs′ = 1.9 would be rounded down to as′ = 1, a very large relative drop.
E.9. Adams Method
(Suggested by John Quincy Adams in or around 1832, but never adopted for Congressional apportion-
ments. Also known as the Method of Smallest Divisors, or the Modified Upper Quota Method).
Given a divisor D, Adams’ method works much like the mirror image of Jefferson’s method, by instead
assigning the ceiling dQse of the quotients as the allotted representatives, and adjusting D as necessary,
recalculating tentative seat assignments by always rounding up all quotients using the modified divisor,
until the total number of representatives assigned is R.
This automatically guarantees each state receives at least one seat, but for apportionment problems
where the required minima differ from unity, it too can be modified by shifting the last assigned seats
as D is lowered.
As a ranking method, the Adams method turns out to be equivalent to ranking states by psa′s
, the average
intra-state district sizes given the representatives apportioned so far, so the state with the largest average
district size based on the previous apportionments earns the next representative.
As a pairwise comparison method, the Adams Method is equivalent to seeking apportionments which
are stable with respect to the fairness test
T (ao, po, au, pu) = ao − au popu = ao − au
qo
qu
, (E5)
which is in a sense dual to, but also as ad hoc as, the comparison test associated with the Jefferson
method.
Late in his career, Walter F. Wilcox, formerly a professor at Cornell University, president of the American
Statistical Association, and regarded as one of the first professional statisticians in the United States,
apparently switched his professional loyalties from Webster’s Method, which he had long championed,
to Adams’ Method. He contended that Adams’ Method of Smallest Divisors “secures the smallest
average population per district and the narrowest range between the largest and smallest average size
of district.” By average population per district, Wilcox does not mean the natural average district size,
1
R
S∑
s=1
as∑
k=1
dsk =
P
R = D¯, which must be the same for all apportionments with the same total number of
seats, but rather the unweighted average (over states) of their respective intra-state average district sizes,
1
S
S∑
s=1
d¯s =
1
S
S∑
s=1
ps
as
, which does not reflect the multiplicity of districts within each state. The range in
average district sizes to which he refers is just max
s
d¯s − min
s
d¯s = max
s
ps
as
− min
s
ps
as
= max
s,s′
[
ps
as
− ps′as′
]
,
which is insensitive to the uniformity of any districts in between the very largest and smallest. So these
criteria do not seem particularly natural. And anyway, Adams’ method does not actually guarantee
an apportionment minimizing either of these quantities—it is straightforward to find counter-examples.
It may tend to do better at minimizing these than either Webster’s or Huntington’s methods (to be
discussed below), but that is hardly a compelling argument. If one’s primary objectives are to make
Congressional districts as small and as nearly equally-sized as possible, then presumably one should
explicitly optimize on those measures.
However, the Adams’ apportionment does minimize the maximum average intra-state district size, so the
simple optimization criteria min
a
max
s
ps
as
, subject to λs ≤ as ≤ us for s = 1, . . . , S and
S∑
s=1
as = R, will
75
generate the Adams apportionment, essentially uniquely accept for ties. This follows from the ranking-
based formulation of the method: Let a be the Adams apportionment, for which state m possesses the
maximal average district size: pm/am ≥ ps/as. Consider any distinct, feasible apportionment a′, for
which there must be at least one state z which has strictly fewer seats than in the Adams’ apportionment,
i.e., 1 ≤ a′z < az. In the Adams’ apportionment, state z’s last seat would have been awarded at some
specific stage of the ranking algorithm, at which point state m would have had a∗m ≤ am seats. Since
state z won the seat at that stage, it follows that pz/(az − 1) ≥ pm/a∗m, and since a′z ≤ az − 1 < az, we
may infer
pz
a′z
≥ pz
az − 1 ≥
pm
a∗m
≥ pm
am
, (E6)
so the maximum average district size must go up, or at least stay the same, under any other feasible
apportionment.
Adams’ Method can violate lower quota, but never upper quota in the absence of upper bound con-
straints, and in fact is the only divisor method guaranteed to satisfy upper fair share. It favors smaller
states in the same sense that the Jefferson method favors larger ones—smaller states are the ones that
tend to end up more over-represented in a relative sense.
E.10. Dean Method
(Communicated by James Dean, a former professor of Astronomy at Dartmouth College, to Daniel
Webster. Also known as the Method of Harmonic Means).
Given a divisor (target district size) D, Dean’s Method [93] may be thought of as choosing the appor-
tionments as so that the average intra-state districts sizes d¯s =
ps
as
are all as close to D as possible in
absolute value. However, this does not lead to a simple global optimization method in the sense defined
above, because in minimizing
S∑
s=1
| psas −D| we must also adjust D self-consistently to ensure
S∑
s=1
as = R.
However, this does turns out to be equivalent to rounding each quotient Qs based on a threshold θ(Qs)
equal to the harmonic mean of bQsc and dQse. As with other divisor methods, D can then be adjusted
iteratively until the number of representatives apportioned,
S∑
s=1
as, exactly equals R, the predetermined
House size.
As a ranking rule, Dean’s Method prioritizes seats based on decreasing values of ps
2a′s+1
2a′s(a′s+1)
, which looks
complicated, but is just the population ps divided by the harmonic mean of the seat count a
′
s so far and
what would be the next seat total, a′s + 1.
As a pairwise comparison method, the Dean Method seeks the apportionment which is stable with
respect to the fairness test
T (ao, po, au, pu) =
pu
au
− poao = PR
(
qu
au
− qoao
)
, (E7)
which reveals that Dean’s Method favors smaller absolute differences in average district size under any
feasible proposed pairwise swap of seats. At the very least, this fairness test appears somewhat more
symmetric and more natural than the fairness tests for either Jefferson’s or Adams’ methods.
In an influential 1929 report on the Census and apportionment [5], the National Academy of Sciences
apparently suggested, erroneously, that Dean’s Method minimizes the difference between the largest and
smallest intra-state average district sizes. It is not hard to find counter-examples to this claim. It seems
that the committee may have confused Huntington’s notion of stability under pairwise swaps of seats
with the requirements for a true global minimum. Likewise, the Dean apportionment does not necessary
minimize
S∑
s=1
S∑
s′=1
∣∣d¯s − d¯s′ ∣∣, nor S∑
s=1
∣∣d¯s − D¯∣∣, nor S∑
s=1
(
d¯−D¯)2. Using the ranking-based characterization,
it is possible to construct a minimax criteria generating the Dean apportionment, but the result does
76
not have any particularly natural interpretation, and in fact we have been unable to find any compelling
and simple global optimization principle leading to Dean’s Method.
Dean’s Method tends to have a slight bias in favor of smaller states, but not as pronounced as Adams’
Method.
E.11. Webster Method
(Suggested by Daniel Webster, circa 1832, and used in the apportionment after the 1840, 1880, 1900, and
1910 censuses. Explored and re-formulated by Wilcox around 1910, after which it was also known as the
Webster-Wilcox Method, or the Method of Major Fractions, or the Method of Arithmetic Means. Known
in Europe as the Sainte-Lague¨ Method, as it was popularized for the purposes of party-list proportional
representation in the latter’s influential 1910 article).
Another divisor method, the Webster Method [19] instead chooses the as so that state representational
shares 1
d¯s
= asps are all as close to
1
D as possible in absolute value. It is not hard to show that this is
equivalent to using as rounding threshold the arithmetic mean of bQsc and dQse, which entails that the
quotients Qs are simply rounded to the nearest whole number:
as = bQs + 12c, (E8)
then D can be adjusted as necessary until the total apportionment reaches the predetermined target R.
As a ranking method, the Webster method amounts to ranking states and assigning additional seats
according to the ratios p
a′s+
1
2
. Here a′s +
1
2 is of course the arithmetic mean of the current seat total a
′
s
and what would be the next seat total a′s + 1.
As a pairwise comparison method, the Webster method is associated with the fairness test
T (ao, po, au, pu) =
ao
po
− aupu = RP
(
ao
qo
− auqu
)
, (E9)
meaning it favors equalizing the absolute differences between the shares of representation under possible
pairwise swaps.
As a global optimization method, Webster apportionments can be generated by minimizing (subject to
constraints) the objective function
UW(a;p, R) =
1
P
∑
s
ps
(
1
d¯s
− 1
D¯
)2
= RP 2
∑
s
(as−qs)2
qs
, (E10)
which is the mean-squared deviation in best-case shares of representatives (over all individuals), or
equivalently can be interpreted as a quantity proportional to the chi-squared statistic χ2 measuring the
discrepancy between the “observed” distribution a of seats and the “expected” proportional distribution
q, across all states.
Birkhoff [16] also introduced a notion of what he called binary consistency, and what Balinski and Young
[23] later labeled relative well-roundedness. They define a state’s apportionment to be over-rounded if
as > qs+
1
2 , and under-rounded if as < qs− 12 . An apportionment a is said to be relatively well-rounded
if there is no pair of states such that one state is under-rounded and another over-rounded. It turns out
that the Webster method is the only method which is house monotone, pairwise consistent, and always
relatively well-rounded. Since we are unmoved in general by arguments about nearness to quotas per
se and in particular by an argument that presumes without justification an ad hoc definition of over or
under-rounding, we are not bothered that the entropic method can violate this property.
The Webster Method can still violate quota in either direction, but in actual practice rarely does so
for non-contrived examples. It is apparently the only divisor method guaranteed to be near fair share,
which underlies its eventual advocacy by Balinski and Young.115 Computer simulations have suggested
115 But only after some earlier enchantment with their own quota/fair share method....
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that the Webster method very slightly favors large states, but it appears to have the smallest bias of
any of the historic divisor methods, by various measures.
E.12. Huntington Method
(Explored and advocated in detail starting around 1921 by Harvard mathematician Edward Huntington,
correcting earlier work of Joseph P. Hill, a Census Bureau statistician. Also known as the Huntington-Hill
Method, and the Method of Equal Proportions).
This method has been used for Congressional apportionment starting in 1929, and since 1941, has in
fact been mandated by ongoing Congressional statute.
Huntington’s goal was to keep the ratio of one state’s persons-per-representative to that of another state
as close to unity as possible under possible pairwise swaps. In this approach, seats are assigned to the
states so that no transfer of a seat can reduce the relative difference in per-capita representation between
those states, or equivalently the relative difference in average district size, where relative discrepancies
are to be determined by dividing the absolute value of the difference by the smaller of the two values.
That is to say, as a pairwise comparison method, the Huntington-Hill approach demands stability with
respect to the fairness test
T (ao, po, au, pu) =
aopu
aupo
− 1 = aoquauqo − 1, (E11)
meaning it favors reducing the relative differences between the district sizes or equivalently, relative
differences between the shares of representation. The fact that this method is “self-dual” in this sense and
does not require a choice between using district sizes or shares of representation (reciprocal district sizes)
to assess inequality of representation in the comparison test was a major selling point for Huntington.
As a divisor method, the algorithm chooses as by rounding the quotient Qs based on a threshold given
by the geometric mean of bQsc and bQsc, then adjusts D as necessary and recalculates the as until the
total number of representatives assigned is R. And just like the other divisor rules, this approach may
be modified to incorporate lower/upper bounds on the apportionments. By default, it must assign at
least one seat to each state, even in the absence of any minimum constraints, which speaks strongly
against its universality.
As a ranking rule, additional seats are apportioned according to the magnitude of ps√
a′s(a′s+1)
, where the
denominator
√
a′s(a′s + 1) is the geometric mean of the current seat count a
′
s and the next seat count
a′s + 1.
In terms of global optimization, the Huntington method can be shown to minimize (subject to con-
straints) the function
UH(a;p, R) =
1
R
∑
s
as
(
d¯s − D¯
)2
= P
2
R3
∑
s
(as−qs)2
as
, (E12)
which is the mean-squared deviation of (best-case) district sizes across all states, or equivalently can be
seen as a sort of dual to the chi-squared function generating the Webster apportionment, in that the
roles of the a and q are reversed vis-a`-vis the Webster objective function.
The Huntington method can violate quota, but to date has not done so in practice for any U.S. Con-
gressional apportionments. Theory and simulations suggest that it favors small states slightly.
E.13. Condorcet Method
(Proposed by Nicolas de Caritat, marquis de Condorcet).
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Condorcet’s apportionment method is similar to Webster’s, except that the rounding threshold occurs
40% into the interval between bQsc and dQse, rather than 50%, apparently based on intuition for what
might better reduce bias between large and small parties.116
E.14. Smith Method
(Suggested in online discussions by Warren Smith [94, 95], circa 2007).
Several divisor methods may be seen as special cases of the rule
as = dQs −∆e, (E13)
where Qs = ps/D as usual, and ∆ is a constant offset. For example, the methods of Webster, Adams,
and Jefferson correspond to the choices ∆ = 12 , ∆ = 0
+, and ∆ = 1−, respectively.
Smith has recommended a rule of this form but with a different intermediate value for ∆. Based on
a simple (if very questionable) probabilistic model of state populations,117 minimizing the expectation
value of an additive measure of bias from rounding suggests an optimal value for ∆ (in the absence of
lower/upper bound constraints):
∆ = a¯ ln
[
a¯(1− e−1/a¯)]−1, (E14)
where a¯ = RS is the average number of seats per state, which for current U.S. parameters (S = 50 and
R = 435) leads to ∆ ≈ 0.495211 . . ., close to the Webster limit.
However, as stated this approach will not guarantee a one-seat minimum. Instead, ∆ can be set to zero
for the first round of seat assignments, then subsequently set to
∆ = a¯
{
ln a¯a¯−1 − ln
[
a¯(e1/a¯ − 1)]}, (E15)
provided 0 < S < R strictly. For a¯ = 435/50 = 87/10, this yields a larger value ∆ = 0.557505 . . ..
Different lower bounds would lead to still different values of ∆, which strikes us an odd sort of dependency
to build into your rounding.
Smith also discusses a number of other optimality criteria, leading to different choices for the offset ∆.
E.15. Burt-Harris-Edelman Method
(Popularized in 2006–2008 by Paul Edelman [42], a mathematics professor at Vanderbilt. The same
method had been proposed earlier by O. Burt and C. Harris, Jr. in 1963 [96], and critiqued by E.J. Gilbert
and J.A. Shatz by 1964 [97]. Also known as the Minimum Total Variation Method).
The National Academy of Science erroneously attributed to Dean’s Method the property of minimizing
the range of average district sizes across states. Wilcox erroneously attributed this property to Adams’
Method. But this criterion can be used to define a (non-unique) apportionment strategy.
Edelman tried to argue that Supreme Court jurisprudence in intra-state Congressional districting cases
singles out a specific numerical measure of disparity in district size as the key criterion in inter-state
apportionment as well. This claim is highly debatable, as the Supreme Court has never invalidated any
of the traditional methods that have been used for Congressional apportionment, nor would a unique
116 In party-list systems, others have advocated shifting in the other direction, and using a threshold of 70%, so as to build
in a higher hurdle for very small parties to receive a seat.
117 The populations for apportionment are assumed to be IID exponentially distributed random variables. This is, to be
sure, the maximum entropy distribution given an overall mean state population, but clearly, in the U.S., we have strong
prior information suggesting that state populations are not identically distributed, and migration problematizes the
assumption that they are independently distributed.
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mathematical measure of deviation in district size obviously follow from any of their decisions. Yes,
the Supreme Court has ruled that Congressional districts within states should be chosen “as nearly
as practicable” to be equal in size with states, and has permitted only “limited variances which are
unavoidable despite a good-faith effort to achieve absolute equality, or for which justification is shown,”
but these standards were never put forward as explicit criteria for apportionment of representatives
amongst U.S. states as opposed to districting within states, and of course many different criteria might
be used to measure inequality in district size within or across states.
Nevertheless, based on a small body of case law regarding apportionment and somewhat more case
law regarding intra-state Congressional districting, Edelman argued for (constrained) minimization of
one particular inequity function, what he calls the total variation in district size, but what we would
call the scaled range of intra-state average district sizes. Specifically, for single-member district-based
representation, his optimal apportionment minimizes with respect to a (subject to constraints on House
size and lower and upper bounds) the difference
UE(a;p, R) =
max
s
d¯s −min
s
d¯s
D¯
= RP
[
max
s
ps
as
−min
s
ps
as
]
= max
s
qs
as
−min
s
qs
as
, (E16)
where in the first expression, the overall normalization by D¯ can be ignored if the House size R is fixed a
priori. Again, this optimality condition is essentially the same as one of the primary criteria eventually
emphasized by Wilcox, if mis-attributed by him to the Adams method.
However, one can certainly raise several objections to this measure of equitable apportionment. Notably,
it is largely insensitive to the absolute number of individuals whose share of representation might be
affected by a shift of seats, and appears completely insensitive to variations in district sizes that do not
affect the largest and smallest average district sizes across all states.
In particular, the latter insensitivity means that this criterion can easily fail to single out a unique
apportionment. Edelman recognized this shortcoming and suggested three different supplementary prin-
ciples for breaking ties amongst apportionments that minimize his total variation measure: minimizing
the standard deviation in district sizes, minimizing the mean absolute deviation in district sizes, or
recursively minimizing as needed the second largest deviation, third largest deviation, etc., between
under-represented and over-represented districts. But even Edelman could muster no Constitutional
argument as to which of these secondary criterion should be preferred in the event of ties.
The Burt-Harris-Edelman Method appears strongly biased in favor of smaller states. For example,
applied to the 2000 U.S. Census data, it would have reproduced the same apportionment as Adams’
Method (well known to favor small states) and violated lower quota for the three largest states (California,
New York, Texas), while neither the Huntington nor Webster methods would have violated quota.
E.16. Ossipoff-Agnew Method
(Proposed by Michael Ossipoff in online discussions beginning in 2006 [57]. Essentially the same method
was derived and analyzed independently by Robert Agnew in 2008 [56]. Following Agnew, this appor-
tionment rule is also referred to as the Method of Identric Means, and is equivalent to what we call
Entropic Apportionment).
This is another divisor method also intended, according to Ossipoff, to minimize bias with respect to
large or small states. Quotients are to be rounded up at or above the threshold given by:
θ(Q) = 1e
dQsedQse
bQscbQsc , (E17)
with the convention that 00 = 10 = 1. That is, the rounding threshold is the so-called identric mean
between bQsc and dQse, where the identric mean.118 of two nonnegative numbers x and y is given by
118 Given any x > 0 and y > 0, the identric mean of this pair of numbers may be defined as I(x, y) = exp
∫ y
x dz ln z∫ y
x dz
=
exp
[ y ln y−x ln x+x−y
y−x
]
. This is reminiscent of the more familiar geometric mean, except the latter is defined using sums
rather than integrals: G(x, y) = exp[ ln x+ln y
1+1
]
= exp
[ ln xy
2
]
=
√
xy As such, the notion of a geometric mean can be
naturally extended to any finite set of nonnegative numbers, but the identric mean cannot.
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I(x, y) = 1e
(
yy
xx
)1/(y−x)
.
As with many other divisor methods, the pure strategy does not ensure that every state receives its
minimal number of representative, but the last (or for that matter, the first) representatives assigned as
D is decreased could be shifted to states without enough representatives.
With good marketing in mind, Ossipoff called this the Bias-Free (BF) Method. He was, however, not
entirely clear regarding what was to be intended by this assertion, but it appears that he zeroed in on
a measure of bias assuming a uniform distribution of state populations, which seems quite questionable.
But whatever his motivation, by our analysis he does seem to have stumbled upon what, based on more
fundamental grounds, we argue is the optimal method for apportionment, since this method is equivalent
to the constrained global optimization of the relative entropy, as shown in the main text. As a global
optimization method, it therefore minimizes K =
S∑
s=1
as
R log
(
as
qs
)
.
E.17. Logarithmic Mean Method
(Discussed by Robert Agnew in 2008 [56]. This method is equivalent to what we call Dual Entropic
Apportionment).
This is yet another divisor method discussed by Robert Agnew, based on taking as the rounding threshold
the so-called logarithmic mean119 of bQsc and dQse,
θ(Q) = dQse−bQscln(dQse/bQsc) . (E18)
Equivalently, as a ranking method, the method of logarithmic means relies on the indices
ρ(a′s, ps) = ps log
(a′s+1
a′s
)
, (E19)
and as a global optimization method, it minimizes the “dual” Kullback-Leibler divergence, that is, the
divergence between q/R and a/R, given by K˜ =
S∑
s=1
qs
R log
(
qs
as
)
.
Because the relative entropy is not symmetric, there is not infrequently some confusion as to which
relative entropy (primal or dual) should be used in a given context. For apportionment, we believe
the answer is clearly K =
S∑
s=1
as
R log
(
as
qs
)
rather than the dual K˜ =
S∑
s=1
qs
R log
(
qs
as
)
. First, when the
goal is equality of representation across inhabitants (or across votes in party-list systems), minimizing
the relative entropy K is equivalent to maximizing the Shannon entropy S for the indirect polling
distribution, which is a direct measure of the uniformity of the weights of representation. Second, notice
that K˜ introduces an infinite penalty when aj = 0 but qj 6= 0. So K˜ cannot be used for party-list
apportionment, and hence fails as a universal method. On the other hand, the dual entropy does not
directly penalize apportionments for which qs = 0 but as 6= 0, so it allows (in the absence of additional
constraints) apportioning representatives where none are deserved.
119 Given any x > 0 and y > 0, the logarithmic mean of this pair of numbers may be defined as  L(x, y) =
[ ∫ y
x dz z
−1∫ y
x dz
]−1
=
y−x
ln
y
x
. This is reminiscent of the harmonic mean, which however is defined using sums rather than integrals: H(x, y) =[x−1+y−1
1+1
]−1
= 2xy
x+y
. Thus the harmonic mean can be generalized to any number of arguments, but the logarithmic
mean cannot.
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E.18. Summary
Table I summarizes features of the most important apportionment methods.
Apportionment Rounding Ranking Pairwise Global
Method (also known as) Threshold Index Comparison Minimum
Hamilton-Vinton Largest Fractions (LF) bqs + ∆H + 12c, where
∑
s
|as − qs|
Greatest Remainders (GR) ∆H ensures
∑
s
as = R
Adams Smallest Divisors (SD) dQse psa′s ao −
po
pu
au max
s
ps
as
Dean Harmonic Means (HM) 2bQscdQsebQsc+dQse ps
2a′s+1
2a′s(a′s+1)
pu
au
− po
ao
max
s
ps√
as(as+1)
Huntington-Hill Geometric Means (GM)
Equal Proportions (EP) (bQscdQse) 12 psa′s(a′s+1)
pu
po
ao
au
− 1 P2
R3
∑
s
(as−qs)2
as
Dual-Entropic Logarithmic Means (LM) dQse−bQsc
ln(dQse/bQsc) ps log
(a′s+1
a′s
) ∑
s
qs
R
log
(
qs
as
)
Entropic Identric Means (IM) 1
e
( dQsedQse
bQscbQsc
) 1
dQse−bQsc ps
e a′s
a′s
(a′s+1)
a′s+1
∑
s
as
R
log
(
as
qs
)
Webster-Wilcox Arithmetic Means (AM)
Major Fractions (MF) bQsc+dQse
2
ps
a′s+
1
2
ao
po
− au
pu
R
P2
∑
s
(as−qs)2
qs
Jefferson Greatest Divisors (GD) bQsc psa′s+1
pu
po
ao − au max
s
ps
as+1
TABLE I. Comparison of apportionment methods. As in the main text, ps denotes the population of the sth
state, Qs = ps/D denotes the quotient relative to a chosen divisor D, a
′
s represents the apportionment at a
given stage of seat distribution via ranking, ao and po refer the proposed apportionment and population of the
relatively over-represented state, while au and pu refer to the relatively under-represented state, and qs = psR/P
represents the exact quota, where R is the total house size and P is the total population. The Hamilton-Vinton
approach is a quota method; all others are divisor methods. The SD, HM, EP, and LM methods automatically
give at least one seat to each state as long as R ≥ S; the other methods can allot zero seats to a sufficiently
small state unless lower bound constraints are imposed explicitly. In all cases global minimization refers to a
constrained minimum of the indicated inequity function subject to constraints 0 ≤ λs ≤ as ≤ us for s = 1, . . . , S,
and
∑S
s=1 as = R.
In addition to the five traditional divisor methods discussed by Huntington, we have included the two
others introduced by Agnew, one of which (the Method of Identric Means) is equivalent to our recom-
mended entropic apportionment method at the level of awarding seats.
Notice that the SD and GD methods, and also the HM and MF methods, are dual in the sense of the
roles played by the as and qs (proportional to the ps) in their respective pairwise comparison tests. The
EP method is self-dual in this sense, which was a principal selling point for Huntington. The MF and
EP methods, and also the IM and LM methods, are dual in the sense of the roles played by the as and
qs in the global optimization criteria, while the GR method is self-dual in this sense.
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Appendix F: SHANNON ENTROPY AND RELATIVE ENTROPY—MOTIVATIONS,
INTERPRETATIONS, AND CHARACTERIZATIONS
Entropy is the central unifying concept in both statistical mechanics [61, 62, 98–100] and information
theory [58–60, 71, 72, 101–103]. Many different arguments have all led to the adoption of the Shannon
entropy as the essentially unique quantification of the amount of uncertainty or degree of uniformity in
one probability distribution, and the relative entropy, or Kullback-Leibler divergence [64], as a measure of
discrepancy between or divergence from one distribution and another. Derivations of or justifications for
what is now called the Shannon entropy pre-date Shannon, going back to the combinatoric arguments
of Boltzmann and Wallis. Axiomatic characterizations and uniqueness theorems were pioneered by
Shannon and Weaver, continued by Fadeev, Kolmogorov, Khinchin, and many others, and have been
streamlined or modernized by a number of authors, leading to a large body of results now summarized
in a number of books and review articles on information measures. See for example [73, 104–111].
By a characterization of entropy we mean a set of (hopefully compelling, or at least plausible) desiderata,
axioms, or properties that we demand of our measure of uncertainty, and that lead uniquely to the
Shannon entropy functional. Similarly, a characterization of relative entropy is list of properties to be
possessed by a measure of divergence, leading to the Kullback-Leibler number.
F.1. Entropy as Expected Surprisal
How much information we would gain, or uncertainty we would resolve, upon learning that some event
occurs may be naturally identified with how surprising, unexpected, or improbable the event was con-
sidered before observing it.
Our degree of surprise may be identified with the amount of information we actually receive when
learning that the outcome in fact happened. If there are N equally likely, mutually exclusive and
exhaustive possibilities, then clearly one would gain log2N bits of information upon learning which
outcome actually obtains, equivalent to learning the answers to log2N independent yes/no questions.
More generally, consider some event to which we assign a probability ρ of occurrence, where 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1.
We seek an expression H(ρ) for the surprisal, or quantified amount of surprise that would be reasonable
to experience upon learning the outcome does indeed happen, or equivalently, the amount of information
acquired when learning that it indeed occurs. It is natural to demand that this surprisal satisfies the
following conditions:
1. non-negativity :
H(ρ) ≥ 0 for any ρ satisfying 0 < ρ ≤ 1, (F1)
because learning that some event actually happened should not make us any more ignorant about
that event than we were before learning that it occurred. A slightly stronger condition would assert
that events which are not certain a priori should surprise us when they happen at least a little,
so that H(ρ) > 0 for any ρ such that 0 < ρ < 1, and H(0) = +∞ since we would be infinitely
surprised upon observing an event known to be impossible, but we can make do with the weaker
criterion;
2. additivity : if ρ = µθ for some µ, θ satisfying 0 < µ ≤ 1 and 0 < θ ≤ 1, then
H(µθ) = H(µ) +H(θ), (F2)
because surprisal toward compound events involving independent sub-events should be additive.
That is, if an overall outcome, of probability ρ = µθ, is equivalent to the joint occurrence of two
independent contributing outcomes, the first with probability µ, and the second with probability
θ independently of the first, then we can either learn of the occurrence directly or infer it from
the joint occurrence of the two contributing events. The overall information we acquire in learning
of the joint event should therefore be equal to the information acquired upon learning the first
contributing event occurs plus the information acquired upon learning the second contributing
event occurs.
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3. standard normalization: the surprisal may be normalized so that
H( 12 ) = 1 bit, (F3)
because if we assigned exactly equal odds to an event occurring or not, we will gain exactly one bit
of information upon learning the outcome. This normalization is strictly optional, but it should
always be possible by a standard change of units involving multiplication by a pre-factor.
Then it turns out that the only class of functions H(ρ) satisfying the first two requirements are multiples
of the logarithm:
H(ρ) = κ log 1ρ = −κ log ρ, (F4)
for some positive constant κ which basically determines the units in which surprisal will be measured—if
we adopt the do use using bits we can set κ = 1 and take base-2 logarithms, such that H(ρ) = log2(ρ).
Now consider N possible outcomes, labeled by j = 1, . . . , N . We wish to quantify our amount of
uncertainty when our knowledge tells us that the events are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, i.e., that
one and only one of them will occur, but not which. The best we can do is assign probabilities ρ1, . . . , ρN ,
where ρj represents the rational degree of belief that the jth outcome will obtain, conditional on our
limited knowledge. The Shannon entropy measures this uncertainty by taking the expectation value of
the surprisal over these mutually exclusive and exhaustive possibilities:
S(ρ1, . . . , ρN ) = κ
N∑
j=1
ρj log
1
ρj
= −κ
N∑
j=1
ρj log ρj . (F5)
Equivalently, when measured in bits, the Shannon entropy may be interpreted as the average number
of yes/no questions that we would need to have (truthfully) answered in order to learn which outcome
obtained.
The weakness of this approach is a lack of clear motivation as to why we rely on the average surprisal, and
not the median, mode, or some other measure of central tendency or typicality across the possibilities.
F.2. Acze´l-Ng Characterization
Many characterizations of information-theoretic entropy rely on principles such as strong additivity or
recursivity (see below) which also build in a preference for the arithmetic average. But it would be
preferable to derive rather than assume such structural properties. It turns out that the usual average
is singled out as the only operation consistent with a deeper principle that we already invoked in the
definition of surprisal itself, that of additivity over independent information.
Perhaps the most elegant and compelling characterization theorem for Shannon entropy is that due to
Acze´l and Ng [73, 112]. Again assume N possible outcomes j = 1, . . . , N , known to be mutually exclusive
and exhaustive. We seek to quantify the uncertainty by some some real-valued function HN (ρ1, . . . , ρn)
of the probabilities, presumed to satisfy the following properties:
1. symmetry :
HN (. . . , ρj , . . . , ρk, . . . ) = HN (. . . , ρk, . . . , ρj , . . . ) (F6)
for every pairwise transposition of the outcome probabilities, and by extension, for every permu-
tation of the probabilities, or their labels.
The measure of uncertainty should depend only on the probabilities of the exclusive and exhaustive
possibilities, not how we happen to label them. Hence, the measure of uncertainty should be
invariant under all permutations of the probabilities, and for a fixed number of possibilities n, the
measure HN is a function of the multiset of probabilities {ρj}.
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2. expansibility :
HN+1(ρ1, . . . , ρN , 0) = HN (ρ1, . . . , ρN ). (F7)
Appending to the list of possibilities an outcome known to be impossible should not change the
uncertainty.
3. near-certainty :
lim
ρ→0+
H2(1− ρ, ρ) = 0. (F8)
In the limit of only one viable possibility, the amount of uncertainty should vanish.
4. additivity :
HNM
({ρjwk}) = HN({ρj})+HM({wk}). (F9)
If we perform two independent experiments, or ask two independent questions, the total information
gained should be the sum of the information gained from each separately. If perhaps somewhat
less self-evident than the other desiderata, this should seem quite natural to all who have grown
up in the digital age, and are accustomed to the idea of information accumulating additively in
disk drives, Dropbox accounts, data charges in cellphone plans, etc.
5. sub-additivity :
HNM
({ρjk}) ≤ HN({ M∑
k=1
ρjk
})
+HM
({ N∑
j=1
ρjk
})
, (F10)
where
M∑
k=1
ρjk and
N∑
j=1
ρjk are the marginal probabilities associated with the joint probabilities ρjk
defined over the outcomes (j, k) for j = 1, . . . , N and k = 1, . . . ,M . This means that we cannot
gain more information from asking dependent questions than from asking independent questions.
6. actuality of uncertainty :
HN ( 1N , . . . , 1N ) ≥ HN (1, 0, . . . , 0), with equality if and only if N = 1. (F11)
In the state of maximal uncertainty about the outcome, we have more uncertainty than in a state
of maximal knowledge about the outcome. This requirement was not mentioned explicitly by
Acze´l, but appears necessary simply to rule out the trivial case where the measure of uncertainty
is identically zero.
The only type of function satisfying these desiderata is the Shannon entropy:
HN (ρ1, . . . , ρN ) = κS(ρ1, . . . , ρN ) = −κ
N∑
j=1
ρj log ρj , (F12)
for some choice of a positive constant κ. Once again, this overall scaling reflects the remaining freedom
to choose the base of the logarithms120 and/or the units in which the uncertainty/missing information
is measured. In the main text, unless otherwise noted we will measure entropies in bits, by taking κ = 1
and log x = log2 x.
120 If we set κ = 1 and use base-2 logarithms, the entropy (missing information) is thereby measured in binary digits (“bits”);
if we take κ = 1 and use natural (base-e) logarithms, the entropy is instead said to be measured in natural units, or
“nats;” and if we set κ = 1 and use base-10 logarithms, the entropy may be measured in (decimal) digits. Retaining the
choice of base-10 logarithms but instead setting κ = 10 leads to information measured in “decibans,” a unit coined by
Alan Turing [63] in analogy to the more familiar“decibels,” but named after the town of Banburry (near to Bletchley
Park, the center of British code-breaking activity during World War II) from which his group ordered special stationery
used for computations. In thermodynamics, conventionally one uses natural logarithms but sets κ equal to Boltzmann’s
constant κB, and in SI units measures entropy in joules per kelvin.
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F.3. Tikochinsky-Tishby-Levine Characterizations
Some characterizations of Shannon entropy more directly emphasize its operational role in assigning
or inducing probability distributions from certain limited information, rather than starting with its
interpretation as quantifying missing information.
For instance, Tikochinsky, Tishby, and Levine [113, 114] justify probability assignment via entropy max-
imization using three different arguments, but in each case demanding certain reasonable behavior from
the assignment algorithm when using data consisting of average-value data from presumably reproducible
experiments.
Specifically, they consider the task of assigning probabilities over mutually exclusive and exhaustive
alternatives, given prescribed average values of some variables defined on those alternatives.121 The
experiments are assumed to be reproducible, in that they could be independently repeated any finite
number N of times. The assignment procedure is postulated to be universal, in that data of a given
kind should be handled in the same way, and different experiments are not arbitrarily subjected to
different procedures or rules for data processing or probability assignment. Provided the data are non-
contradictory, the resulting probability assignment should be unique, or else the procedure would be
regarded as incomplete.
F.3.1. Uniform Consistent Inference
Given that an experiment can be reproduced, if N repetitions of the experiment are performed, there
are two ways to induce probabilities over the extended hypothesis space regarding the set of all possible
outcomes. Either we assign probabilities to the single-trial outcomes based on prescribed expectation
values, and then extend to the distribution over the N -fold repetitions using a multinomial distribution,
or we can apply the same assignment algorithm directly to the extended hypothesis space over the N
independent repetitions, prescribing the sample averages.
If we demand that the resulting probability assignments should be the same under either strategy, then
the single-trial probability assignment must be that which maximizes the Shannon entropy using the
prescribed average values as constraints.
F.3.2. Most Stable Inference
Given any procedure to map expectation-value data to a probability distributions, small statistical errors
in the inputs (the specified average values) should lead to small changes in the probability assignment.
Among all assignments agreeing with the original average-value constraints, the maximum entropy as-
signment is also the least sensitive to small errors in this input data, in the specific sense of saturating
the Cramer-Rao inequality. This make intuitive sense, since the maximum entropy distribution is always
the most “uniform” distribution consistent with the constraints, so small changes in the values of average
values should lead to less appreciable changes in the probabilities, compared to any other distribution
agreeing with the constraints.
F.3.3. Sufficient inference
In statistical inference, sufficient statistics are functions of the data which convey all of the information
in the data relevant for estimating some parameter or parameters of interest—that is, if the posterior
121 This is not the most general type of inference task, but any general method should work in this sub-class of problems,
and this is sufficient to single out the entropy.
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probability distribution for the parameter(s) depends on the data only through the value of the (jointly)
sufficient statistics, for any choice of the prior distribution.
There is no guarantee that any such “compression” of the information in the data relevant to parameter
estimation will be possible. But if we are to assign probabilities based only on average values of certain
variables, then it is natural to demand that the sample averages for these variables should end up as
sufficient statistics for the parameters consisting of the corresponding expectation values over the assigned
distribution. The Pitman-Koopman-Darmois theorem tells us that the only probability distributions
which admit sufficient statistics belong to what is known as the exponential family, and it follows that
the assigned distributions must be maximum entropy distributions if the sample averages are to become
sufficient statistics for the expectation values.
F.3.4. Some Points of Connection
Given the goal of inducing probabilities from averages, these authors present three complementary
arguments all leading to the same, unique procedure, namely entropy maximization. Each of the three
approaches invokes the notion of reproducibility of experiments, but this requirement is translated in
different ways into relations between measured sample averages and calculated expectation values under
the probability distribution assigned. In the consistency approach, it is demanded that averaging (if
only in the sense of a gedanken experiment) of the sample average over possible samples should yield the
expectation value over the assigned distribution. In the second, stability-based approach, the expectation
value of the distribution is equated to one particular measured value of the sample average, but it is
recognized that in so doing there may be a statistical error (due to the finite size of the sample), whose
effects should be minimized. The third, sufficiency, approach stems from the assumption that the sample
average of some variable(s) may be all the information that can be extracted from the observations
regarding the corresponding expectation value(s).
F.4. Gull-Skilling Characterization
Another characterization that focuses on the role of Shannon entropy as a variational maximand, to be
used in assigning or approximating probability distributions, was suggested by Gull and Skilling [115].
Originally developed in the context of astronomical image processing, their axiomatic approach does not
even presume that the distribution of interest is necessarily interpreted in terms of probability.
Suppose that a non-negative, additive, discrete distribution (what they call a “reconstruction” or “rep-
resentation”) x = (x1, . . . , xN ) is to be sought by maximizing some function over“trial” reconstructions
x, subject to certain constraints (including normalization if relevant) based on measurements or prior
information. Their derivation is based on the following assumptions:
i. variational universality : the same variational maximand is to be used on all problems of a given size
N ;
ii. output-extensibility : the maximum for smaller N coincides with the maximum for larger N ′ > N
when the extra cells are constrained to be zero;
iii. scale invariance: the choice of units should not affect the shape of the reconstruction. This implies
that the maximand can be taken to be a function of the relative proportions ρj =
xj∑
i
xi
, for j =
1, . . . , N .
iv. differentiability : since we will be seeking constrained maxima, for technical reasons the maximand
is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable in its arguments (for all positive values of all of
the proportions);
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v. subset independence: knowledge of the relative proportions within some cells should not affect the
relative proportions in the remaining cells (apart from overall normalization), except insofar as there
is prior knowledge of correlations. That is, if, say, ρj +ρk is fixed, the optimal value of the remaining
proportions ρ` for ` 6= j, ` 6= k should not depend on the ratio ρjρk , unless explicitly constrained to
do so.
Together, these assumptions require that the variational maximand be of additive form
RN (ρ) =
N∑
j=1
φj(ρj) (F13)
for some suitably well-behaved functions φj(ρj);
vi. permutation-invariance In the absence of prior information favoring some cells over others, cells
should be treated on an equal footing, implying that the function should be invariant with respect
to permutations of the cell labels. This means the maximand simplifies to
RN (ρ) =
N∑
j=1
φ(ρj). (F14)
for some one scalar function φ(ρ);
vii. marginal independence: if the cells “factorize” in some natural way (e.g., as a two-dimensional im-
age), the information constraining the structure within one sub-class should not impose any structure
in any other sub-class, unless one has additional prior knowledge regarding such correlations. That is,
the reconstructed proportions themselves should factorize into the product of marginal distributions
in the absence of explicit constraints introducing correlations.
This turns out to require that
φ(ρj) = Aρj log ρj +Bρj + C, (F15)
so that
RN (ρ) = A
N∑
j=1
ρj log ρj +B
N∑
j=1
ρj + CN = A
N∑
j=1
ρj log ρj + (B + CN), (F16)
for some constants A, B, and C. A must be positive if RN (ρ) is to have a maximum rather than a
minimum, but the values of B and C do not effect the location of the maximum, and can be set to
zero.
Garrett [116] offers a similar derivation, only instead of marginal independence, demands that the vari-
ational principle always outputs nonnegative proportions, even when not explicitly constrained to be
so.
F.5. Baez-Fritz-Leinster Characterization
Shannon entropy over a discrete outcome space can also be characterized by considering not the amount
of information itself, but the change in informativeness associated with some measure-preserving “data-
processing” transformation.
Specifically, suppose X = {x1, x2, . . . , xN} is the set of original, “latent” mutually exclusive and exhaus-
tive states, with probabilities ρ = (ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρN ), and Y = {y1, y2, . . . , yM} is a space of outcomes to be
actually measured, also assumed mutually exclusive and exhaustive, and where it is understood here that
we only include outcomes with non-zero chance of observation. In a measure-preserving transformation
f : X → Y, the number M of actually realizable outcomes in Y must be less than or equal to the number
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N of states in X , while the corresponding probabilities m = (m1,m2, . . . ,mM ) for the Y outcomes are
simply inherited from the latent X states, by the law of total probability:
mk =
∑
j : f(xj)=yk
ρj (F17)
for each k = 1, . . . ,M .
Intuitively, such a transformation might represent an ideal type of measurement that can involve deter-
ministic course-graining, but cannot add further “randomness” or uncertainty, and hence cannot increase
the informativeness of the subsequent measurement as to the latent state, as compared to measuring
this state directly.
Suppose ∆h is intended to quantify this loss in potential informativeness of the measurement regarding
the unknown latent state, which we refer to as “information loss” for short122. Baez, Fritz, and Leinster
[117] suggest that a natural set of constraints on ∆h is:
i. additivity under composition: if the measure-preserving transformation is effected in two (or more)
stages, then the total information lost in the whole transformation is the sum of the information loss
in each stage;
ii. continuity : if the original probabilities over X are changed slightly, then the information loss only
changes slightly;
iii. convex linearity : if a (possibly biased) coin is used to decide whether to effect one measure-preserving
transformation or another, then without knowing the result of the coin flip, the information loss will
be the expected loss, averaged with respect to the outcomes of the coin flip.
They show that the only measure satisfying these conditions is
∆h = c
[S(ρ)− S(m)], (F18)
where S(ρ) is the Shannon entropy over the latent X states, S(m) is the Shannon entropy over the
measured Y outcomes, and c > 0 is a positive constant (which just serves to change units).
F.6. Further Properties and Characterizations of Shannon Entropy
The Shannon entropy HN (ρ1, . . . , ρN ) = −κS = −κ
N∑
j=1
ρj log ρj also enjoys several additional mathe-
matical properties, including:
1. continuity : HN (ρ1, . . . , ρN ) is a continuous function of all ρj for 0 ≤ ρj ≤ 1.
2. smoothness: In fact, HN (ρ1, . . . , ρN ) is a smooth function at all points away from boundary points
where one or more of the ρj vanish;
3. measurability : HN (ρ1, . . . , ρN ) is a Lebesgue measurable function of all ρj for 0 ≤ ρj ≤ 1. This
property is weaker than, but a consequence of, the continuity property;
4. lower boundedness:123 HN (ρ1, . . . , ρN ) ≥ HN (1, 0, . . . , 0) = 0, with equality if and only if ρj = δjj′
for some fixed j′ ∈ {1, . . . , N};
5. upper boundedness: HN (ρ1, . . . , ρN ) ≤ HN ( 1N , . . . , 1N ) = κ logN , with equality if and only if
ρ1 = . . . = ρN =
1
N ;
122 Note however, that the uncertainty as to the measurement outcome cannot increase under such a transformation.
123 In working with entropies, it is convenient and natural to adopt the convention that 0 log 0 = lim
x→0+
x log x = 0.
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6. monotonicity : HN ( 1N , . . . , 1N ) > HM ( 1M , . . . , 1M ) for N > M ;
7. strict additivity : any joint entropy over the distribution wjk for j = 1, . . . ,M , and k = 1, . . . , N ,
satisfies:
HMN
({wjk}) ≤ HM({∑
k
wjk
})
+HN
({∑
j
wjk
})
, (F19)
with equality if and only if wjk =
( N∑
k′=1
wjk′
)( M∑
j′=1
wj′k
)
. That is, the entropy of a joint distribution
is additive only for independent events, and strictly sub-additive otherwise;
8. recursivity : the entropy over M possibilities can decomposed as:
HM
({ρjk}) = HN({ρj})+ N∑
j=1
ρjHMj
({ρjk
ρj
: k = 1, . . . ,Mj
})
, (F20)
where M =
N∑
j
Mj , Mj are the number of outcomes aggregated into the jth group (where the
groups are assumed non-empty and non-overlapping), and ρj =
Mj∑
k=1
ρjk is the overall probability
for the jth group of possibilities. If the fine-grained events are aggregated into course-grained
events, then the total (fine-grained) entropy can be decomposed into the entropy of course-grained
possibilities plus the average conditional entropy of the fine-grained sub-possibilities constituting
each course-grained possibility;
9. strong additivity : if ρjk = wjmk|j is a decomposition of joint probabilities using the probabilistic
product rule, in which wj =
∑
k
ρjk for j = 1, . . . , N are marginal probabilities and hence mk|j =
ρjk
wj
, k = 1, . . . ,M are the associated conditional probabilities for each j, then
HNM
({ρjk}) = HN({wj})+ N∑
j=1
wjHM
({mk|j : k = 1, . . . ,M}), (F21)
which is to the say, the entropy of a joint distribution can be decomposed into the sum of the
entropy of one marginal distribution and the average (with respect to the marginal distribution)
over the entropy of the associated conditional distribution124;
10. concavity under mixing : if (µ1, . . . , µM ) is a normalized mixing distribution (satisfying µk ≥ 0 and
M∑
k=1
µk = 1), and {ρjk} are a finite sequence (for k = 1, . . . ,M) of probability distributions over
the outcomes j = 1, . . . , N , then:
HN
({ M∑
k=1
µkρjk : j = 1, . . . N
}) ≥ M∑
k=1
µkHN
({ρjk : j = 1, . . . N}), (F22)
which just says that the entropy is a concave function of its arguments, so that the entropy
of a mixture df distributions cannot be less that the weighted average of the entropies of each
contributing distribution. This is a corollary of Jensen’s inequality;
11. concavity under smoothing : if Θjk j, k ∈ {1, . . . , N} is a doubly stochastic matrix (satisfying
Θjk ≥ 0,
∑
j
Θjk = 1, and
∑
k
Θjk = 1), then for any probability distribution ρ1, . . . , ρN ,
HN
({∑
k
Θjkρk : j = 1, . . . N}
) ≥ HN({ρj : j = 1, . . . , N}), (F23)
124 Note that recursivity and strong additivity are closely related.
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which captures the notion that entropy is non-decreasing under any smoothing or convolution of
the probability distribution. This also represents a certain sort of convexity property, but com-
plementary to the mixing convexity—mixing involves a weighted average of several distributions,
while smoothing involves a sort of weighted moving average of of one distribution.
Various subsets of these or related properties can also be used to uniquely characterize the Shannon
entropy. For example, a well-known theorem of Fadeev shows that the only function that jointly satisfies
symmetry, continuity, and the binary case of recursivity, namely
HN (ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρN ) = HN−1(ρ1 + ρ2, ρ3, . . . , ρN ) + (ρ1 + ρ2)H2
(
ρ1
ρ1+ρ2
, ρ2ρ1+ρ2
)
, (F24)
must in fact be a multiple of the Shannon entropy. Khinchin proved that expansibility, upper boundedness,
continuity, and strong additivity uniquely characterize the Shannon entropy. Shannon himself used
monotonicity, continuity, and strong additivity.
F.7. Relative Entropy and its Characterizations
We turn to consideration of the relative entropy125 K = K(ρ;m) = ∑
j
ρj log
ρj
mj
, which has been redis-
covered many times, and therefore is known by many names: it was called the directed divergence when
introduced into statistics by Kullback and Leibler in 1951, the discrimination information by Kullback
in his influential book on statistics and information theory, the Kullback-Leibler number or Kullback-
Leibler divergence by many who learned about it from that book but somehow ignored his advice on
nomenclature, the information gain by Re´nyi, the error by Kerridge, the decibannage by Turing during
early use in World War II for cryptanalysis, and then the expected weight of evidence by his assistant,
the statistician I.J. Good, who also mentioned [63] that another accurate if awkward terminology might
be binegentropy.126
Relative entropy has been used both as as a scalar measure of discrepancy, difference, departure, or
divergence of one probability distribution from another, and as a measure of information gain associated
with updating from one probability distribution to another. From an information-theoretic perspective,
these are really the same thing, because if we are to quantify by a single real number how different are
two probability distributions (over the same space of mutually exclusive and exhaustive possibilities), it
is natural to use the amount of information gained about the outcome in updating from one distribution
to another. So we will use the terms divergence or information gain more or less interchangeably.
F.7.1. Relative Entropy as Expected Information Gain
If Shannon entropy measures average surprisal, then relative entropy measures the average change in
surprisal. Specifically, suppose we acquire some new information leading us to update our state of knowl-
edge from a prior probability distribution, m = (m1, . . . ,mN ), to a posterior probability distribution,
ρ = (ρ1, . . . , ρN ), regarding some set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive possibilities. How much
information about the potential outcome was acquired?
For the jth possibility, the change in surprisal in updating from the prior probability mj to the posterior
probability ρj is
∆Hj =
[
log 1ρj − log 1mj
]
=
[
logmj − log ρj
]
= log
mj
ρj
, (F25)
125 Nota bene: some authors define the relative entropy with an extra minus sign, i.e., as the additive inverse of what we
have called the relative entropy, in order to make it look more like the Shannon entropy. However, our sign convention
is more prevalent, and ensures that the relative entropy, like the Shannon entropy, is nonnegative when defined over a
countable space of mutually exclusive and exhaustive possibilities, and that K measures an average information gain.
126 Some other authors like Shore and Johnson have also referred to the relative entropy as the cross entropy, but that
terminology is now usually reserved instead for a different quantity C = −∑j ρj logmj , what Kerridge called the
inaccuracy.
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which, depending on the actual nature of information obtained, can of course be positive, zero, or
negative. But because of the Gibbs inequality, the expectation value (with respect to the posterior
distribution) of the change in surprisal over all possibilities cannot be positive—that is, on average, the
new information must reduce our surprise:〈
∆H
〉
ρ
=
∑
j
ρj log
mj
ρj
≤ 0, (F26)
with equality if and only if we do not learn anything relevant, such that ρ1 = m1, . . . , ρN = mN .
We then identify the expected amount of information gain with the expected loss of surprisal upon
acquiring the information:
K(ρ;m) = K(ρ1, . . . , ρN ;m1, . . .mN ) = −
〈
∆H
〉
=
∑
j
ρj log
ρj
mj
≥ 0, (F27)
with equality if and only if the distributions are equal, i.e., ρ1 = m1, . . . , ρN = mN .
Here, it is crucially important to distinguish the change in expected surprisal ∆S—that is, the difference
in Shannon entropies, which can be of either sign127—from the expected loss in surprisal, K—which is
always nonnegative.
F.7.2. Relative Entropy as Discrimination Information or Expected Weight of Evidence
The idea of relative entropy as information gain is reinforced by its interpretation in statistical testing
as an expected weight of evidence in favor of one hypothesis over another , or the amount of information
provided by the evidence relevant to discriminating one hypothesis from another. If hypothesis A assigns
probabilities ρA to certain possible observable outcomes, and hypothesis B assigns probabilities ρB to
the same set of outcomes, then if the jth outcome were to be observed, our posterior odds in favor of
hypothesis A relative to B would be updated by multiplying by the likelihood ratio
ρAj
ρBj
. The logarithm
of this factor is the relative weight of evidence log
ρAj
ρBj
in favor of hypothesis A relative to hypothesis B.
It is particularly convenient to work with logarithms because (i) the weight of evidence becomes additive
for independent observations, and (ii) human perception of uncertainty (very much like our perception of
the loudness of sounds, the brightness of light, pressure on our skin, or other psychophysical responses)
seems to work on something resembling a logarithmic scale, giving our brain more “dynamic range”
when faced with probabilities that are either very small or very close to unity.
Before seeing the data, we can ask how informative or discriminating an experiment or observation is
expected to be, in the sense of how much weight of evidence we expect it to provide in favor of the correct
hypothesis. The expected weight of evidence in favor of hypothesis A against hypothesis B, if hypothesis
A is in fact true, is then the average (with respect to the probabilities assigned by hypothesis A) of the
weights of evidence, which are the logarithms of the Bayes factors:
K(ρA;ρB) =
∑
j
ρAj log
ρAj
ρBj
, (F28)
which is just the relative entropy once again.
127 At first, this may seem counter-intuitive. After all, any change in our probabilities, and corresponding entropies,
presumably is to be based on new knowledge, and requires some non-zero number of bits of relevant conditioning
information to be learned. But remember that Shannon entropy measures uncertainty or missing information as to the
outcome of the event, not the total amount of information received or processed in reaching our probabilistic judgement
as to the possible outcomes. Obtaining extra information about something can definitely make one less certain about
something related. For example, here in Berkeley, California in July my prior degree of belief that it will rain today,
based on general climate patterns and past meteorological experience, is well below 50%, and my entropy regarding the
rain/non-rain dichotomy is therefore well below one bit. But if I receive (many bits of) information detailing dropping
barometric pressures, satellite photos indicating incoming thunderclouds, etc., the conditional probability of rain may
creep up towards, yet remain below, 50%, thereby increasing my entropy regarding the possibility or not of rain. Of
course, at the same time this information obviously lowers my uncertainty as to the actual atmospheric pressure, and the
existence of incoming clouds. However, the expected change (under various possible evidentiary findings) in expected
surprisal is negative, and can be expressed in terms of another quantity from information theory, the mutual information,
which is a special case of relative entropy.
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F.7.3. Acze´l-Ng Characterization of Relative Entropy
One of the more compelling standard characterizations for relative entropy is provided by theorems of
Acze´l and Ng [73, 118].
Suppose we demand that the measure of information gain, or divergence, DN (ρ1, . . . , ρN ;m1, . . .mN )
between two probability distributions over the same set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive possibilities
satisfy the following properties:
1. labeling symmetry :
DN (. . . , ρj , . . . , ρk, . . . ; . . . ,mj , . . . ,mk, . . . ) = DN (. . . , ρk, . . . , ρj , . . . ; . . . ,mk, . . . ,mj , . . . ) (F29)
for all pairwise transpositions, and by extension all permutations, as long as the same permutation
is applied to both the prior and posterior probabilities. This says that the measure should not
depend on arbitrary choices we made in labeling the possibilities.
2. extensibility :
DN+1(ρ1, . . . , ρN , 0;m1, . . . ,mN , 0) = DN (ρ1, . . . , ρN ;m1, . . . ,mN ). (F30)
Including outcomes already known to be impossible a priori should not change the amount of
information gain.
3. nilpotence:
DN (ρ1, . . . , ρN ; ρ1, . . . , ρN ) = 0. (F31)
Unless our probabilities over the outcomes change, we have gained no information about the
outcome.
4. ordering :
DN (1, 0, . . . , 0; 1N , . . . , 1N ) > 0 for N ≥ 2. (F32)
If we go from a state of maximum uncertainty to maximum knowledge regarding the outcome, we
must have gained information.
5. continuity :
DN (ρ1, . . . , ρN ;m1, . . . ,mN ) is a continuous function (F33)
of each mj for 0 < mj ≤ 1 and for every ρk in 0 ≤ ρk ≤ 1. Small changes in any of the probabilities
should lead to small changes in the measure of information gain.128
6. additivity :
DNM (ρ1w1, . . . , ρ1wM , . . . , ρNwM ;m1µ1, . . . ,m1µM , . . . ,mNµM ) =
DN (ρ1, . . . , ρN ;m1, . . . ,mN ) +DM (w1, . . . , wM ;µ1, . . . , µM ). (F34)
Information gain should be additive when performing fully independent experiments or asking
independent questions.
7. branching :
DN (ρ1, . . . , ρN ;m1, . . . ,mN ) = DN−1(ρ1 + ρ2, ρ3, . . . , ρN ;m1 +m2,m3, . . . ,mN )
+ JN (ρ1, ρ2;m1,m2) (F35)
for some sequence of functions JN (ρ1, ρ2;m1,m2). When we aggregate possibilities, total informa-
tion gain should be expressible in terms of that between the aggregated categories plus that within
the aggregated categories.
128 Actually, only Lebesgue measurability is needed in the proofs, but continuity seems a more natural, if mathematically
stronger, requirement.
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Then the only family of functionals satisfying all these properties is:
DN (ρ1, . . . , ρN ;m1, . . . ,mN ) = K(ρ1, . . . , ρN ;m1, . . . ,mN ) = κ
N∑
j=1
ρj log
ρj
mj
, (F36)
for some choice of a positive scaling constant κ > 0 reflecting the choice of units and/or base of logarithm.
F.7.4. Some Further Properties and Characterizations of Relative Entropy
In addition to those features invoked previously, the relative entropy enjoys the following mathematical
properties129 (all of which can be derived from the definition, and not all of which are independent):
1. smoothness: K(ρ1, . . . , ρN ;m1, . . . ,mN ) is a smooth function of all of its arguments, apart from
boundary points where one or more probabilities vanish;
2. measurability : K(ρ1, . . . , ρN ;m1, . . . ,mN ) is (Lebesgue) measurable function of all arguments. This
is a weaker condition than continuity, but implied by the latter;
3. positive definiteness: For any probability distributions over the same space of possibilities,
K(ρ1, . . . , ρN ;m1, . . . ,mN ) ≥ 0, (F37)
with equality if and only if the two distributions are identical, i.e., ρ1 = m1, . . . , ρN = mN . This
follows from the so-called Gibbs inequality,130 and provides the underpinnings of much of the
structure of statistical mechanics;
4. sum property :
K(ρ1, . . . , ρN ;m1, . . . ,mN ) =
∑
j
G(ρj ,mj), (F38)
for some function G(p,m) of two nonnegative variables. This says that the total discrimination
information is the sum of separate contributions from each outcome.
5. restriction-monotonicity : KM (1/N, . . . , 1/N, 0, . . . , 0; 1M , . . . , 1M ) is an increasing function of M
and a decreasing function of N , for any integers satisfying 1 ≤ N ≤M . This says that information
is gained when the number of equally likely possibilities is reduced from M to N , and the bigger
the reduction the more the gain;
6. convexity : K(ρ1, . . . , ρN ;m1, . . . ,mN ) is concave-up in all arguments or combinations of arguments.
7. joint-convexity : an important special case of the above is:
0 ≤ K(∑
i
µi ρi;
∑
i
µimi
) ≤∑
i
µiK
(
ρi;mi
)
, (F39)
for any nonnegative normalized mixing weights µi satisfying µi ≥ 0,
∑
i
µi = 1, and any finite
sequence of probability distributions ρi = (ρ1i , . . . , ρNi) and mi = (m1i , . . . ,mNi) over the same
space of N mutually exclusive and exhaustive possibilities.
129 Here and elsewhere, it is convenient to adopt the following natural conventions: x log x
0
= +∞ for any x > 0; 0 log 0
x
= 0
for any x > 0; and 0 log 0
0
= 0.
130 The Gibbs inequality (also known as the Shannon inequality or the Gibbs-Shannon inequality) says that for any pair of
probability distributions ρ1, . . . , ρN and m1, . . . ,mN over N possibilities,
N∑
j=1
ρj log ρj ≥
N∑
j=1
ρj logmj , with equality if
and only if the distributions are the same, i.e., ρ1 = m1 . . . ρN = mN . The Gibbs inequality follows from the Jensen
inequality, or more simply from the fundamental logarithm inequality: lnx ≤ x − 1 for all x ≥ 0, with equality if and
only if x = 1. This in turn can proven by considering integrals of 1/x.
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8. smoothing-monotonicity : If θj|k is a stochastic matrix131 satisfying θj|k ≥ 0 and
∑
j
θj|k = 1, and
ρ˜j =
∑
k
θj|kρk and m˜j =
∑
j
θj|kmk, are “smoothed” distributions, then
0 ≤ KN (ρ˜1, . . . , ρ˜N ; m˜1, . . . , m˜N ) ≤ KN (ρ1, . . . , ρN ;m1, . . . ,mN ), (F40)
so that divergence between distributions decreases under (parallel) smoothing of both distributions;
9. smoothing chain rule: with the same notation as above,
KN (ρ1, . . . , ρN ;m1, . . . ,mN ) = KN (ρ˜1, . . . , ρ˜N ; m˜1, . . . , m˜N )
+
∑
j
p˜j KN
( θj1ρ1
ρ˜j
, . . . ,
θjNρN
ρ˜j
;
θj1m1
m˜j
, . . . ,
θjNmN
m˜j
)
, (F41)
which is somewhat reminiscent of the strong additivity property of Shannon entropy.
10. conditional chain rule: denoting a joint probability distribution by
ρ⊗ θ = (ρ1θ1|1, . . . , ρ1θM |1, . . . , ρNθ1|N , . . . ρNθM |N ), (F42)
in terms of a marginal distribution ρ over N “primary” outcomes and a conditional distribution θ
over M “secondary” possibilities given any one of the primary outcomes, then
KNM (ρ⊗ θ;m⊗w) = KN (ρ;m) +
∑
j
ρj KM (θ1|j , . . . , θM |j ;w1|j , . . . , wM |j). (F43)
This expresses overall information gain (regarding both the primary and secondary outcomes)
in terms of the information gain over the primary outcomes plus the average of the conditional
information gain over the secondary possibilities given each primary outcome;
11. composition: if the probabilities are grouped so that w1 = ρ1 + · · · + ρr, w2 = ρr+1 + · · · + ρN ,
µ1 = m1 + · · ·+mr, and µ2 = mr+1 + · · ·+ ρN , then
KN (ρ1, . . . , ρr, ρr+1, . . . , ρN ;m1, . . . ,mr,mr+1, . . . ,mN ) = K2(w1, w2;µ1, µ2)
+ w1Kr
(
ρ1
w1
, . . . , ρrw1 ;
m1
µ1
, . . . , mrµ1
)
+ w2KN−r
(ρr+1
w2
, . . . , ρNw2 ;
mr+1
µ2
, . . . , mNµ2
) (F44)
for any integer r satisfying 1 ≤ r < N . This just says that information gain is equal to the
information gain at the group-level plus the expected information gain within each group, and is
closely related to the conditional chain rule property;
12. recursivity :
KN (ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρN ;m1,m2, . . . ,mN ) = KN−1(ρ1 + ρ2, . . . , ρN ;m1 +m2, . . . ,mN )
+ (ρ1 + ρ2)K2
(
ρ1
ρ1+ρ2
, ρ2ρ1+ρ2 ;
m1
m1+m2
, m2m1+m2
)
,
(F45)
which is closely related to the previous composition and chain rules properties—a generalization
includes all three properties as special cases is:
KM
({{ρjk}Mjk=1}Nj=1;{{mjk}Mjk=1}Nj=1) = KN({ρj}Nj=1; {mj}Nj=1)
+
N∑
j=1
ρj KMj
({ρjk
ρj
}Mj
k=1
;
{mjk
mj
}Mj
k=1
)
,
(F46)
whereM =
N∑
j
Mj is the total number of possibilities, aggregated into non-empty, non-overlapping
groups of Mj outcomes each, for j = 1, . . . , N , and ρj =
Mj∑
k=1
ρjk and mj =
Mj∑
k=1
ρjk are, respectively,
131 Notice that θj|k must be stochastic but is not required to be doubly stochastic here.
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the overall posterior and prior probabilities for the jth group of possibilities, for every j = 1, . . . , N .
If the fine-grained events are aggregated into course-grained events, then the total (fine-grained)
relative entropy can be decomposed into the relative entropy of course-grained possibilities plus an
average conditional relative entropy of the fine-grained sub-possibilities constituting each course-
grained possibility.
Various subsets of these and other properties have also been used to uniquely characterize the relative
entropy. For example, starting with the continuity, symmetry, nilpotence, extension-monotonicity, and
composition properties, Hobson [119] proved that the only functions which satisfies all of these conditions
are positive multiples of the relative entropy. Kannappan and Ng [120–123] instead uniquely character-
ized relative entropy in terms of only recursivity, symmetry only for the N = 3 case, measurability, and
nilpotence only for the N = 2 case. Other combinations are possible—see for example [124, 125].
F.7.5. Johnson Characterization
Another compelling characterization is due to R. Johnson [126], based on some earlier efforts by Kashyap.
First, we mention a few more criteria, slightly different than those introduced above, but wherein ρ and
m continue to represent nonnegative, normalized distributions over the same set of mutually exclusive
and exhaustive possibilities:
1. finiteness: D(ρ;p) <∞;
2. positivity : D(ρ;m ≥ 0, where the inequality is strict if p 6= m;
3. semiboundedness: D(ρ;m) ≤ D(ρ;ρ), where the inequality is strict if p 6= m.
Then Johnson has shown that measurability, additivity, finiteness, and either positivity or semibounded-
ness together require that
DN (ρ;m) = BK(ρ;m) + C K(m;ρ) (F47)
for some constants B ≥ 0 and C ≥ 0, that require further boundary conditions to pin down. For a
measure of information gain in going from the prior distribution m to the posterior ρ, it makes sense to
also demand that D become infinite if there is some outcome for which ρj > 0 but mj = 0, but not the
other way around. This requires C = 0.
F.7.6. Operational Desiderata: Shore-Johnson, Caticha, and Other Variational Characterizations
As with the Shannon entropy itself, some characterizations of relative entropy have emphasized its
operational purpose in assigning distributions rather than just its information-theoretic meaning in
quantifying information and information gain.
Assigning probability distributions via entropy maximization, or relative entropy minimization, orig-
inated in the development of statistical thermodynamics by Boltzmann and Gibbs, and generalizes
Laplace’s Principle of Insufficient Reason, which itself formalizes widespread intuitions regarding prob-
ability and symmetry that trace back at least to the birth of probabilistic thinking in games of chance.
In the second half of the 20th century, E.T. Jaynes [61, 62] clarified and extended the role of maximum
entropy reasoning in statistical mechanics, generalized and championed the concept as a basic ingredi-
ent of rational inference, and inspired the application of the so-called Principle of Maximum Entropy
(MAXENT) in a number of new areas in physics, astronomy, geology, chemistry, biology, economics, and
other fields.
Since entropy measures uncertainty or missing information, Jaynes argued that assigning a prior prob-
ability distribution over some hypothesis space by maximizing entropy, subject to whatever constraints
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are known, reflects the most honest representation of our partial knowledge, since by definition any other
distribution of smaller entropy would embody less uncertainty, and thereby pretend to information we
do not in fact possess.
Subsequently, various author endeavored to translate this insight into more precise mathematical terms,
by formulating compelling axioms which lead to the Principle of Maximum Entropy or Minimum Relative
Entropy as a general rule for assigning prior probability distributions. That is, if we seek to assign
probability distributions via some variational principle, based on optimization of some functional of
the distribution, what properties should be required, and to what extent do these pick out a unique
variational “potential” to minimize?
a. Shore-Johnson Axioms: Shore and Johnson [127, 128] make a case for the following consistency
axioms (in which possible events or outcomes are cast in the language of states of a system or systems),
which reflect the idea that if a problem can be solved in more than one equivalent way, the answers
should be the same. Stated informally, their axioms are:
0. universality : the same general optimization framework should apply to all cases, only using differ-
ent constraints and priors to reflect the specifics of the problem;
1. uniqueness: given a well-posed prior distribution and consistent constraints leading to a convex set
of feasible distributions, the posterior distribution should be uniquely determined via constrained
optimization;
2. coordinate invariance: our choice of coordinates systems or labels for the possibilities over which
the probability distribution is defined should not matter;
3. system independence: it should not matter whether independent information about independent
systems is incorporated separately (in marginal distributions) or jointly (in a joint distribution);
4. subset independence: it should not matter whether one treats information pertaining only to certain
subsets of a system in terms of a conditional probability distributions for the subsets, or in terms
of the full distribution for the full system.
Shore and Johnson then argue how these requirements necessarily132 lead to a distribution ρ1, . . . , ρN
minimizing the relative entropy K(ρ) = ∑
j
ρj log
ρj
mj
subject to certain constraints embodying the avail-
able information, in terms of some prior distribution m1, . . . ,mN to which the probability distribution
would relax in the absence of any further information.
b. Skilling Axioms: Skilling [129] has characterized relative entropy using arguments along the same
line as employed to derive the Shannon entropy, contended that essentially the same axioms ought
to apply in essentially any situation where we wish to generate or compare approximations to any
non-negative, additive distribution f = (f1, . . . , fn), even if not naturally interpreted as a probability
distribution per se.133 By additive, we mean here that the “weight” attached to some set is always the
sum of the weights of the members of the set.
Based on several different arguments, Skilling showed134 that the nonnegative distribution f should be
chosen so as to maximize a functional of the form
H(f ;m) =
∑
j
[
fj −mj − fj log fjmj
]
, (F48)
subject to whatever further constraints on f are known, and given some “prior model” m to which f
should relax in the absence of constraints. This just reduces to −K(f ;m) when the distributions are
both normalized so that
∑
j
fj =
∑
j
mj = 1.
132 Strictly speaking, their argument confines its attention to problems where the constraints limit the feasible distributions
to some closed, convex subset. The apportionment problem does not actually involve minimization over a closed,
convex set of distributions, since the allowed distributions constitute a discrete number of possibilities dotting the space
of probability distributions, as they involve the apportionment of whole numbers of seats. However, if a variational
principle is favored in the case of convex constraints, it would seem that we should also use it in the case of non-convex
constraints, even if the optimal solution is then not guaranteed to be unique.
133 Focusing at the time in image processing applications, Skilling called such a distribution a “scene,” and any one estimate
of it an “image.”
134 See also his contribution in [100] for a more streamlined argument.
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c. Caticha Axioms: Caticha [130–137] has developed a very similar axiomatization to that of Shore
and Johnson, in terms of properties to be satisfied by the variational principe used to assign probability
distributions given certain information as constraints. Guided by what he refers to as the Principle of
Minimal Updating (PMU), namely that beliefs are to be updated only to the minimal extent required
by any new information, he invokes the following desiderata:
1. locality : local information has local effects, in the sense that if new information refers only to
some sub-domain, then the distribution conditional on being outside that sub-domain should not
change. An important special case is one of idempotence: when there is no new information there
is no reason to change one’s mind;
2. coordinate invariance: the content of the assignment should not depend intrinsically on our choice
of labels or coordinates used to specify the possibilities;
3. independence: when systems are known to be independent, it should not matter whether they are
treated jointly or separately,
which together lead again to relative entropy minimization. Here universality of the variational prin-
ciple is left implicit, while his coordinate invariance axiom is the same as Shore’s and Johnson’s, his
independence axiom is essentially the same as their system independence axiom, and his locality axiom
is closely related to their subset independence axiom.135
F.7.7. Baez-Fritz Relative Entropy Characterization
As with the entropy, relative entropy can also be characterized in terms of properties expected under
measure-preserving transformations [138]. Consider the same setup as in the earlier Baez-Fritz-Leinster
entropy characterization, only now we add another ingredient: some sort of background hypothesis
leading to (i) measurement probabilities q over the outcomes in Y , and (ii) “transition” probabilities
θj|k about the possible latent state of the system given the result of the measurement. The latter are
assumed to be consistent with the measure-preserving transformation f : X → Y, in the sense that
θj|k = 0 unless f(xj) = yk.
Together, these lead to a “prior” distribution over the latent states via
mj =
∑
j
mkθj|k (F49)
But new knowledge will lead in general to a different distribution ρ over the latent states. It is demanded
that the quantification of information gain G associated with this new knowledge satisfy three criteria.
First, the information gain G should be additive under the composition of such measurements. Second,
the information gain is lower-semicontinuous with respect to the underlying probability distributions,
meaning if ρi and mi are sequences of normalized distributions converging to ρ and m respectively in
the limit as i → ∞, then G(ρ;m) ≤ lim
i→∞
inf
i′≥i
G(ρi′ ;mi′). (This means than if the problem is changed
slightly the gain is either close to or below its original value). Third, the information gain is convex
linear. Intuitively, this means that if we are to flip a (biased) coin to decide whether to perform one
measurement process or another, the information gain is the expectation of the gain with respect to the
unknown result of the coin flip. Fourth, the information gain vanishes when the hypothesis is “ideal,”
so that ρ = m. Then it can be shown that G(ρ;m) = K(ρ;m) for some choice of the constant κ > 0.
135 Some form of th independence assumption plays a central role in the Acze´l, Shore-Johnson, Caticha, and many other
axiomatizations of entropy and relative entropy. Its connection to apportionment may seem obscure, but really the
connections is so obvious that is goes unspoken—apportioning seats in Switzerland should have no effect on apportioning
seats in the U.S.A. Such obvious separability is imposed by hand with most figures-of-merit, but arises as it were
automatically for entropy. If we simultaneously optimize the joint relative entropy (constraining one county’s legislative
seats to be granted to districts form that country) then we naturally arrive at the same answer as if we optimize
separately.
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F.7.8. Information Geometry and Amari’s Characterization
Beginning perhaps with the pioneering work of statisticians R.A. Fisher and C.R. Rao, many authors
have explored connections between probability theory and differential geometry, culminating in the work
of Amari [139–141] and his co-workers on what is now known as Information Geometry, which makes
statistical inference look something like general relativity.136 So as not to take us too far afield, this brief
summary simply presumes some basic familiarity with differential geometry, but may be safely skipped
or skimmed.
The key idea is to consider a parameterized family of probability distributions,137 then interpret the
parameters as coordinates on a Riemannian manifold of distributions, in order to invoke the usual
notions of metrics, connections, etc. developed in the context of differential geometry. Because each
“point” in the manifold corresponds to one well-defined probability distribution, any geometric structure
must be compatible with this additional probabilistic structure, which greatly narrows the consistent
possibilities. In fact, it is natural to demand that the metric and connections are invariant under
transformations associated with so-called sufficient statistics,138 and this requirement alone singles out
the Fisher information matrix as the only natural metric tensor,139 and also singles out one family
of torsion-free connections parameterized by a single real number, known as the α-connections, where
the connections corresponding to ±α are dual with respect to the Fisher metric, while the α = 0 case
corresponds to the Levi-Civita connection for this metric.
Furthermore, it is known that there is a direct correspondence between these connections and so-called
directed divergences, defined in information geometry as functionals (of pairs of probability distributions)
satisfying a positive-definiteness property, namely, that for any pair ρ, m of “points” (i.e., probability
distributions) in the manifold,
positive-definiteness: Dα(ρ;m) ≥ 0, with equality if and only if ρ = m (almost everywhere). (F50)
The α-divergences corresponding to the α-connections are not in general symmetric with respect to
interchanging the roles of distributions ρ and m, and do not in general satisfy a triangle inequality, so
cannot represent true distances on the manifold of probability distributions,140 with the exception of
the self-dual α = 0 case, which is known as the Hellinger distance.141 The α = −1 case corresponds to
the relative entropy or Kullback-Leibler divergence K(ρ;m), and the α = +1 case corresponds to its
dual K˜(ρ;m) = K(m;ρ). These two α-divergences are in fact the only choices which are additive for
independent events, and once again the α = −1 case is usually to be preferred if m is regarded as the
prior, default, reference, or source distribution, and ρ is the posterior, destination, or variational trial
distribution, because this ensures that impossible (zero probability) events remain impossible.142
This overtly geometric approach to entropy has been further explored in the context of Bayesian inference
by Carlos Rodr´ıguez (see for instance [144, 145]), and in the context of thermodynamics by a number
of authors, including Weihold, Ruppeiner, Salamon, Gilmore, Levine, and Crooks. See for example
[146–148], and references therein. A somewhat similar statistical framework has also been explored by
Ole Barndorff-Nielsen [149].
136 Or possibly vice versa? The connection between gravitation and information has become an area of active contemporary
research in theoretical physics.
137 For probabilities over a finite number of possibilities, as in the applications studied here, the probabilities ρ = (ρ1, . . . , ρN )
themselves can be thought of as the parameters.
138 Recall that a sufficient statistic is a mapping of the raw data which still contains all of the information relevant to
estimating the parameters of the likelihood distribution. If x represents the full data and θ represents the parameters
determining the likelihood function P(x |θ) , then y = F (x) is a sufficient statistic if the posterior predictive probabilities
for the parameters are identical whether conditioned on y or x: P(θ |y) = P (θ |x).
139 In the case of a discrete probability distribution p1, p2, . . . , where the probabilities themselves can be identified as natural
coordinates on the manifold, the Fisher metric tensor is gµν =
δµν√
pµpν
.
140 The fact that the most natural ways to quantify how probability distributions differ are not interpretable in general in
terms of distances in the manifold, geodesic or otherwise, has led some authors, particularly John Skilling [142, 143],
to remain skeptical of imposing a metric structure on probability spaces, or to critique the usefulness of the geometric
approach altogether. In recent years, Skilling has argued that when it comes to probability distributions, there is a
useful notion of “from/to”—namely, the relative entropy—but not “between.”
141 In the case of discrete probability distributions, the Hellinger distance can be written as H (ρ,m) = 2
∑
k
(
√
ρk−√mk)2.
Interestingly, this is reminiscent of the Hilbert-space distance that arises in quantum mechanics.
142 And in applications to legislative apportionment, the minimization of K as variational potential is applicable to party-list
representation without non-zero lower bounds, while the dual measure K˜ is not.
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F.7.9. Information Elicitation and a Scoring-Rule Characterization
Another illuminating approach to motivating relative entropy, explored by a number of scholars in
probability, statistics, economics, psychology, and artificial intelligence, involves elicitation of honest
information.
By the early 1950s, I.J. Good and many others had begun to explore notions of epistemic utility,
or the value of information (as opposed to just the amount of information or information change).
Around the same time, Glenn Brier observed that then-standard sorts of evaluations for tasks like
weather forecasting actually introduced incentives for rational forecasters to mis-report or misrepresent
their actual probabilistic predictions (e.g., the “chance of heavy, light, or no rain tomorrow morning in
Philadelphia.”). If above all, we desire rational information-handling and utility-maximizing agents to
honestly report predictions,143 presumably in support of future decisions by other parties, what sort of
utility function should we try to impose on the forecaster?
That is, suppose that, based on relevant data available to her, a rational forecaster adopts a probability
distribution ρ = (ρ1, . . . , ρn) over n mutually exclusive and exhaustive possible outcomes, but chooses
to report publicly a distribution m = (m1, . . . ,mn). With nothing at stake, there is not necessarily
any incentive for honest reporting, or with arbitrary or exogenous stakes, there may arise incentives for
distorted reporting. But if the payoffs can be shaped, honesty can be encouraged.
Obviously a forecast should come before observation of the outcome, but before either, imagine that it
is credibly made known to the forecaster that the outcome will subsequently be observed and compared
to her probabilistic predictions m, and if the kth outcome actually obtains, she will be rewarded with a
utility uk(m). In this context, such utility payoffs are referred to as a prediction scoring rule. The idea
is to induce incentives so that a rational forecaster tells us what she really thinks, not what she thinks
we want to hear.
With this goal in mind, we might hope that a good prediction scoring rule144 satisfy the following
properties:
1. smoothness: each uk(m1 . . . ,mn) varies smoothly as a function of each mj when 0 < mj < 1;
2. propriety :145 given any fixed “internal” probability distribution ρ, the function U¯(m;ρ) =
n∑
k=1
ρk uk(m1, . . . ,mn) is maximal (as a function of possible reported distributions m) when
m = ρ. This says that in order to maximize expected utility, the forecaster can report her actual
probabilities.
3. strict propriety : For a fixed distribution ρ, the function U¯(m;ρ) =
n∑
k=1
ρk uk(m1, . . . ,mn) has
a unique absolute maximum at m = ρ amongst all nonnegative, normalized distributions. This
says that a rational forecaster must report her actual probabilities in order to maximize expected
utility.
4. prediction-monotonicity : if in the probability distributionsm′ = (m′1, . . . ,m
′
n) andm = (m1, . . . ,mn),
it is the case that m′k > mk, then uk(m
′
1, . . . ,m
′
n) > uk(m1, . . . ,mn). This would mean that greater
reward is offered for a more accurate prediction that placed higher probability on the outcome
actually realized, however such increased probability comes at the expense of probabilities over
the unrealized possibilities;146
5. symmetry across unrealized alternatives: if pi( ) is a permutation of the indices (1, . . . , n), then
upi−1(k)(mpi(1), . . . ,mpi(n)) = uk(m1, . . . ,mn). This is saying much more than just (i) rewards
143 This task is similar to problems in collective social choice, where we want to encourage honest voting rather than strategic
voting.
144 “Psychological” or personalistic Bayesians like de Finetti and Savage have considered similar scoring rules designed to
elicit coherent probabilities. However, here we are implicitly assuming that the forecaster is rational, and will always
report probabilities that are nonnegative and sum to unity over the mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypothesis space.
145 This is also known as a reproducing property in the literature.
146 However appealing this sort of property, keep in mind that the primary goal here is honest prediction, not accurate
prediction.
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should not depend on arbitrary re-labeling of the outcomes (assuming which label corresponds
to which actual outcome is known to forecaster and evaluator), but moreover that (ii) the score
is affected by how much of the probability mass was assigned to the unrealized outcomes147, or
possibly by the set of magnitudes of probabilities assigned to the unrealized outcomes, but not on
which of these probabilities is assigned to which amongst the unrealized outcomes;148
6. irrelevance under non-occurrence: uk(m1, . . . ,mn) = φk(mk) is a function only of mk, for each
k = 1, . . . , n. This says that the reward depends only on which outcome obtained and the re-
ported probability assigned to that outcome, but not on how the remaining probability mass was
distributed across the unrealized outcomes.149
Then it can be shown that the only prediction scoring rules satisfying smoothness, strict propriety, and
irrelevance are of the form
uk(mk) = κ log(mk) + bk, (F51)
for some positive coefficient κ > 0 (the same for all k), and real offsets bk. Monotonicity need not be
assumed, but is enjoyed.
If we additionally demand symmetry, then bk = b for all k = 1, . . . , n. So the expected utility becomes
U¯(m;ρ) =
n∑
k=1
ρk [κ logmk + b] = b+ κ
n∑
k=1
ρk logmk, (F52)
which, apart from an overall additive shift b, is just proportional to what is known as the cross entropy
in information theory. Speaking of the shift, because additive constants do not affect the location of
the optimum, we can choose this constant arbitrarily (as long as it remains independent of m), and for
fixed ρ, it is convenient to choose b to be proportional to the Shannon entropy of the forecaster’s actual
distribution,
b = S(ρ) = −κ
n∑
j=1
ρj log ρk, (F53)
so that the expected utility becomes equal to the additive inverse of the (dual) relative entropy:
U¯(m;ρ) = −κ
n∑
k=1
ρk log
[
ρk
mk
]
= −K(ρ,m) = −K˜(m,ρ) ≤ 0, (F54)
with equality if and only if m = ρ. Notice however that the “trial” distribution m appears here as the
reference measure (in the denominator of the logarithm), so the utility plummets infinitely if an outcome
predicted to be impossible actually does turn out to occur.150
We may conclude that the log-score, leading to the dual relative entropy, is essentially the only smooth,
symmetric, strictly proper prediction scoring rule that depends only on the quality of prediction accorded
to what turns out to be the true hypothesis. This sort of log scoring rule has been explored by a number
of authors, including Good, Savage, McCarthy, de Finetti, and Shufford, Albert, and Massengill.151
147 Note that the remainder of the unit probability mass must have been assigned to the correct alternative.
148 An equivalent way to express this symmetry constraint is that, for all k, uk(m1, . . . ,mn) =
f(mk,m1, . . . ,mk−1,mk+1, . . . ,mn) for some one function f(m1;m2, . . . ,mn) that is symmetric in all but the
first argument. We might easily imagine other situations where this sort of symmetry would not be desirable, for
example if accurate prediction of some possible outcomes is already known to be more important than others. But again,
here we are supposing that the goal is honest elicitation of predictions across all possible outcomes, without regard to
the nature of the outcome itself, the idea being that these probabilities of an informed expert could subsequently serve
as input for many different possible decisions problems where different end users might have very different utilities over
the outcomes.
149 Once again, one can imagine situations where this would not be desirable–for example, if some wrong answers are deemed
to be better than others. But in the current context it seems to be a compelling feature of fairness to the forecaster that
once it is known that outcome k obtains, the appraisal should be based on how likely that one outcome was judged.
Note that without the reward-symmetry property, irrelevance does not by itself demand that the reward for accurate
responses be the same across all all realized outcomes.
150 This forces a rational forecaster to declare non-zero probability to all outcomes under consideration unless an outcome
is logically impossible
151 More generally, for smooth, proper scores, the difference in expected proper score between honest and dishonest reporting
is a so-called Bregman divergence, discussed below.
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F.7.10. Lattice Valuations and the Knuth-Skilling Characterization
A recent axiomatization of entropies developed by Knuth and Skilling [150] just might provide the
strongest justification for entropic apportionment, in the sense of requiring the fewest overtly proba-
bilistic assumptions. Their axioms and arguments do however involve some significant mathematical
technicalities involving lattice theory, so are only summarized briefly here.
Knuth and Skilling build on the pioneering work of the physicist Richard Cox [87, 88], who motivated the
usual rules of the probability calculus from more basic desiderata of logical consistency, and established
that probability theory is essentially the unique quantification of rational degree of belief and the unique
extension of deductive logic to cases of uncertainty, where information may be incomplete, and the truth
value of propositions may not be known. Knuth and Skilling begin with what appears to be a somewhat
more general situation, seeking natural constraints152 to be satisfied by any valuations on the elements
of a distributive lattice.153 They are able to infer that compatibility with the underlying structure154
of the lattice of possibilities requires that the valuations be equivalent (up to an invertible mapping) to
the usual notion of nonnegative, additive measures. Each such measure is uniquely determined by the
values assumed on the “atomic” elements just above the “bottom” of the lattice, and if these atomic
valuations are normalized so as to sum to unity, the valuations will satisfy all of the mathematical rules
of probability, whether or not they are naturally interpreted as probabilities in the sense of degrees of
rational belief or as degrees of partial implication.155
Apportionment naturally possesses just this sort of distributive lattice structure. In the case of Congres-
sional apportionment, the atomic elements of the lattice may be identified with individual inhabitants,
and can be joined into districts, the districts into states, and if desired, the states into regions, etc. Or
in the case of party-list representation, the votes can be grouped by parties, the parties into coalitions,
etc. Shares of representation are naturally represented by nonnegative numbers which can be assigned
to any subset, and at each level of aggregation, the share of representation for any group is just the
arithmetic sum of the shares of its distinct members.
This suggests that in such applications we can, and indeed should, make use of the further mathematical
machinery which emerges from the Knuth and Skilling lattice axioms. Having inferred the sort of
measures that can be naturally defined on a distributive lattice, they then look at valuations on these
valuations—real-valued functions of the measures that can be used to characterize a measure, to compare
or rank these measures, or to assign these measures through an associated variational principle.
First, one seeks a functional which quantifies the divergence of some “destination” measure (ρ1, . . . , ρN )
from a “source” measure (m1, . . . ,mN ) that existed before the constraints that lead to the ρj were
imposed. Given a measure (ρ1, . . . , ρN ) over the atoms of the lattice, compatibility with the underlying
distributive lattice structure turns out to limit consideration to variational potentials of the form:
Γ(ρ1, . . . , ρN ) =
N∑
j=1
[
Aj +Bjρj + Cj(ρj log ρj − ρj)
]
(F55)
for some choice of of real-valued parameters Aj , Bj , and Cj .
Given that we seek a quantified notion of divergence or discrepancy between measures, we demand that
the function Γ is to achieve its minimum when (and only when) ρj = mj for all j = 1, . . . , N . This
requires that Bj = −Cj logmj and CJ > 0. As a matter of convenience, we might as well choose this
152 The authors speak of respecting certain lattice symmetries, but it might be more accurate to say that the demand is
that valuations embody structure-preserving homomorphisms between the lattice and the numerical assignments on the
lattice.
153 Bayesian probabilities live on a so-called Boolean lattice of propositions, which is closed and consistent under all logical
disjunctions (ORs), conjunctions (ANDs), and negations (NOTs), and their combinations. Knuth and Skilling employ
the broader construct of a distributive lattice equipped with notions of meet, join, and partial order (which in many
cases can be identified with set-theoretic intersection, union, and inclusion, respectively). Boolean lattices are special
cases of distributive lattice, but by focusing on the latter, the authors manage to motivate the rules of probability theory
without direct recourse to the use of logical negation. In fact, they do not even make use of all of the defining properties
of a distributive lattice, so it may turn out that their conclusions will hold for a still broader class of lattices or partially
ordered sets.
154 They make much use of ordering and associativity properties, but need not assume commutativity of the measure from
the start. Additivity, and thereby commutativity, for the valuations are derived rather than postulated. They do make
much use of an independence postulate, which again says that independent problems can be analyzed separately or
together, and conclusions should be the same.
155 In a Bayesian framework like that of Knuth and Skilling, all probabilities are conditional degrees of belief, so technically
probabilities are constructed as ratios of what the authors call measures, rather than measures themselves.
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minimum value to be zero,156 which further entails that Aj = −Cj , and hence
Γ(ρ1, . . . , ρN ;m, . . . ,mN ) =
N∑
j=1
Cj
[
mj − ρj + ρj log ρjmj
]
. (F56)
The coefficients Cj now clearly represent some sort of intrinsic weighting of the possibilities. In most
applications, the different outcomes j = 1, . . . , N are to be treated equivalently a priori, requiring that
the Cj all assume a common value Cj = C. In other words, we demand symmetry under parallel
permutations of the ρj and also the mj . This is particularly salient in cases of apportionment, where
j will index different inhabitants (in the case of Congressional apportionment) or different votes (in
the case of party-list representation), and so the equality of the Cj follows from our basic democratic
motivations. The possible functions are thereby further reduced to
Γ(ρ1, . . . , ρN ;m, . . . ,mN ) = C
N∑
j=1
[
mj − ρj + ρj log ρjmj
]
, (F57)
and finally, if both measures are normalized so that
∑
j
ρj =
∑
j
mj = 1, we are led to
Γ(ρ1, . . . , ρN ;m, . . . ,mN ) = C
N∑
j=1
ρj log
ρj
mj
, (F58)
which is recognized as the relative entropy, scaled by some factor C > 0.
A related, if distinct task involves quantifying the uniformity of a single measure over the atomic possi-
bilities. Assume the measure (ρ1, . . . , ρN ) has been normalized
157 such that
∑
j
ρj = 1. Here we require
the function Γ(ρ1, . . . , ρN ) to be permutation invariant, to achieve its minimum when the measure is
maximally non-uniform, namely when any one value is unity and the rest of the values are zero, and
to achieve its maximum when the measure is completely uniform, namely when all of the ρj are equal.
Again as a matter of convenience, we can choose the minimum to be zero. Together, these constraints
require Aj = 0 and Bj = Cj = C = − |C| for some constant C < 0, resulting in
Γ(ρ1, . . . , ρN ) = − |C|
∑
j
ρj log ρj , (F59)
which is recognized as being proportional to the Shannon entropy.
F.8. Interpretation of Entropy and Relative Entropy in Communication Theory
In Shannon’s original application to communication theory, entropy represents the (receiver’s) uncer-
tainty as to which message will be sent, and therefore the amount of uncertainty that is expected to be
removed if the message is received unambiguously. Of course the total number of bits used to express or
transmit the message may tend to be greater, because of inefficient coding, unavoidable redundancy in
an otherwise convenient or familiar language, or the need for deliberate error correction in noisy chan-
nels, but the entropy represents the minimum number of bits to which the message could be reliably
compressed on average (in the absence of noise).
But in order to achieve good compression, one must be well informed about the source of possible mes-
sages. While the Shannon entropy S(ρ) represents best-case compressibility given message probabilities
ρ, relative entropy K(ρ;m) represents the cost in terms of expected extra bits required when the coding
is optimized for message probabilities m but messages are predicted to occur with probabilities ρ. It is
a measure of inefficiency in coding or transmission, or equivalently if more optimistically, of potential
savings if information about the source is gained.
156 This just serves to fix an overall additive offset.
157 The lattice is assumed to be generated from a finite number of “atoms,” so this is always possible by a simple re-scaling
if necessary.
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F.9. Relationships Between Entropy and Relative Entropy
Whether we consider Shannon entropy or relative entropy more fundamental is largely a matter of taste.
If we adopt either of these functionals, the other arises almost inevitably.
F.9.1. From Entropy to Relative Entropy
Consider K “course-grained” possibilities, assumed mutually exclusive and exhaustive, and indexed by
k = 1, . . . ,K. Imagine we learn that each can be refined into nk “fine-grained” exclusive sub-possibilities
which we label by j = 1, . . . , nk for each k, for a total of N =
∑
k
nk fine-grained possibilities in all.
Knowing nothing else, the principle of maximum entropy assigns equal probabilities 1N to all of the
fine-grained possibilities, leading to probabilities
gk =
nk∑
j=1
1
N =
nk
N =
nk∑
k
nk
(F60)
for the course-grained possibilities. These are rational numbers, but mathematically speaking we may
imagine problems involving refinements of arbitrary granularity, so the gk can be arbitrarily close to any
discrete probability distribution.
Our uncertainty as to which fine-grained possibility will obtain is quantified by the (maximal) entropy
SN = −
K∑
k=1
nk∑
k=1
1
N log
1
N = logN, (F61)
while our uncertainty as to the course-grained outcome is quantified by the entropy
SK = −
K∑
j=1
gk log gk = SN −
K∑
k=1
gk log nk. (F62)
But suppose we receive additional information implying that the probabilities of the course-grained
possibilities become ρk for k = 1, . . . ,K, where still ρk ≥ 0 and
∑
k
ρk = 1, so that our uncertainty as
to the course-grained outcome changes to S ′K = −
∑
k
ρk log ρk. If we learn nothing further about which
of the nk fine-grained possibilities may be more or less likely given that the course-grained outcome
k occurs, then each course-grained probability ρk must be spread uniformly over all nk fine-grained
possibilities, which is to say that the conditional probabilities over the fine-grained outcomes, given any
course-grained outcome k, remain uniform, and equal to P(j | k) = 1nk . Our overall uncertainty as to
the fine-grained outcome becomes
S = −
K∑
k=1
nk∑
j=1
ρk
1
nk
log
[
ρk
1
nk
]
= −
K∑
k=1
ρk log
[
ρk
Ngk
]
= logN −
K∑
k=1
ρk log
[
ρk
gk
]
= SN −K(ρ; g), (F63)
which is simply the difference between the maximum possible entropy SN and the relative entropy K(ρ; g)
between the updated distribution ρ = (ρ1, . . . , ρK) and the prior distribution g = (g1, . . . , gK) over the
course-grained possibilities. So K can be interpreted as the amount by which the fine-grained Shannon
entropy has been reduced by learning the information taking our course-grained probabilities from g to
ρ. The distribution g is sort of a “density of states” or degeneracy factor that properly accounts for the
fine-grained multiplicity of the course-grained outcomes in the evaluation of the overall entropy.
So from this point of view, probability assignment via the Principle of Minimum Relative Entropy can
be viewed as just a special case of the Principle of Maximum Entropy, when the specified hypothesis
space is a course-graining of some more primitive space of elementary possibilities.
104
F.9.2. From Relative Entropy to Entropy
Conversely, suppose we start with the Kullback-Leibler divergence
K(ρ;m) =
N∑
j=1
ρj log
ρj
mj
, (F64)
accepted as a measure of relative information, of a probability distribution ρ = (ρ1, . . . , ρN ) over some
set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive possibilities, relative to another distribution m = (m1, . . . ,mN )
over the same space of possibilities, or equivalently, as the quantified information gain in updating to
probabilities ρ starting from prior probabilities m.
We then seek a measure of overall uncertainty, or missing information, associated with a single distri-
bution ρ. In this context, a prior state of minimal knowledge is one in which we know nothing except
that there are N mutually exclusive and exhaustive possibilities, leading to the probability assignment
mj =
1
N for all j = 1, . . . , N . Under this state of ignorance, any other distribution would pretend to
knowledge we do not have, namely that certain outcomes are more likely than others. This is known
as the Principle of Indifference, or Principle of Insufficient Reason, but is really just an elementary
symmetry requirement in the absence of symmetry-breaking information.
On the other extreme, a state of maximal knowledge would obviously correspond to learning which one
of the mutually exclusive and exhaustive outcomes actually obtains, taking us from the prior distribution
m to a probability distribution µ = (µ1, . . . , µJ) concentrated on exactly one of the possible outcomes,
say the `th:
µj = δj` =
{
1 if j = `
0 if j 6= ` , (F65)
where δj` is the usual Kronecker delta symbol.
Thus, K(µ;m) quantifies the maximal information obtainable starting in the prior state of maximal
ignorance. If our actual state of knowledge is instead described by the distribution ρ, then the missing
information that would be required to reach a state of maximal knowledge should be the difference
between the maximal information obtainable and the information already gained in going from m to ρ:
∆K = K(µ;m)−K(ρ;m) =
∑
j
µj log
µj
mj
−
∑
j
ρj log
ρj
mj
=
∑
j
δj` log
δj`
1/N −
∑
j
ρj log
ρj
1/N
= logN −
∑
j
ρj logN −
∑
j
ρj log ρj = −
∑
j
ρj log ρj = S(ρ),
(F66)
which is just the Shannon entropy of the final probability distribution ρ.
From this complementary point of view, probability assignment via the Principle of Maximum Entropy
can be viewed as just a special case of the Principle of Minimum Relative Entropy when the background
measure over the specified hypothesis space is assumed uniform.
F.9.3. Entropy and Bregman Divergence
Another connection between Shannon entropy and relative entropy may be summarized by saying that
the relative entropy is the Bregman divergence of the entropy. The notion of Bregman divergence
frequently arises in contemporary machine learning applications, as well as other applications involving
convex optimization. Given a continuously-differentiable and strictly convex function defined on a convex
set, the associated Bregman divergence may be defined as the difference between that function evaluated
at one point in the set, and its first-order Taylor approximation evaluated at the point but centered at
some reference point. In the context of discrete probability distributions, if F (ρ) is the original (convex
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and differentiable) function defined on the probability simplex, then the associated Bregman divergence
generated by F (ρ) is
BF (ρ,m) = F (ρ1, . . . , ρN )− F (m1, . . . ,mN )−
N∑
k=1
(pk −mk) ∂∂mkF (m1, . . . ,mN ). (F67)
This divergence is nonnegative definite for nonnegative, normalized distributions, is always textitconvex
with respect to the first argument p, and enjoys a number of additional useful properties relevant in
statistical estimation and convex optimization problems.
Since spaces of normalized discrete probability distributions are naturally closed and convex, and the
negentropy F (ρ) = −S(ρ) is convex and differentiable at interior points, we can define a Bregman
divergence of the negentropy with respect to some reference distribution m, and the result is just the
relative entropy K(ρ;m):
−S(ρ1, . . . , ρN ) + S(m1, . . . ,mN ) +
N∑
k=1
(pk −mk) ∂∂mkS(m1, . . . ,mN )
= κ
N∑
k=1
[
pk log pk −mk logmk − (pk −mk) logmk − 1ln b (pk −mk)
]
= κ
N∑
k=1
[
pk log pk − pk logmk
]
= κ
N∑
k=1
pk log
pk
mk
,
(F68)
where here b represents the base of the logarithm used in defining S, but drops out since it only appears
explicitly in a term which vanishes because
∑
k
pk =
∑
k
mk = 1.
F.10. Relative Entropy and Csisza´r f-Divergences
The relative entropies belong to a wider class of functionals known as Csisza´r f -divergences158 which are
intended to measure the discrepancy or divergence between two probability distributions ρ = (ρ1, . . . , ρN )
and m = (m1, . . . ,mN ) defined over the same space of N mutually exclusive and exhaustive outcomes.
The f -divergence represents an expectation value (with respect to the reference probability distribution
m) of some real-valued function f( ) of the relative odds ratio ρkmk :
Df (ρ;m) =
N∑
k=1
mk f
(
ρk
mk
)
. (F69)
To generate a well-defined f -divergence, the function f(x) must possess two properties,159 namely: (i)
it must be convex (i.e., concave up) for all x > 0, and (ii) it must satisfy the boundary/normalization
condition f(1) = 0. Because valid inputs must be normalized probability distributions, notice that the
generating function f(x) for any particular divergence measure is not unique, as we can add to f(x) any
linear “gauge” function of the form g(x) = γ (x − 1), which always averages to zero but does not alter
the convexity properties160 of f(x), nor the value of f(1).
All f -divergences satisfy the following properties:
1. positive definiteness: D(ρ;m) ≥ f(1) = 0, with equality if and only if ρ = m;
158 Such measures of divergence are also known as Csisza´r-Morimoto divergences, or Ali-Silvey divergences.
159 Additionally, we adopt the conventions that 0 f
(
0
0
)
= 0, 0 f
(
0
x
)
= x lim
y→0+
f(y), and 0 f
(
x
0
)
= x lim
y→∞
f(y)
y
.
160 Preservation of convexity follows because the second derivative of a linear function vanishes everywhere.
106
2. Markov convexity : Df
(
ρ˜; m˜
) ≤ Df(ρ;m), where ρ˜ and m˜ are transformed from ρ and m re-
spectively by the same stochastic transition matrix Θkj , and the equality holds if and only if the
transition is associated with a sufficient statistic for (ρ,m)161;
3. joint convexity : for 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1,
Df
(
λρ+ (1− λ)ρ′;λm+ (1− λ)m′) ≤ λDf(ρ;m)+ (1− λ)Df(ρ′;m′) (F70)
when ρ, p′, m, m′ are all probability distributions over the same space.
Some commonly-encountered examples are listed in Table II. The χ2-divergence
Dχ2(p;m) =
N∑
k=1
mk
(
pk
mk
− 1)2 = N∑
k=1
(pk −mk)2
mk
(F71)
is commonly encountered in statistics applications, more out of historical precedent and continued con-
venience than anything else more fundamental. The total variation distance represent a standard L1
distance on the space of normalized, nonnegative probability distributions over the N exclusive and
exhaustive “elementary” outcomes,
DTV(p;m) = 12
N∑
k=1
∣∣pk −mk∣∣, (F72)
but can also be interpreted as the the maximum absolute difference in probability assigned by the two
distributions to any (possibly compound) event. The Hellinger distance
DH(p;m) =
N∑
k=1
(√
pk −√mk
)2
(F73)
is a standard L2 Hilbert-space metric, but using the square roots of the probabilities rather than the
probabilities themselves, so is somewhat reminiscent of quantum mechanics, as mentioned earlier. As
alluded to above, the Amari α-divergences are the only f -divergences compatible with an arguably
natural differential geometric structure on the manifold of probability distributions, and amongst these,
the Kullback-Leibler divergences (corresponding to α = ±1) enjoy additional information theoretic
properties, while the α = 0 case is the only true metric, and is proportional to the Hellinger distance.
Although certain types of f -divergences (like the Hellinger distance and the total variation distance)
are true metrics, in general an f -divergence need not be symmetric under interchange of ρ and m, and
need not satisfy a triangle inequality. But given a generating function f(x), notice that we can naturally
define a dual generating function by f˜(x) = xf(x−1), which satisfies f˜(1) = f(1) = 0 while sharing the
same convexity properties as f(x) itself.162 The corresponding dual f -divergence just reverses the roles
of the distributions ρ and m:
Df˜ (ρ;m) = Df (m;ρ). (F74)
Since two successive interchanges of p and m should do nothing, this duality relation had better be
idempotent, and indeed we find
˜˜
f(x) = xf˜(x−1) = x
[
x−1f
(
(x−1)−1
)]
= f(x). An f -divergence is
symmetric (with respect to interchanging any pairs of distributions ρ and m) if and only if it can be
generated by an f(x) that is self-dual in the sense that f˜(x) = f(x) + γ (x − 1) for some constant γ,
and for all x > 0. The Kullback-Leibler number K and dual Kullback-Leibler number K˜ are dual in
just this sense, while the Hellinger distance is self-dual, as is the total variation distance. The Amari
α-divergence is dual to the (−α)-divergence.
161 Meaning that, given the transition matrix Θkj , ρ can be inferred unambiguously from ρ˜, and m˜ from m. Note that
re-labeling symmetry is an important special case of this property.
162 This is easy to see if f(x) is twice-differentiable, for then f˜ ′′(x) = x−3f ′′(x−1) ≤ 0 whenever x > 0.
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Type of f -Divergence Generating Function f(x)
Kullback-Leibler divergence κx log x (κ > 0)
dual Kullback-Leibler divergence −κ log x (κ > 0)
Hellinger distance (
√
x− 1)2 or
2(1−√x)
total variation distance 1
2
|x− 1|
χ2 divergence (x− 1)2 or
x2 − 1
dual χ2 divergence x(1− x−1)2 or
x−1 − x
− lnx if α = −1
Amari α-divergences 4
1−α2
(
1− x 1+α2 ) if |α| 6= 1
x lnx if α = +1
TABLE II. Csisza´r f -divergences commonly encountered in probability theory. Given two probability distribu-
tions ρ = (ρ1, . . . , ρN ) and m = (m1, . . . ,mN ) over the same space of N mutually exclusive and exhaustive
outcomes, the f -divergence is given by Df (ρ;m) =
∑N
k=1mk f
(
ρk
mk
)
. The generating function f(x) for any one
type of divergence between normalized distributions is not unique, but these representatives are perhaps the
simplest. The family of Amari α-divergences are closely related to what are known as Re´nyi divergences, which
in turn are based on the Re´nyi entropy, a generalization of the Shannon entropy. The Amari divergences for ±α
are duals. Notice that the Kullback-Leibler divergences are special limiting cases of the Amari α-divergences
corresponding to α → ±1 (provided we measure the entropies in nats rather than bits), while the Hellinger
distance corresponds (apart from an overall factor of 2) to the self-dual case α = 0.
While we maintain that various information-theoretic considerations single out the relative entropy as
particularly fundamental, (constrained) minimization of any f -divergence between the indirect and di-
rect polling probabilities could be used as an valid Congressional apportionment method. Indeed, several
existing methods can be cast in terms of minimizing a suitable f -divergence between the direct (demo-
cratically ideal) distribution m and indirect (Congress-mediated) polling probability p. In particular,
the identric mean method is associated with the Kullback-Leibler divergence, the logarithmic mean
method with the dual Kullback-Leibler divergence, the Webster-Wilcox method with the χ2 divergence,
the Huntington-Hill method with the dual χ2 divergence, and Hamilton’s method with the total variation
distance.163
Any apportionment method based on minimizing an f -divergence does enjoy the following appealing
feature: Our desideratum to focus on the weighs of representation across represented individuals, rather
than the entitlements of states, dictates that we try to minimize some measure of the difference between
the direct polling probabilities msn =
1
P and the indirect polling probabilities
164 p¯isn =
1
R
1
d¯s
= asR
1
ps
, for
all represented individuals in all states.
But one could also just try to minimize a discrepancy between a state-level sampling distribution
(a1R , . . . ,
aS
R ) and the democratic ideal (
qs
R , . . . ,
qs
R ). In general, using the same measure of discrepancy,
we arrive at different answers for the optimal choice of the as. While in our view the former is clearly
the correct approach in principle, it is reassuring that if we use an f -divergence, then we must obtain
the same optimal apportionment a either way. This is because for these polling distributions,
S∑
s=1
ps∑
n=1
1
P f
( as
R
1
ps
1
P
)
=
S∑
s=1
ps
P f
(
asP
psR
)
=
S∑
s=1
1
R
psR
P f
(
as
P
psR
)
=
S∑
s=1
qs
R f
(
as
qs
)
=
S∑
s=1
qs
R f
(as/R
qs/R
)
, (F75)
so the same f -divergence can be written using the same generating function either at the level of
individual weights of representation, or in terms of the state sampling probabilities, as long as we
assume ideal (district-averaged) sampling probabilities within states.
163 Instead of or In addition to relying on what we regard as dubious arguments based on satisfying quota, the Hamilton
method could have been motivated by the property that it minimizes the absolute value of the difference between the net
indirect and direct weights of representation for the worst-case grouping of individuals, consistent with other constraints.
164 Once again, we are assuming ideal sampling within states, since the district partitioning is not known as this stage.
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However, several examples of the “dual” generating functions, including those associated with the dual
entropic and the Huntington-Hill methods, suffer from a mathematical divergence lim
x→0+
f(x) = +∞ and
so would deliver an infinite penalty if some as = 0 but qs > 0, and hence cannot generally be used
for party-list voting, and thus are disfavored according to our universality desideratum. In contrast,
certain “primal” divergences, including those associated with the entropic and Webster apportionment
methods, instead satisfy lim
x→0+
f(x) < +∞, but lim
x→+∞ f(x) = +∞, and would assign infinite penalty
only if some qs = 0 but as > 0. Our view is that this latter behavior is more reasonable in a variational
principle generating apportionments. After all, if it is undesirable or unacceptable for groups with
positive quotas to receive nothing, it is straightforward to enforce lower bounds with explicit constraints
during optimization. But it would be not just undesirable, but non-sensical, to give seats or votes to
groups with zero quotas—Congressional apportionment in the U.S. should never assign representatives
to Canada, for example.
The Kullback-Leibler (K-based) and Webster (χ2-based) approaches differ most noticeably in how these
measures decompose under different levels of aggregation or subdivision. Suppose for instance that
the sets Sr, for r = 1, 2, . . . , partition the states {1, . . . , S} into non-empty, exclusive and exhaustive
groups,165 say, by regional affiliation, or historical electoral college voting patterns, or really any criterion.
The figure-of-merit for the Webster method can be thought of as a population variance of the individual
weights of representation, and can be decomposed into between-group and within-group contributions,
as follows:
1
P
S∑
s=1
ps∑
n=1
(
as
R
1
ps
− 1P
)2
=
∑
r
νr
P
(
σr
R
1
νr
− 1P
)2
+
∑
r
νr
P
∑
s∈Sr
ps
νr
(
as
R
1
ps
− σrR 1νr
)2
= 1P
∑
r
1
νr
(
σr
R − νrP
)2
+ 1P
∑
r
σr
R
∑
s∈Sr
1
ps
σr
R
(
as
σr
− psνr
)2
,
(F76)
where
σr =
∑
s∈Sr
as, and (F77a)
νr =
∑
s∈Sr
ps (F77b)
are, respectively, the number of seats and the number of represented individuals associated with the
rth group. But the weighted averaging that emerges, as required to maintain the equality, is not truly
recursive. And while all terms in the first and second formulations are easily interpretable, the weights
appearing in the last expression are a bit hard to understand.
In contrast, the relative entropy can be decomposed recursively as
S∑
s=1
ps∑
n=1
as
R
1
ps
log
[
as
R
P
ps
]
=
S∑
s=1
as
R log
[as/R
qs/R
]
=
∑
r
σr
R log
[ σr
R
νr
P
]
+
∑
r
∑
s∈Sr
ps∑
n=1
as
R
1
ps
log
[ as
R
1
ps
σr
R
1
νr
]
=
∑
r
σr
R log
[σr/R
νr/P
]
+
∑
r
σr
R
∑
s∈Sr
as
σr
log
[as/σr
ps/νr
]
,
(F78)
which provides a more natural sum of between-group and averaged within-group contributions. Fur-
thermore, the same sort of recursivity holds if we refine rather than course-grain the partitions, so that
relative entropy provides a fully consistent and universal measure of discrepancy between ideal and ac-
tual weights of representation within individual states, as well as between states or groups of states, or
any other subdivisions of the population.
165 Since the sets are exhaustive, there must be at least one set in the partition, and since we are requiring the subsets to
be both non-empty and exclusive, there can be at most S sets.
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Another unique feature for the relative entropy is that it is the only measure on the space of normalized,
nonnegative probability distributions that is both an f -divergence and a Bregman divergence. Moreover,
both of these divergences are generated from the same function, in that K(ρ;m) is the f -divergence given
by
N∑
j=1
ρj f
( ρj
mj
)
, and the Bregman divergence is associated with a Taylor expansion of F (ρ) =
N∑
j=1
f(ρj),
both divergences involving the same function f(x) = κx log x.
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Appendix G: LORENZ CURVES AND INEQUALITY INDICES
An extensive scholarship on measurement of distributional inequality in income, wealth, or other resources
provides yet another route to the entropic figure-of-merit [26, 28, 65, 151–161]. We start with a review of
the Lorenz curve and its properties, and then discuss quantitative, summary measures of the inequality
embodied in an asset distribution or its associated Lorenz curve, finally settling on the Theil, or entropic,
index, as the most natural.
G.1. The Lorenz Curve as a Visual Representation of Inequality
What is now called a Lorenz Curve was introduced in 1905 by American economist M.O. Lorenz to
represent and visualize concentration or inequality of wealth or income distributions, but it can also
be used for distributions of essentially any (additive, divisible, ratio-scale) asset or resource, including
representational weight in a legislative government.166
Suppose we rank order all individuals in a population by asset level, from lowest (asset-poorest) to
highest (asset-richest). For each rank, we may determine the proportion of the population at that rank
or below, and also the proportion of the total assets controlled by individuals at that rank or below. A
Lorenz curve itself plots the first fraction against the second fraction, so that L(F ) specifies what fraction
of the total assets are possessed, controlled, or associated with units constituting a certain fraction F of
the population, measured up from the bottom of the distribution when the units are sorted in ascending
order from asset-poorest to asset-richest.167 Considering, for example, the wealth distribution across all
households in a certain country at a certain time, L(0.8) = 0.2 would mean that the bottom 80% of
households together possess only 20% of the wealth.
A Lorenz curve can be used to characterize either a continuous univariate probability distribution, a
discrete probability distribution, or some finite population of discrete units.168 Though much of the
theory has developed for the continuous case, we are interested in the latter case, which requires a bit
of care in its construction if we are to usefully treat populations where many different individuals may
have exactly the same asset level, without introducing excessive course-graining into the curve. Here we
will rely on a standard definition based on piecewise linear interpolation.169
G.1.1. Empirical Lorenz Curve for Voting Weight Distributions
Though ultimately interested in measuring inequality in political representation, in order to emphasize
how this task fits squarely within a larger class of applications, we will talk more or less interchangeably
in terms of distribution of “representational weight” or more generally of any “resource” or “asset”
which is quantifiable on a nonnegative, ratio scale, but also is additive across individuals, such that the
asset level of any identifiable group is the sum of the asset levels associated with the members of that
group, and the proportion of assets associated with a group is the sum of their assets divided by the
total amount of assets within the observed population as a whole.
Consider some nonnegative asset levels x = (x1, . . . , xP ) distributed amongst a population of P individ-
uals or units. The corresponding fractional asset shares, or allotment proportions, are
ρj =
xi
Px¯
for j = 1, . . . , P, (G1)
166 Other examples include distributions of financial debt or energy consumption across households, racial or political
segregation, biomass or reproductive fecundity of organisms or biodiversity of species in evolutionary ecology, prevalence
of word use in a language, or sizes of cities in a country, etc.
167 The Lorenz curve is hence also closely related to the concepts of “rank-size” or “rank-frequency” distributions.
168 Depending on the context, these observed individuals may or may not be considered a random sample from a larger
super-population, in a statistical sense
169 Other interpolating functions (such as exponentials or power laws) could be better justified, but would make little visible
difference on the scales at which we would ever plot a Lorenz curve for the represented U.S. population, with hundreds
of millions of individuals.
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where
x¯ = 1P
P∑
j=1
xj (G2)
is the overall average asset level within the population. The fractional shares therefore satisfy
ρj ≥ 0, (G3a)
P∑
j=1
ρj = 1, (G3b)
and, if convenient, can be interpreted as probabilities, associated with sampling at random elementary
units of the assets, and asking to whom they belong. However, we emphasize that a probabilistic
interpretation is not required for these proportions.
In the context of representational equality, the population consists of P =
S∑
s=1
ps represented individuals
across all states, and the “assets” may be taken to be the corresponding weights of representation:
x = w = (w11, . . . , w1p1 , . . . , wS1, . . . , wSpS ), (G4)
with population average
x¯ = w¯ = 1P . (G5)
At the pre-districting stage, all represented individuals within a given state will have the same (averaged)
weight of representation, but here we can consider an arbitrary distribution. These weights have already
been normalized by construction, but we would obtain the same curve if we started instead with the
(unnormalized) shares of a representative, and then took care to consider the allotment proportions—
that is to say, the Lorenz curve will be invariant under mere changes in the units in which we measure
the assets.
Individual asset levels (counted according to their multiplicity) can be re-sorted into non-decreasing
order,
min
j
{xj} = x(1) ≤ x(2) ≤ · · · ≤ x(P−1) ≤ x(P ) = max
j
{xj}, (G6)
which are known as the empirical order statistics. In our case, x(`) denotes the representational weight
of the `th least-represented individual. In the event of multiple individuals with the same weight, we
may adopt some convention for mapping between these sorted weights and the actual individuals so
represented, although the actual Lorenz curve will be independent of such choices.
Next, we consider quantiles of the ranked population, and also fractions of the aggregated assets associ-
ated with these sub-populations. Specifically , for non-negative integer `, let
Φ` =

0 if ` ≤ 0
`
P if 1 ≤ ` ≤ P
1 if ` ≥ P
(G7)
denote the cumulative fraction of the population made up of the ` least-represented individuals, and
define
Λ` =

0 if ` ≤ 0
∑`
j=1
ρ(j) =
∑`
j=1
x(j)
P∑
j=1
x(j)
=
∑`
j=1
x(j) if 1 ≤ ` ≤ P
1 if ` ≥ P
(G8)
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as the cumulative proportion of weight170 carried collectively by the ` least-represented individuals.
Using these population data, we can define the empirical Lorenz curve L(F ) over the interval 0 ≤ F ≤ 1
as the continuous, piecewise-linear interpolant passing through the points:
(0, 0), (Φ1,Λ1), . . . , (ΦP ,ΛP ), (1, 1). (G9)
That is, L(F ) is constrained to satisfy
L(Φ`) = Λ`, (G10)
and has constant slope in between these points.
G.1.2. Basic Properties of the Empirical Lorenz Curve
Over the interval 0 ≤ F ≤ 1, an empirical Lorenz curve L(F ) possesses the following properties:
1. L(F ) is continuous;
2. L(F ) is piecewise linear;
3. L(F) is non-negative;
4. L(F ) is non-decreasing;
5. L(F ) is (non-strictly) convex;
6. 0 = L(0) ≤ Θ(F − 1) ≤ L(F ) ≤ F ≤ L(1) = 1,
where
Θ(x) =
{
1 if x ≥ 0
0 if x < 0
(G11)
is the right-continuous171 Heaviside step function.
In the continuous case, L(F ) can be derived directly from a continuous cumulative distribution function
(CDF) Φ(x), and, like Φ(x), can itself be interpreted as a CDF. Either we can randomly sample individ-
uals and ask whether their weights of representation fall within a certain range, as described by Φ(x), or
we can randomly choose units of representation, and consider the probability that it will be associated
with some subset of individuals,172 using L(F ).
In any case, the Lorenz curve L(F ) encodes information about the representational inequality across
the population. We see that L(F ) is always bounded (non-strictly) from below by the step-function
L(F ) = Θ(F −1), which is referred to as the curve of perfect inequality, and would reflect a limiting case
where a negligible fraction of the population controls all of the weight.173
L(F ) is bounded (non-strictly) from above by the straight line L(F ) = F , known as the line of perfect
equality, wherein all individuals would possess exactly the same weight, such that the weight possessed
by any group is exactly proportional to the size of the group.
The Lorenz curve cannot rise above the line of perfect equality, nor sink below the curve of perfect
inequality. Where it falls in between reflects the degree of inequality in the distribution over the corre-
sponding range of population quantiles.
The Lorenz curve may displayed graphically, and/or characterized in terms of some reduced sets of
descriptive parameters.
170 Representational weight wsn was already normalized to unity, so the cumulative fraction is just equal to the sum.
171 That is, here we are adopting the convention Θ(0) = lim
x→0+
Θ(x) = 1.
172 In the discrete empirical case, the possibility of exact ties in the weight of representation complicates this picture
somewhat. We can view the empirical Lorenz curve as a sample estimate for the CDF of some underlying continuous
probabilistic model of the possible realizations of populations, and/or we can imagine adding tiny amounts of random
“jitter” to the individual weights to make it almost certain that no exact ties will occur
173 In the case of a finite discrete population, the most unequal distribution is not quite a step function, but corresponds to
state of affairs where one dictatorial individual has all of the representational weight. The empirical Lorenz curve L(F )
would vanish for 0 ≤ F ≤ 1− 1
P
, then rise linearly form 0 to 1 over the interval 1− 1
P
≤ F ≤ 1, which is quite steep if
P  1.
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G.1.3. Conventional Summary Statistics of the Lorenz Curve
Traditionally, the two parameters in most common use to characterize the shape of the Lorenz curve are
the Gini coefficient and the Lorenz asymmetry coefficient.
In the case of continuous distributions, the Gini coefficient is defined s the ratio of two areas, namely the
area between the line of perfect equality and Lorenz curve, and the area between the curves of perfect
equality and perfect inequality:
G =
1∫
0
dF
[
F−L(F )
]
1∫
0
dF F
= 2
1∫
0
dF
[
F − L(F )] = 1− 2 1∫
0
dF L(F ). (G12)
Introduced by Italian sociologist and statistician174 Corrado Gini in 1912 (along with several other
variants), the GIni coefficient serves as a measure of departure from the line of perfect equality and hence
emerges as an overall reflection, or summary statistic, of inequality within the population. The Gini
coefficient necessarily falls in the interval 0 ≤ G ≤ 1, and is thus a normalized measure of distributional
inequality, where larger values correspond to greater inequality, and the upper and lower bounds are
achievable only in the case of perfect inequality or perfect equality, respectively.
By integrating the interpolated curve, or equivalently by approximating an integral using a discrete
numerical quadrature rule, the Gini coefficient for a finite, discrete population can be written directly
in terms of the empirical order statistics:
G =
1
2
P∑
j=1
P∑`
=1
∣∣xj − x`∣∣
P∑
j=1
P∑`
=1
xj
=
1
2P
P∑
j=1
P∑
`=1
∣∣ρj − ρ`∣∣ = 1
P
P∑
j=1
∑
`<j
[
ρ(j) − ρ(`)
]
, (G13)
which is one-half the relative mean difference in weight across all pairs of individuals, which is a standard
measure of statistical dispersion.175
Many different Lorenz curves can share the same Gini coefficient. A second, complementary parameter,
the Lorenz asymmetry coefficient (LAC), is often reported, and may be defined in the continuous case
by
LAC = Φ(x¯) + Λ(x¯), (G14)
where , Φ(x¯) and Λ(x) represent, respectively, the fraction of the population with assets at or below
average, and the fraction of the total assets associated with this part of the population. This parameter
measures asymmetry with respect to a prospective axis of symmetry defined176 by (1−F ). Some Lorenz
curves are symmetric under reflection about this axis, but others are not. In the case of Lorenz curves
derived from continuous distributions, it can be shown that the Lorenz curve is parallel to the line of
perfect equality (i.e., has slope ddF L(F ) = 1) at the population quantile corresponding to the average
asset level, x = x¯. If LAC > 1, then the point on the Lorenz curve which is parallel to the line of
perfect equality lies above the axis of symmetry. This reflects a situation where the inequality in the
population is due primarily to a small number of very over-represented individuals. If LAC < 1, then
this point of parallelism lies below the axis of symmetry, indicating that the inequality is due primarily
to an overabundance of very under-represented individuals. If LAC = 1, then this point lies on the axis
of symmetry, and in fact, it can be shown that the entire Lorenz curve is symmetric under reflections
about this axis of symmetry. Lorenz curves corresponding to the line of perfect equality, and the curve
of perfect inequality are both symmetric in this sense, as are certain other distributions, such as the
log-normal.
174 He also had degrees in mathematics, biology, and law.
175 Sometimes the Gini coefficient G for a discrete population is defined with an additional pre-factor of P
P−1 , so that it
assumes the maximum value of unity for the most unequal achievable distribution.
176 Note that the axis of symmetry is not itself a valid Lorenz curve, but every Lorenz curve intersects this line exactly once.
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When the Lorenz curve derives from a finite population, though these exact theorems no longer hold,
an empirical estimate for LAC can still provides a useful measure of asymmetry. We may define
Φ(x) =
∑
j
Θ(x− x(j)) (G15)
as the empirical CDF giving the fraction of the population with weights of representation at or below
w, then estimate the population quantile corresponding to the mean level of representation as
Fx¯ = lim
→0
1
2 [Φ(x¯− ) + Φ(x¯+ )], (G16)
and finally use the approximation
LAC ≈ Fx¯ + L(Fx¯) (G17)
as the empirical LAC.
G.2. Inequality Metrics and their Characterizations
The Gini coefficient is perhaps the most familiar amongst a wide class of measures of distributional
inequality known as (income) inequality metrics177 or inequality measures, or inequality indices. These
may be axiomatically characterized in a manner similar to measures of uncertainty as explored earlier—
and as we will see, the most reasonable measure again just corresponds to the relative entropy.
G.2.1. Defining Properties
Once more considering a population of size P with associated nonnegative asset levels x = (x1, . . . , xP ),
an inequality metric IP (x) is a mapping from possible asset distributions into the real numbers, which
is intended to quantitatively summarize or characterize the level of inequality in the distribution, where
larger values indicate more distributional inequality, in some prescribed sense.
Such an inequality measure should satisfy certain plausible axioms if it is to serve its intended purpose.
In the literature (mainly in economics, but also in ecology and other fields), four basic properties are
generally required of any inequality metric:
1. anonymity or symmetry : the inequality metric does not depend on the labeling of individuals
within the population, but only on the multiset of asset levels.
Exactly who gets which slice of cake should not affect our objective judgement of inequality in
the cake-slicing. That is, IP (x1, . . . , xP ) = IP (xpi(1), . . . , xpi(P )) for any permutation pi( ) of the
integers {1, . . . , P};
2. asset homogeneity, mean independence, or scale-invariance: the inequality metric is independent of
the units in which the asset x is measured.178 Inequality of the slices of the cake should not depend
on the absolute size of the cake, nor on whether we measure sizes of slices in cubic centimeters or
cubic inches.
That is, if asset levels are all multiplied by a common positive factor, the inequality metric should
be unchanged: IP (τx) = IP (x) for any τ > 0;
177 Income inequality metrics are not typically true metrics in the mathematical sense, and may measure distributional
inequality of assets other than monetary income.
178 Of course, the same choice of unit must be adopted across all individuals, if comparisons are to be meaningful.
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3. population independence or population replication-invariance: the inequality metric should not
depend intrinsically on whether the population is large or small in number—the overall degree of
fairness of cake-cutting should be quantifiable independently of the number of cake-eaters.
In particular, if we imagine replacing every individual in the original population with the same
number n of “children,” dividing up equally the individual asset level of their “parent,” then the
overall measure of inequality should be unchanged: InP ( 1nx, 1nx, . . . , 1nx) = IP (x);
4. (weak Pigou-Dalton) transfer principle: If some assets are transferred from an initially asset-richer
person to an initially asset-poorer person, conserving assets overall but without the initially richer
person ending up poorer than where the initially poorer person began,179 (and no other exchanges
are made), then the inequality metric should not increase. Taking a bit of cake from someone with
a large slice and giving it to someone with a thin slice should improve matters.
That is, if two individuals start out with assets xj and xk, and exchange assets so as to end up
with x′j and x
′
k, respectively, where x
′
j + x
′
k = xj + xk and |x′j − x′k| ≤ |xj − xk|, and no other
exchanges are made, then IP (x′) ≤ IP (x). A stronger version of this principle would make these
inequalities strict, and say that an exchange bringing two individual strictly closer in asset level
should strictly decrease the level of inequality.180
All such inequality measures have the property that if the Lorenz curve LA(F ) for one distribution
xA falls strictly below the Lorenz curve LB(F ) for another distribution xB , except at the endpoints
where they must agree, then the first distribution (xA) will be judged as more unequal than the second
distribution (xB), in the sense of having a larger value for the inequality metric. However, for more
general cases, where Lorenz curves might cross in the interval 0 < F < 1, even the ordinal rankings of
the associated resource distributions can depend on the choice of the inequality metric. Some further
criteria will be required to single out an inequality index.
G.3. Additional Properties
Other quite reasonable properties, sometimes, but not always, imposed on inequality metrics include:
i. non-negativity or zero lower bound : the inequality metric is always greater than or equal to zero;
ii. egalitarianism of zero: the inequality metric vanishes when all the assets are distributed exactly
equally.
Together these two properties just define a natural reference point in the limit of no inequality;
iii. nonnegative definiteness: the inequality metric is nonnegative, and zero if and only if the distribution
of assets is perfectly uniform;
iv. upper boundedness: the inequality metric achieves a finite upper bound for a distribution of maximum
inequality, where one individual controls all assets181. A stronger version of the principle holds that
the upper bound is realized only for the maximally unequal distribution where all but one of the
individual asset levels xj vanish;
v. continuity : small changes in any (non-zero) asset levels lead to small changes in the inequality metric
IP (x);
vi. smoothness: the inequality metric IP (x) is continuously differentiable with respect to all non-zero
asset levels. A stronger version may demand more orders of continuous differentiability;
179 Some authors adopt a seemingly weaker principle, considering only hypothetical exchanges that do not reverse the
relative ordering of the two individuals exchanging assets. But since we have already demanded permutation symmetry,
these conditions are actually equivalent.
180 Note however that thesensitivity to transfers (by how much some pairwise transfer would tend to improve equality) can
vary amongst different choices for the metric, and at different asset levels for a given metric.
181 Inequality metrics are sometimes, but definitely not always, normalized such that this upper bound is either unity, or
some number which approaches unity in the limit as the population size approaches infinity.
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vii. aggregativity : when the population is partitioned into exclusive and exhaustive sub-groups, the
overall inequality can be expressed self-consistently as a function of the inequality within the various
subgroups and of aggregated characteristics (i.e., asset levels and numerical size) across the groups.
Suppose we cut a cake, then further sub-divide these slices. The overall inequality should depend
on the inequality of the original slices, and, recursively, on the inequality within each slice after the
second round of cuts.
Whenever we are interested in distributional inequality, almost inevitably we may be curious about
the interplay of within-group and between group differences.182 Aggregativity embodies this intuition
that there should be a coherent functional relationship between the level of inequality in the whole
population and inequality in its constituent parts;
viii. subgroup decomposability or additive decomposability : a narrower version of the aggregativity princi-
ple demands that the within-group and between-group contributions to the overall inequality should
be additive—because otherwise, it would be prohibitively difficult to interpret these different com-
ponents of the inequality, or even to call them components, and to ask or answer how much of the
inequality can be attributed to variation within groups versus between groups.
That is, if the population is arbitrarily partitioned into g disjoint, non-empty, non-overlapping sub-
groups, of respective positive sizes n = (n1, . . . , ng), where n1 + · · · + ng = P , and with respective
intra-group asset distributions xk such that x = x1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xg, then the inequality metric can be
decomposed as a sum of a between-group contribution and within-group contributions:
IP (x) = IP (
n1︷ ︸︸ ︷
x¯1, . . . , x¯1, . . . ,
ng︷ ︸︸ ︷
x¯g, . . . , x¯g) +
g∑
k=1
Ωk(x;n) Ink(xk) (G18)
for some set of nonnegative weights Ωk(x,n), the x¯k representing the intra-group averages
x¯k =
1
ng
∑
j∈Sk
xj , (G19)
where Sk ⊂ {1, . . . , P} , k = 1, . . . , g indicate the set of individuals belonging to the various sub-
groups, such that n1x¯1 + · · ·+ ngx¯g = Px¯.
Decomposability means that the total inequality of a population may be expressed as the weighted
sum of the inequality within subgroups of the population plus the (course-grained) inequality existing
between these groups, where each component of inequality is quantified using the same sort of metric.
But the nature and meaning of the weighting coefficients is as yet left unspecified.
We will see that demanding all of these further properties, in addition to the basic four axioms, and
making some further sensible restrictions on the nature of the weights in a decomposition, will uniquely
characterize an entropic measure of inequality.
G.4. Utility-Based Approaches
Some economists and philosophers argue that the choice of an inequality metric must involve at a
normative judgement as to whether one distribution is to be preferred to another, and not just an
empirical observation of differences in asset levels, and that therefore the choice of I(x) should depend
on the nature of the population’s overall utility function, known as a social welfare function. We tend
to disagree with this assertion, thinking that the amount of inequality in a distribution is actually a
distinct concept from how psychologically or sociopolitically undesirable such inequality is or ought to
be collectively viewed. However, these approaches have led to some interesting mathematical results.
182 For instance, when assessing income inequality, demographic factors of interest might include country or region of
residence, age, gender, race, education, employment status, political affiliation, etc.
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The basic idea is to adopt a utility or social welfare function which builds in a preference for equality
of asset distribution, then take the inequality measure to decrease monotonically with increases in this
utility function.
One simple, if extreme, measure is the so-called Rawls’s maximin criterion,
R(x) = 1−min
j
{xjx¯ : j = 1 . . . , P} = 1− P minj {ρj : j = 1 . . . , P}, (G20)
which for a fixed population and a fixed total level of assets is sensitive only to the status of the worst-off
individual in the population.
More generally, Suppose U(x) is a collective utility, or social welfare, function over individuals’ assets,
which is: (i) continuous in each argument, (ii) monotonically increasing in each argument, (iii) sym-
metric under any permutations of the asset levels, and (iv) locally equality-preferring, which means that
U(x1, . . . , xP ) can be written as
U(x1, . . . , xp) = Ξ(ψ(x1), . . . , ψ(xP )), (G21)
where Ξ(y1, . . . , yP ) is a symmetric (i.e., permutation-invariant), jointly concave function of P arguments,
and ψ(x) is a concave function of one argument.
As we see it, the problem from the point of view of actual psychological or economic utility is that there
is no reason whatsoever to assume that the utility function should be symmetric, in the sense of all
individuals sharing the same quantitative preferences for the asset in question. Nevertheless, we can
strip away this interpretation of the utility, and just regard it directly as a measure of equality.
Then it can be shown that if an asset distribution xA leads to an a Lorenz curve LA(F ) that never
falls below and somewhere lies above the Lorenz curve LB(F ) for another distribution xB (over the
same populations), then U(xA) > U(xB). In terms of pairwise transfers, if a distribution xA can be
obtained from distribution xB by a sequence of pairwise transfers from relatively asset-richer individuals
to relatively asset-poorer individuals, then again U(xA) > U(xB).
In many discussions, the utility function is for simplicity taken to be additive,
U(x1, . . . , xp) = ψ(x1) + . . .+ ψ(xP ) (G22)
where ψ(x) is continuous, strictly monotonic, and strictly concave.183 Strict monotonicity and concavity
assumptions imply that as an individual’s nonnegative asset level x increases, ψ(x) increases but at an
ever decreasing rate, so that ψ′(x) decreases while remaining positive.
A further simplifying assumption is that of constant inequality aversion, which says that the relative
decrease in ψ′(x) for a very small relative increase in asset level x is independent of the absolute asset
level x. This is measured by an inequality aversion parameter  ≥ 0, characterizing the strength of
society’s “yearning for equality” vis-a´-vis uniformly higher total income. Therefore ψ(x) would satisfy
the differential equation
xψ′′(x)
ψ′(x)
= , (G23)
or
ψ(x) ∝ ψ1 + ψ′1
x1− − 1
1−  (G24)
for some integration constants ψ1 and ψ
′
1 > 0.
In his pioneering work, Dalton [151] suggested that inequality can be indexed by how how far the
actual average social utility per individual falls short of potential average social utility if all income were
distributed equally:
ID = 1− ψ¯ψ(x¯) , (G25)
183 This is, of course, only a proper subset of the class of utility functions described above.
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where ψ¯ = 1P
P∑
j=1
ψ(xj).
For the particular choice ψ1 = 0, this leads to the Dalton family of inequality measures:
184
D(x) = 1−
1
P
P∑
j=1
x1−j − 1
x¯1− − 1 (G26)
for any  ≥ 0.
But the Dalton inequality measures are not invariant with respect to affine transformations of the utility
function,185 and/or changes of units used to measure assets. While such changes would not effect the
ordering properties of the inequality measure applied to distributions with the same mean asset level
(i.e., for a given , all such choices would lead to the same ordinal ranking of different distribution across
the same population and with the same mean), this behavior is unacceptable in a fundamental measure
of inequality.
Atkinson [154] suggested instead using
IA = 1− ψ
−1(ψ¯)
x¯
(G27)
as the inequality measure, and demanded full scale invariance, which restricts the possibilities to
A(x) =

1− 1x¯
(
1
P
P∑
j=1
x1−j
) 1
1−
if 0 ≤  < 1, or  > 1
1− 1x¯
( P∏
j=1
xj
) 1
P
if  = 1
, (G28)
involving relative differences between the arithmetic mean and so-called Ho¨lder generalized means of
order (1− ). As such, for a fixed asset distribution x, A(x) increases monotonically with .
Again, the  parameter can be interpreted as the “inequality aversiveness” of the measure, quantifying
the amount of utility presumed to be gained from redistribution. At  = 0, the index A0(x) = 0 is
indifferent to any differences in asset levels across individuals. In the limit as  → ∞, infinite utility
can be gained by redistribution from any state of inequality to the state of perfect equality. In between,
as  rises, A tends to become more sensitive to changes at the lower end of the asset distribution, and
as  falls, A tends to become more sensitive to changes at the upper end of the asset distribution. At
 = 1, a small relative increase in the asset level leads to the same relative decrease in the underlying
marginal utility, regardless of the asset level. Here the Atkinson measure just reduces to the relative
difference between the arithmetic and geometric means of the asset levels across the population, which
sounds reminiscent of the entropic figure-of-merit—in fact A1 is just a monotonic function of the relative
entropy.
G.5. Some Other Inequality Measures
Besides the Gini index, Rawls index, and Atkinson Indices, many other inequality measures (all satisfying
the basic four axioms, at least weakly, and some satisfying some of the other axioms) have been proposed
in economics, ecology, and other contexts, including:
184 These are closely related to the so-called Tsallis generalized entropies.
185 If utility functions are to be revealed by preference orderings amongst possible allocations (including randomized mixtures
thereof), then they can only be determined modulo affine transformations U(x)→ aU(x)+ b (for any positive a), which
would change the unknowable origin and overall scale.
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G.5.1. 20-20 Ratio
As the name suggests, the 20-20 ratio simply measures how much (by ratio) the richest 20% of the
population is compared to the bottom 20%. This is not bounded from above, and does not satisfy the
strong transfer principle, and is otherwise rather ad hoc, but may be useful in a descriptive sense.
Obviously, variants of this idea can be defined for other quantiles—for example, the decile dispersion
ratio compares the assets of the top 10% and bottom 10% of the population. Empirically, in a discrete
population, interpolation186 may be needed to estimate these indices if individuals do not happen to fall
exactly at the indicated percentages and percentiles.
Any of these indices are easily interpretable, but fundamentally arbitrary, and insensitive to changes in
the middle of the distribution.
G.5.2. Palma Ratio
The Palma ratio is the ratio of asset share of the upper 10% of the population divided by the share of the
poorest 40%. This is bounded in neither direction, and only satisfies a weak transfer principle. It was
motivated by an empirical observation that middle class incomes typically tend to represent about half
of gross national income, while the other half is split between the richest 10% and poorest 40% in manner
reflective of political forces and the direction of sociopolitical alignment of the middle class. From our
perspective this is perhaps useful as a summary description, but highly ad hoc as a fundamental measure.
G.5.3. E´lteto¨-Frigyes indices
If characterizing inequality using a ratio of assets controlled by different portions of the population, a
less arbitrary dividing line might be the mean asset level itself.
Letting x¯ continue to represent the overall mean asset level across the entire population, define x¯+ as
the mean asset level of all individuals richer than the overall mean, and similarly define x¯− as the mean
asset level of all individuals poorer than the overall mean.
Then the unnormalized E´lteto¨-Frigyes indices [153] are the ratios of these means, namely
uE =
x¯
x¯−
, (G29a)
wE =
x¯+
x¯ , (G29b)
vE =
x¯+
x¯−
= uE wE , (G29c)
which range in value from 1 to +∞. Note that only two of these three quantities are independent. It is
convenient to instead use standardized indices,
u′E = 1− 1uE =
x¯−x¯−
x¯ , (G30a)
w′E = 1− 1wE =
x¯+−x¯
x¯+
, (G30b)
v′E = 1− 1vE =
x¯+−x¯−
x¯+
= 1− (1− u′E)(1− w′E), (G30c)
which lie between 0 to 1, inclusive. However, these indices still only satisfy a weak version of the transfer
principle, and are not decomposable.
186 Following standard practice, we have used linear interpolation to define the empirical Lorenz curve, but a better choice
might involve Pareto interpolation, or maximum entropy interpolation.
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G.5.4. Coefficient of Variation
The coefficient of variation is defined as the square root of the variance of the possessed asset levels,
divided by the mean asset level:
C(x) =
[
1
P
P∑
j=1
(xj − x¯)2
] 1
2
1
P
P∑
k=1
xk
=
[
1
P
P∑
j=1
(xj
x¯ − 1)2
] 1
2
=
[
1
P
P∑
j=1
(xj
x¯ )
2 − 1
] 1
2
. (G31)
The coefficient of variation is not bounded from above, but that is not terribly troubling. Its square is
subgroup-decomposable (though not in the most natural way, in our view).
G.5.5. Hoover index
The Hoover index is the proportion of all assets which would have to be redistributed so as to achieve a
state of perfect equality. This is also known as the Robin Hood index or the Shutz index. Graphically,
in the case of continuous distributions, it can be expressed as the largest vertical separation between the
Lorenz curve L(F ) and the line of perfect equality F . It is automatically bounded between 0 and 1.
The Hoover index for a discrete population can be written in the simple form:
H =
1
2
P∑
j=1
|xj − x¯|
P∑
j=1
xj
=
1
2P
P∑
j=1
|xj − x¯|
x¯
= 12P
P∑
j=1
|xjx¯ − 1|, (G32)
so is proportional to the relative mean deviation. Though simple to interpret, the Hoover index only
satisfies a weak version of the transfer principle, since any exchanges between a pair of individuals both
below the mean or both above the mean do not produce any change in H. Also it is non-aggregative.
G.5.6. Logarithmic variance
Another commonly encountered inequality measure is the logarithmic variance,
vL =
1
P
P∑
j=1
(
ln
wj
w¯
)2
, (G33)
which is nonnegative definite, but is not bounded from above, and is not aggregative.187
G.5.7. Herfindahl-Hirschman index
The Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HII) is just given by the sum of the squares of the fractional asset
shares:
HHI =
P∑
j=1
ρ2j =
P∑
j=1
( xj
Px¯
)2
= 1P 2
P∑
j=1
(xj
x¯
)2
, (G34)
187 In contrast, the variance of the logarithms of asset levels has also been used as an inequality measure, but does not satisfy
even a weak transfer principle for exchanges between individuals at sufficiently high asset-levels, so is unacceptable.
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and in, say, a wealth distribution just represents the probability that two dollars sampled at random
belong to the same individual. Note that amongst distributions with the same mean asset level, this
induces the same ordering as the coefficient of variation.
In ecology, this is known instead as the Simpson index,188 and is used as a measure of species diversity. In
microbiology, it is known as the Hunter-Gaston index. In quantum theory, it is used as the conventional
measure of purity of the quantum state, and it is also related (by exponentiation) to the order-2 Re´nyi
generalized entropy, also known as the collision entropy. These Re´nyi entropies can be used to define
another family of inequality measures, as discussed next.
G.5.8. Re´nyi Divergences
The Re´nyi entropies of nonnegative order α,
Hα(ρ) =
1
1−α log
P∑
j=1
ραj , (G35)
were introduced as generalizations of the Shannon entropy, which corresponds to the α → 1+ limiting
case [162].
And just as the Re´nyi entropies generalize the Shannon entropy, the Re´nyi divergences generalize the
standard relative entropy (i.e., Kullback-Leibler divergence).189 We can use any of the Re´nyi divergences
between the realized (or proposed) and ideal asset distributions as an inequality metric. The divergence
of order α becomes
Rα(x;P ) =
1
α−1 log
P∑
j=1
ραj (
1
P )
1−α = 1α−1 log
[
1
P
P∑
j=1
(xj
x¯
)α]
. (G36)
Although the Re´nyi entropies are only (meaningfully) defined for α ≥ 0, it turns out that the divergences
can be extended190 to all real-valued α. These divergences are nonnegative definite, scale-invariant,
replication-invariant, and also all aggregative, but not in what we view as a natural way, and they lack
desirable convexity properties for α > 1.
Note that these divergences are closely related to the Atkinson indices defined above, and to the gener-
alized entropy indices, to be defined below, as well as the Amari divergences discussed previously.
G.5.9. Generalized Entropy Indices
For a suitable choice of a kernel function h(x), a natural inequality index can be constructed as the
difference of the average value of h(x) in the perfectly uniform distribution, ρj =
1
P for j = 1 . . . , P , and
the average of the same function under the actual distribution, ρj =
xj
Px¯ , j = 1, . . . , P . That is, we can
define
Ih(x;P ) =
P∑
j=1
1
P h
(
1
P
)− P∑
j=1
xj
Px¯ h
( xj
Px¯
)
=
P∑
j=1
xj
Px¯
[
h
(
1
P
)− h( xjPx¯)] (G37)
188 The complementary quantity (1−HHI) is known as the Gini-Simpson diversity index, not to be confused with the Gini
coefficient defined above.
189 As in the standard Shannon-Kullback case, the Re´nyi divergence between a given distribution and the uniform distribu-
tion is equal to the difference in their Re´nyi entropies. However, we continue to maintain that the standard expressions
for entropy and relative entropy are superior for most applications, including fair apportionment.
190 Again the α = 1 case must be arrived at by a limiting procedure, and corresponds to the usual Kullback-Leibler
divergence.
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Such averages are automatically scale invariant, but additional structure must be imposed on h(x) if this
is to function as an inequality index. In particular, if h
(
1
P
)− h( xjPx¯) = f(xjx¯ ) for some convex function
f(y) satisfying f(0) = 1, then
Ih(x;P ) = 1P
P∑
j=1
xj
x¯ f
(xj
x¯
)
(G38)
can be interpreted as nonnegative-definite Csisza´r f -divergence, and is then also automatically replication
invariant.
The parameterized family of kernels
hα(ρ) =

− ln ρ if α = 0
1−ρ−α
α(α−1) if α 6= 0, 1
ρ ln ρ if α = 1
(G39)
leads to the generalized entropy indices, or Shorrocks [158] indices,
Eα(x) =

1
P
P∑
j=1
ln x¯xj if α = 0
1
α(α−1)
1
P
P∑
j=1
[(xj
x¯
)α − 1] if α 6= 0, 1
1
P
P∑
j=1
xj
x¯ ln
xj
x¯ if α = 1
, (G40)
defined for any real value of the parameter α, which reflects a weighting given to disparities between asset
levels in different parts of the distribution. In general, lower values of α correspond to more sensitivity
to inequality in the lower tail of the asset distribution, and for higher values to greater sensitivity in the
upper tail.191
It can be shown that these generalized entropy indices are the only family of additively decomposable
inequality metrics.
This family is monotonically related to the Re´nyi divergences, and includes monotonic functions of the
Atkinson indices as special cases, as well as other familiar indices. For example, E2(w) is related to
the coefficient of variation and the HHI index, and E0(w) is the mean log deviation, or Theil L-index.
E1(w) is our favored choice, known in this context as the Theil T -index, discussed next.
G.5.10. Theil Index
Aggregativity, and especially decomposability, are very natural but also very stringent requirements.
Indices such as the Gini coefficient lacking any aggregativity property can exhibit some quite counterin-
tuitive behavior, where under some redistributions of assets, inequality within every subgroup goes up,
the inequality across groups remains the same, yet the overall measure of inequality goes down.
In our view, it is sensible, even essential, to have an inequality metric that is in fact additively decompos-
able into within-group and between-group contributions, so that we can meaningfully address questions
of how much of the total inequality can be attributed to within-group or between-group differences, and
even speak of the proportions of different contributions to the overall inequality. Hence the parameter-
ized family of generalized entropy indices enjoys a privileged status, not shared by the Gini coefficient
or other non-decomposable indices.
191 Most authors have advocated values corresponding to α ≤ 2, since larger value show little “concern” with inequality
except amongst the richest echelon of the population. In contrast, the α→ −∞ limit focuses entirely on the very bottom
of the distribution, and induces the same rankings as Rawls’s maximin criterion.
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But demanding additive decomposability does not by itself buy much unless the coefficients Ωk weighing
the within-group contributions can be interpreted in a sensible way. So for example, while additive
decomposition of the familiar variance of a distribution underlies much of the logic of standard linear
regression and analysis of variance (ANOVA), the meaning of the weighting coefficients is not entirely
transparent.
Indeed, in our view, about the only reasonable choice compatible with permutation, scale, and replication
invariance should make the within-group contribution a weighted average of the inequality of the sub-
groups. As we have seen, in information theory, this property is called recursivity. Demanding additive
decomposability (together with the four primary axioms) restricts options to the family of generalized
entropy indices, while it turns out that insisting on the stronger recursivity requirement singles out a
pair of special cases, the Theil indices.
Straightforward calculation reveals that the sub-group weighting coefficients appearing in the decompo-
sition of the generalized entropy index Eα(x) of order α are given by
Ωαk =
nk
P
(
x¯k
x¯
)α
, k = 1, . . . , g. (G41)
These weights are always nonnegative, but can only be interpreted as probabilities when they are also
suitably normalized, ∑
k
Ωαk = 1, (G42)
and that only happens when α = 0 or α = 1
Furthermore, it can be shown that the normalization deficit (1−∑
k
Ωαk) is directly proportional to the
between-group component itself, so these two indices are the only (permutation, scale, and replication
invariant) inequality metrics additively decomposable in a manner where the within-group inequality
components can be said to be truly independent of the between-group contribution.
The α = 0 case corresponds to the Theil L-Index [65],
L(x) = E0(x) = 1P
P∑
j=1
ln x¯xj (G43)
also known as the logarithmic mean deviation. In terms of (normalized) representational weight, this
can be written as
L(w) =
P∑
j=1
1
P ln
1/P
wj
= 1P
P∑
j=1
ln 1wj − lnP = K˜(w), (G44)
which is just the dual Kullback-Leibler divergence, measured in nats.
The α = 1 case corresponds to the Theil T-index
T (x) = E1(x) =
1
P
P∑
j=1
xj
x¯ ln
xj
x¯ , (G45)
and is often just referred to as the Theil index. As a measure of inequality of representational weight,
the Theil T-index reduces to
T (w) =
P∑
j=1
wj ln[Pwj ] = lnP −
P∑
j=1
wj ln
1
wj
= K(w), (G46)
The Theil T-index is none other than the Kullback-Leibler divergence, or relative entropy (measured in
nats, rather than bits) of the asset distribution relative to the perfectly equal (uniform) distribution, or
equivalently, can be interpreted as the Shannon redundancy. It has been used as a measure of inequality,
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non-uniformity, compressibility, segregation or stratification, and diversity. So apart from a change of
units, it is precisely entropic figure-of-merit we have advocated for apportionment.
As a measure of income or wealth inequality, the Theil T-index can be interpreted as the uncertainty
associated with randomly sampling dollars of income and asking to whom they belong. In terms of
communications theory, it can be thought of as indicating under-utilized information capacity which
reduces the effectiveness of price signals, or as measuring the “redundancy” of assets in some individuals,
implying scarcity in others. A high value for the Theil T-index indicates that total income is not
distributed evenly among individuals, in the same way that an uncompressed text file does make equal
use of words or characters
Proposed by Dutch econometrician Henri Theil in his 1967 book on economics and information theory
[65], both of these indices satisfy strong versions of all of the principles of inequality metrics suggested
above. The weights in the decomposition of the Theil L-index (dual relative entropy) are the population
shares nkP of the respective sub-groups, while the weights in the Theil T-index are the asset shares
nkx¯k
Px¯
of the sub-groups.
As general measures of distributional inequality, one of these two are therefore the most natural choice,
but which? As we are interested n the distribution of assets across individuals, and not individuals
across assets, an asset-weighted average across groups seems the more natural, and this suggests the
T-index192 Additionally, the L index can exhibit some odd behavior. For example, suppose in income
distribution xA, one person makes a million dollars per year, a million people make one dollar per year,
and one person earns one cent per year. In income distribution xB , one person makes a two dollars
per year, a million people make one dollar per year, and one person makes nothing. The Theil L-index
judges distribution A to be infinitely more equal than distribution B.
It may be helpful to see how the decomposition works out in the case of the T-index. Specifically, consider
a partition of all individuals into g exhaustive, non-empty, non-overlapping sub-groups of respective (sizes
n1, . . . , ng and respective distributions x1, . . . ,xg, as defined above. The intra-group Theil index of the
kth subgroup is
T (xj) =
∑
j∈Sk
xj
nkw¯k
ln
xj
w¯k
, (G47)
where the total amount of assets controlled by the kth group is nkx¯k, so
xj
nkx¯k
represents the fractional
share of the intra-group assets controlled by individual j within group k, and
xj
nkx¯k
x¯k
nkx¯k
=
xj
nkx¯k
1
nk
=
xj
x¯k
(G48)
represents the ratio of this individual intra-group fractional share to the ideal fractional share under
equal distribution of intra-group assets, which would of course just be
1
nk
(nkx¯k)
nkx¯k
=
1
nk
. (G49)
The overall Theil index can then be written as
T (x) =
ng∑
k=1
nkx¯k
Pw¯ ln
x¯k
x¯ +
g∑
k=1
nkx¯k
Px¯ T (xg)
= T (
n1︷ ︸︸ ︷
x¯1, . . . , x¯1, . . . ,
ng︷ ︸︸ ︷
x¯g, . . . , x¯g) +
g∑
k=1
nkx¯k
Px¯ T (xg)
(G50)
192 Shorrocks [158] instead argues for the L-index over the T-index. He notes that a question like “how much of the observed
income inequality due to age?” can have (at least) two interpretations. It might be seeking: how much less income
inequality (as a proportion of the total) would be observed if age variation were the only source of income variation? This
suggests that we group the population into age brackets, and calculate the ratio of the between-group inequality level
(which is the inequality with within-bracket differences ignored) to the total inequality level. But it might instead be
asking: by how much (as a proportion of the total) would inequality decrease if age-income correlations were eliminated?
This suggests using in the numerator the difference between the total inequality level in the original distribution and the
inequality in a distribution where inequality within each age bracket is left unchanged, but the mean income levels across
age brackets are equalized. The latter distribution will then have no between-group inequality, but is numerically equal
to the average within-group inequality in the original distribution for the Theil L-index, but not the Theil T-index, since
adjusting the within-group mean income levels will change the asset shares but not the population shares of the groups.
Thus, the two ratios are always the same under either interpretation for the L-index, but not the T-index. However,
we do not see this is as a compelling argument—obviously different questions may have different answers. Better to
carefully specify what is seeking than choosing an index on the grounds that it happens to given the same answer to
two distinct questions.
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wherein nkx¯kPx¯ represents the fractional share of total assets controlled by the kth group, while
nkx¯k
Px¯
nk
P
=
nkx¯k
Px¯
nk
P
=
x¯k
x¯
(G51)
represents the ratio of this achieved fractional share to the ideal share assuming perfect proportionality
(taking into account the sizes of the groups).
For fixed population size P , the Theil T-index satisfies
0 ≤ T (x) ≤ lnP, (G52)
with equality at the lower bond if and only if all individuals have exactly the same asset level, and
equality at the upper bound if and only if one individual controls all of the assets.193 Some have
criticized the Theil T-index for not having an upper bound of unity, but this is actually a point in its
favor—surely, if one individual is to control all of the assets, then the total amount of inequality should
grow monotonically with the number (P − 1) individuals who are thereby left with nothing.194
193 Each of its components separately satisfies analogous inequalities.
194 And if we were to renormalized T (x) by dividing by lnP , it would no longer satisfy the population replication property,
nor a natural decomposability property.
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Appendix H: SOME OPTIMIZATION LEMMAS
Arbitrary combinatorial optimization problems can become arbitrarily difficult,195 but in certain special
cases, we can exploit analogies to the more familiar mathematical task of optimizing smooth functions.
Here we verify a few basic results which are relevant to optimal allocation in the apportionment problem,
where many of the most commonly suggested apportionment methods may be derived from a variational
principle minimizing (subject to constraints) some concave, additive objective function representing a
total error of apportionment.196
Here we discuss the problem in the context of constrained maximization, because we find it easier to
speak in terms of hill-climbing and possible gains to the figure of merit, but of course constrained
maximization of a function φ(x) is equivalent to constrained minimization of the additive inverse −φ(x)
of that same function.
H.1. Constrained Optimization of Discrete, Additive, Concave Functions
Suppose we seek a constrained maximum of an additive,197 real-valued, discretely concave (down) func-
tion of integer arguments, of the form:
φ(x) =
N∑
j=1
fj(xj), (H1)
for some choice of scoring functions fj : Z → R, where x = (x1, . . . , xN )T ∈ A(N) ⊆ ZN is an ordered
N -tuple of integers taking discrete values inside some allowed hyper-rectangle A(N) ⊂ ZN defined by
−∞ < λj ≤ xj ≤ uj < +∞ for j = 1, . . . , N, (H2)
where the lower bounds λj and upper bounds uj can be taken to be integers, and where the optimization
is further subject to a single linear constraint, namely a requirement that
N∑
j=1
xj = X, (H3)
for some choice for the total budget X ∈ Z (which must necessarily lie in the interval ∑
j
λj ≤ X ≤
∑
j
uj
if there is to be any consistent solution). Together, the inequality constraints on the individual xj and
the equality constraint on the total sum
∑
j xj define the feasible set of possibilities. We further assume
each function fj(x) satisfies a discrete concavity condition:
fj(x+ 1)− fj(x) ≤ fj(x)− fj(x− 1) if λj < x < uj , (H4)
so that any gains from incrementing xj are subject to diminishing marginal returns
198. Equivalently,
this condition says that f(x) lies above the average of its neighboring values:
fj(x) ≥ 12
[
fj(x− 1) + fj(x− 1)
]
if λj < x < uj . (H5)
This discrete concavity condition implies that if fj(x
∗) is maximal, then fj(x) must be non-decreasing
in either direction moving away from x = x∗.
Such an optimization problem naturally arises when X represents some fixed, discretized resource that
is to be allocated amongst N different groups, agents, regions, or categories, based on maximizing some
additive utility function φ(x) exhibiting diminishing marginal utility, where fractional allocations are
not possible, and non-trivial lower and/or upper bounds on each share may be imposed.199
195 Some, in fact, are known to be NP hard, and even NP complete.
196 Or equivalently, maximizing a figure-of-merit reflecting the degree of fairness or proportionality of apportionment.
197 Some sources on operations research or optimization theory instead refer to this property as separability rather than
additivity, but the latter terminology seems more clear.
198 This condition is implied by, but weaker than, the requirement that ∂
2
∂x2
fj(x) ≤ 0, but the latter inequality may be
simpler to verify when the fj(x) functions are sufficiently smooth.
199 In the context of utility theory, we would also naturally require that each fj(x) be an increasing function of x over
its allowed domain (more is better when it comes to utility, just typically at a decreasing marginal rate), but such a
monotonicity property is not actually needed for our conclusions here, so is not assumed.
127
H.1.1. Greedy Is Global
Under these conditions, we claim that the obvious sequential “greedy” algorithm, doling out one unit
of resource at a time according to whichever fj(xj) will be increased the most, finds not just a local
but a global (constrained) maximum of φ(x). That is, when the objective function |phi(x) satisfies the
conditions above, by allocating each unit in succession, the following procedure constructs a sequence
x(0), . . . ,x(n) = x∗ culminating in an allocation x∗ corresponding to a constrained global maximum of
φ(x) subject to λj ≤ xj ≤ uj , for all j = 1, . . . , N , and to
N∑
j=1
xj = X:
(1) initially (i.e., for stage t = 0), assign xj(0) = λj for each j = 1, . . . , N , and define n = X −
∑
j
λj ;
(2) for t = 1, 2, . . . , let xj(t) = xj(t − 1) + δjk(t) , where δjk is the Kronecker delta, and the index
k = k(t) corresponds to that variable xk for which the change fk
(
xk(t − 1) + 1
) − fk(xk(t − 1)) is
maximal (choosing randomly or by some other prescription in the event of an exact tie), amongst
all remaining unsaturated variables xj for which xj(t− 1) ≤ uj − 1;
(3) repeat process (2) until t = n.
If n < 0, the constraints are mutually inconsistent, and no solution at all will be feasible. If n = 0, there
is only one feasible solution satisfying all constraints, namely x∗ = x(0) = (λ1, . . . , λN )T. But if n > 0,
distinct allocations may be feasible, and at each iteration t = 1, . . . , n as specified above, we define the
corresponding “greedy gains” ∆φ1, . . . ,∆φn to the objective function φ(x) such that
∆φi = φ
(
x(t)
)− φ(x(t− 1)) = fk(xk(t)(t− 1) + 1)− fk(t)(xk(t)(t− 1)). (H6)
For simplicity, we refer to these as “gains,” even thought they are not necessarily positive if the fj(x)
are not monotonically increasing functions. Notice that the gain at any stage depends only on the one
variable being incremented, and not any of the other variables. The algorithm can identify and notify
whether any randomization is needed to break a tie. However, note that even if ties do occur, they
can only affect the final apportionment if we in effect run out of seats before all of the states once tied
receive another representative.
Furthermore, it must be the case that gains at subsequent stages of the greedy allocation are subject to
diminishing marginal returns:
∆φ1 ≥ · · · ≥ ∆φn. (H7)
Why? At the tth step, ∆φt can never be larger than its immediate predecessor ∆φt−1 at the (t − 1)th
step: if two successive increments are made to the same variable xk, the later change in φ(x) cannot
be larger than the preceding one, because by assumption every fj(xk) satisfies the discrete concavity
condition over its allowed domain. If instead successive increments are made to distinct variables (say
xk, then xk′ for k
′ 6= k), then the later gain in φ(x) arising from incrementing xk′ cannot be larger than
the earlier gain due to incrementing xk, or else the later gain would instead have been selected at the
earlier stage of the greedy allocation.
To verify that the greedy algorithm works as claimed, and leads to a global constrained optimum x∗, we
can actually prove a slightly stronger result, which will be useful for subsequent developments. Suppose
x′ is any other feasible allocation. We will infer that φ(x′) ≤ φ(x∗), by connecting x′ to x∗ along a
path of feasible allocations generated by pairwise exchanges of units of the resource, for which φ(x)
is non-decreasing while the allocations remain feasible at each point along the path. (Obviously, unit
pairwise swaps automatically preserve the total budget X. To be feasibility-preserving, they additionally
must keep each xj between its allowed upper and lower bound at all times).
Evidently, in any feasible allocation x′ distinct from x∗, one or more of the individual variables x′j in x
′
must be greater than the corresponding variable x∗j in the greedy optimum x
∗, and to compensate, one
or more x′k must be less than the corresponding x
∗
k. (Otherwise, either the allocations were not actually
distinct, or else the constraint fixing the total allocation X could not be satisfied in both allocations).
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Thus, the distinct feasible allocation x′ can be connected to the greedy allocation x∗ by some minimal
number ` ≤ n of feasibility-preserving, unit pairwise exchanges ∆xjk—that is, swaps transferring one
unit at a time, maintaining consistency with all constraints at each step—resulting in a sequence of
transitions x′ = x′(0) → x′(1) · · · → x′(`) = x∗ made to the independent variables, where at each
successive step, one unit is removed from an xj for which λj ≤ x∗j < x′j ≤ uj before the swap, and
transferred to an xk for which λk ≤ x′k < x∗k ≤ uk prior to the swap. The constructed path will be
of minimal length (measured in numbers of pairwise swaps), in the sense that only the variables that
need to be changed are changed to get from x′ to x∗, and each such variable is either incremented or
decremented monotonically.
Moreover, if
∆φ′t = φ
(
x′(t)
)− φ(x′(t− 1)) for t = 1, . . . , `, (H8)
are the net changes to the objective function φ(x) associated with each such pairwise swap, we can
choose the sequence of exchanges taking x′ to x∗ so that feasibility is always maintained, but also
∆φ′1 ≥ · · · ≥ ∆φ′` ≥ 0. (H9)
How, and why? Starting with x′, we can construct a list of the ` independent variables (multiplicities
included) xj1 , . . . , xj` to be decremented, sorted in order of decreasing (or at least non-increasing) changes
−δφ′−t to the function φ(x) associated with each removal of a unit, such that
− δφ′−1 ≥ · · · ≥ −δφ′−` . (H10)
Likewise, we can can construct a second list of ` independent variables (multiplicities included)
xk1 , . . . , xk` to be incremented, sorted in order of decreasing (or at least non-increasing) changes δφ
′
+t
to the function φ(x) corresponding to the successive replacements of the units, such that
δφ′+1 ≥ · · · ≥ δφ′+` . (H11)
We claim that it is always possible to effect the ` unit pairwise swaps taking x′ to x∗ by choosing paired
removals and compensatory replacements from the sorted lists in the order specified, removing a unit
form xjt and adding it xkt for t = 1, . . . , `. This follows because feasible increments or decrements to
distinct variables can be effected in either order, whereas the assumed concavity of the fj(x) implies that
multiple decrements to any one variable, or multiple increments to one variable, will lead to decreasing
changes to φ(x) as indicated.
This particular choice of path will then lead to net changes ∆φ′t = δφ
′
+t−δφ′−t for each swap, increments
that must satisfy
∆φ′1 ≥ · · · ≥ ∆φ′`, (H12)
since both (H10) and (H11) are satisfied for all t = 1, . . . , `. We further argue that these changes ∆φ′t
must all be nonnegative. First, it must be the case that δφ′+` ∈ {∆φ1, . . . ,∆φn}, because any unit
(above the prescribed minimum) belonging to the allocation x∗ must necessarily have been introduced
at some point during the greedy allocation. It follows that ∆φn ≤ δφ′`+ ≤ ∆φ1. But it also turns out
that δφ′−` ≤ ∆φn: note that +δφ′−` corresponds to a gain in the objective function due to an increment
which was in fact never chosen during the greedy allocation, but which would have increased one variable,
say xj , to a level beyond the value x
∗
j actually obtained in the greedy allocation. So if xj happens to
be the same variable xk(n) that was incremented at the final (nth) stage of the greedy allocation, then
concavity ensures that any subsequent additions to xj would have resulted in gains to φ(x) no larger
than ∆φn. Otherwise, if xj is not the same variable xk(n) incremented at the nth stage of the greedy
allocation, then it is still the case that δφ′−` can be no larger than ∆φn, for otherwise incrementing xj
instead of xk(n) would have resulted in a gain at least as large as δφ
′
−` > ∆φn, and the choice of xk(n)
in the greedy allocation would not have been optimal after all.
We may therefore infer that δφ′−` ≤ ∆φn ≤ δφ+` , which then implies ∆φ′` = δφ+` − δφ−` ≥ 0, meaning
all of the inequalities (H9) must hold, as claimed. So therefore it is possible to connect x′ to x∗ along
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a feasible path of pairwise exchanges for which φ(x) never decreases (and furthermore, at an ever non-
increasing rate). In particular, the global optimality of x∗ amongst all feasible allocations follows. Do
keep in mind, however, that such a global optimum need not be unique.200
H.1.2. Local is Global: Optimality Under Unit Pairwise Swaps Is Necessary and Sufficient
For functions of integer arguments, the change ∆φ to φ(x) under a unit pairwise swap x → x + ∆xjk
is the closest analog we have to the derivative of a smooth function of real arguments.201
It turns out that non-increase of φ(x) under all feasibility-preserving, unit pairwise swaps is both a
necessary and sufficient condition for any global constrained optimum of an additive, concave function
φ(x). In other words, local optima are global optima, for such functions.
By construction, such swaps preserve feasibility of the solution, and as we have just seen, if x∗ is an
optimal solution, then φ(x∗) ≥ φ(x′) for all feasible solutions x′, including those which are connected
to x∗ by just one feasibility-preserving unit pairwise swap: x′ = x∗ + ∆xjk.
To verify the converse, suppose that x′ is a feasible allocation for which φ(x′ + ∆xjk) ≤ φ(x′) for all
feasibility-preserving unit pairwise swaps ∆xjk starting from x
′. As we have seen, some finite sequence
of ` ≤ n feasibility-preserving, unit pairwise swaps can always connect x′ to a greedy optimum x∗ along a
minimal monotonic path, such that the changes to φ(x) along the path satisfy (H9). But by hypothesis,
necessarily ∆φ′1 ≤ 0 as well, so
0 ≥ ∆φ′1 ≥ · · · ≥ ∆φ′` ≥ 0, (H13)
which is only consistent if
∆φ′1 = · · · = ∆φ′` = 0, (H14)
meaning
φ(x′) = · · · = φ(x∗), (H15)
so x′ is an optimal solution as well. Either x′ coincides with x∗, or else it is an equally valid solution,
as are all points on the minimal monotonic path which connects x′ to x∗.
H.2. Lagrange Multipliers
For these sorts of constrained optimization problems, a discrete analog of the method of Lagrange
multipliers can also be introduced [152, 163]. Until noted otherwise, in the following discussion we need
not even presume the concavity of the functions fj(x).
Suppose that for some real number µ ∈ R, we define the Lagrangian function
L (x, µ) = φ(x) + µ
∑
j
xj =
∑
j
ψj(xj , µ), (H16)
where
ψj(x, µ) = fj(x) + µx for j = 1, . . . , N, (H17)
constitute a set of augmented scoring functions. If, for each j = 1, . . . , N , and a fixed, common value of
the multiplier µ, we can find an integer solution x∗j (µ) for which ψj(x, µ) is maximal amongst all integers
200 In the language of operations research, a solution x∗ that we have called a constrained global optimum would instead
be said to be undominated.
201 Here again ∆xjk denotes an ordered N -tuple with the jth component equal to −1, the k component equal to +1, and
the remaining components equal to zero.
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in the interval λj ≤ x ≤ uj , then we claim x∗(µ) =
(
x∗1(µ), . . . , x
∗
N (µ)
)T
is a constrained global optimum
of φ(x) subject to the constraints λj ≤ xj ≤ uj for j = 1, . . . , N as well as
∑
j
xj = X(µ) =
∑
j
x∗j (µ).
To verify this simple but sometimes useful result, first imagine fixing the value of the Lagrange multiplier
µ. Let x′ be any feasible solution for which λj ≤ x′j ≤ uj and
∑
k
x′j = X(µ) =
∑
j
x∗(µ). Since necessarily
ψj
(
x′j , µ
) ≤ ψj(x∗(µ), µ), by summing over j we find that
0 ≤
∑
j
[
ψj
(
x∗(µ), µ
)− ψj(x′j , µ)] = ∑
j
fj
(
x∗(µ), µ
)−∑
j
fj
(
x′j , µ
)
+ µ
[∑
j
x∗j (µ)−
∑
j
x′j
]
= φ
(
x∗(µ)
)− φ(x′)+ µ[X(µ)−X(µ)] = φ(x∗(µ))− φ(x′), (H18)
implying
φ
(
x∗(µ)
) ≥ φ(x′), (H19)
and proving our claim.
In the continuum case, the value of a Lagrange multiplier tells us how much the value of the constrained
function changes as the value the constraint is varied. A somewhat analogous result holds in the discrete
case. Specifically, suppose x∗(µ1) and x∗(µ1) are optimal solutions for two different Lagrange multipliers
satisfying µ1 < µ2 (strictly), and therefore for possibly two different total budgets X(µ1) and X(µ2).
Because x∗(µ1) is optimal for the budget X(µ1), it follows that
φ
(
x∗(µ1)
)
+ µ1X(µ1) ≥ φ
(
x∗(µ2)
)
+ µ1X(µ2), (H20)
and because x∗(µ2) is optimal for the budget X(µ2), it follows that
φ
(
x∗(µ2)
)
+ µ2X(µ2) ≥ φ
(
x∗(µ1)
)
+ µ2X(µ1). (H21)
Re-arranging, and remembering that µ1 < µ2 by assumption, we find that
X(µ1) ≤ X(µ2), (H22)
and if it is the case that X(µ1) < X(µ2) strictly, then
µ1 ≤
φ
(
x∗(µ1)
)− φ(x∗(µ2))
X(µ2)−X(µ1) ≤ µ2, (H23)
where at least one of the two inequalities in the last expression must be strict, since µ1 < µ2.
Lagrange multipliers can be quite useful, because they can allow us to decouple the constrained optimiza-
tion problem involving a collective constraint on
∑
j xj into a set of simpler single-variable optimization
problems with rather trivial (interval) constraints on individual variables, at the price of not knowing
ahead of time for what budget X(µ) the resulting solution will be optimal.
Any optimum of the Lagrangian will lead to a constrained optimum of the original problem for some
choice of the budget. The converse question naturally arises as to whether all constrained optima (under
any allowed budget X consistent with lower and upper bound constraints) can be generated in this
manner. In general, the answer is unfortunately negative, as there can be so-called gaps in the solutions
space not covered by allocations generated by a Lagrange multiplier.
But we can see what additionally would be necessary in order to capture all possible solutions via a
Lagrangian: for each j = 1, . . . , N , every integer in the interval λj ≤ xj ≤ uj is to become optimal for
some choice of the Lagrange multiplier, and as µ is continuously varied over the range leading to feasible
solutions, no x∗j (µ) need ever jump by more than one unit at a time.
Notice that if every fj(x) is both bounded and strictly concave over its allowed domain, then no gaps
will occur. As µ → −∞, ψj(x) will become increasingly dominated by the added +µx penalty term,
and the constrained maximum of ψj(x) must eventually become x
∗ = λj . As µ→ +∞, the constrained
maximum will instead eventually reach x∗ = λj . In between, suppose the maximum of ψj(x) is achieved
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at some feasible x∗− 1 for multiplier µ−  for suitably small but non-zero , but at x∗+ 1 for multiplier
µ + , while x∗ is not optimal in either case. Then
fj(x
∗ + 1) + (µ + )(x∗ + 1) > fj(x∗) + (µ + )x∗, (H24a)
fj(x
∗ − 1) + (µ − )(x∗ − 1) > fj(x∗) + (µ − )x∗, (H24b)
which after some rearrangements imply
fj(x
∗ + 1)− fj(x∗) > −(µ + ), (H25a)
fj(x
∗ − 1)− fj(x∗) > +(µ − ). (H25b)
Adding, we find
fj(x
∗ + 1)− 2fj(x∗) + fj(x∗ − 1) > −2, (H26)
and considering the limit as → 0+, we may infer fj(x∗ + 1)− 2fj(x∗) + fj(x∗ − 1) ≥ 0, or
fj(x
∗ + 1)− fj(x∗) ≥ fj(x∗)− fj(x∗ − 1), (H27)
which is impossible if fj is strictly concave.
202 So as µ is varied continuously over some suitable interval,
the optimal solution x∗j starts at λj , can be taken to jump by at most one unit at a time as µ is
continuously increased, and eventually ends up at x∗j = uj , after a finite number of unit jumps.
The only catch is that as the Lagrange multiplier is increased, it is possible that more than one x∗j
may be inclined to jump at exactly the same value of µ under independent optimizations (either by
coincidence, or more likely, symmetry). But in this event, one can simply temporarily delay all but
one of the increments suggested by the Lagrangian, in order of gains contributed to φ(x) (or randomly
in the case of a true tie). For any delayed variables, concavity of each ψj(x) ensures that x
∗
j − 1 is
the next best thing to x∗j amongst all possibilities less than x
∗
j . So the Lagrangian algorithm, with a
suitable modification in case of predicted simultaneous jumps, can find all possible constrained optima
when the fj(x) are strictly concave and bounded. Of course, it is in precisely these same cases that the
straightforward greedy algorithm will also work, as we have seen in the discussion above.
H.3. Convexity of Various Objective Functions Suggested for Apportionment
The simple greedy algorithm introduced above can be used to implement several of the usual appor-
tionment methods, including not just our recommended entropic scheme, but also the dual entropic,
Webster-Wilcox, and Huntington-Hill criteria, since each turns out to be equivalent to constrained min-
imization, with respect to a, of a certain convex objective function U(a; q;R,P ) = −φ(a; q;R,P ) that
satisfies
U(a1, . . . , as, . . . , aS ; q1, . . . , qs;R,P ) ≤
1
2
[
U(a1, . . . , as − 1, . . . , aS ; q1, . . . , qs;R,P ) + U(a1, . . . , as + 1, . . . , aS ; q1, . . . , qs;R,P )
] (H28)
for each s = 1, . . . , S, whenever as > 0, and for any allowed fixed values of the other seat assignments
as′ for s
′ 6= s, given fixed values of q, R, and P .
In many cases, the objective function Φ(a; q;R), though only ever evaluated at integer-valued seat
assignments, is actually a smooth function of the a variables, so this discrete convexity condition may
be deduced from a continuous one,
∂2
∂a2s
U(a1, . . . , aS ; q1, . . . , qs;R,P ) ≥ 0 for all s = 1, . . . , S, (H29)
which generally is easier to verify directly than the discrete version whenever second derivatives exist.
202 And furthermore, jumps by three or more units also prove impossible, by a similar argument.
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H.3.1. Entropic/Identric Mean Method
If we take as our objective function the Kullback-Leibler divergence, or relative entropy
K(a; q, R) =
∑
s
as
R log2
[as/R
qs/R
]
= 1R
∑
s
as log2
[
as
qs
]
, (H30)
then a straightforward calculation reveals after a bit of algebra that
∂2
∂a2s
K(a; q, R) = 1ln 2 1R 1as ≥ 0, (H31)
from which the non-strict, discrete convexity property follows by standard arguments from analysis. So
for fixed R and q, K can be minimized (or −K maximized) with respect to the a, by employing the
greedy algorithm outlined above.
H.3.2. Webster-Wilcox Method
If instead we adopt as our objective function the Webster-Wilcox “chi-squared” objective function,
UW(a; q, R, P ) = RP 2
∑
s
(as−qs)2
qs
, (H32)
then
∂2
∂a2s
UW(a; q, R, P ) = RP 2
2
qs
≥ 0, (H33)
which establishes convexity for of UW.
H.3.3. Huntington-Hill Method
For the Huntington-Hill objective function,
UH(a; q, R, P ) =
P 2
R3
∑
s
(as−qs)2
as
, (H34)
we find
∂2
∂a2s
UH(a; q, R, P ) = P
2
R3
2q2s
a3s
≥ 0, (H35)
from which the needed sort of convexity follows from the mean value theorem.
H.3.4. Dual Entropic/Logarithmic Mean Method
Recall that the dual Kullback-Leibler divergence is given by swapping the roles of a and q in the relative
entropy:
K˜(a; q, R) =
∑
s
qs
R log2
[ qs/R
as/R
]
= 1R
∑
s
qs log2
[
qs
as
]
. (H36)
Taking derivatives with respect to any of the as, we find
∂2
∂a2s
K˜(a; q, R) = 1ln 2 1R qsa2s ≥ 0, (H37)
which establishes convexity.
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H.3.5. Hamilton-Vinton Method
Recall that the Hamilton-Vinton method can be cast as a constrained minimization of the total squared-
error
UV(a; q) =
∑
s
(as − qs)2 (H38)
between the apportionments and quotas of all states.
Second derivatives are straightforward to evaluate, resulting in
∂2
∂a2s
UV(a; q) = +2 ≥ 0, (H39)
and confirming convexity.
H.3.6. Conditional Entropic Apportionment, Given Optimal Intra-State Districting
As a somewhat more complicated case, consider the conditional relative entropy, given knowledge of
best-case districting:
Kd(a; q;R,P ) = log2 D¯− 1R
S∑
s=1
as∑
k=1
log2 d
∗
sk
= log2 D¯− 1R
∑
s
{
(as − ηs) log2bd¯sc+ ηs log2dd¯se
}
= log2 D¯− 1R
∑
s
{
(as − ηs) log2bd¯sc+ ηs logs
(bd¯sc+ 1)},
(H40)
where, for each s = 1, . . . , S, the quantities
d∗sk =
{
dd¯se if 1 ≤ k ≤ ηs
bd¯sc if ηs + 1 ≤ k ≤ as
(H41)
represent the optimal (i.e., most uniform) district sizes given a and p, and ηs = ps mod as = ps −
asbd¯sc = as
(
d¯s − bd¯sc
)
is the explicit remainder upon dividing ps by as.
Discrete convexity is a bit more difficult establish in this situation, because the objective function is not
differentiable, nor even continuous. The trick involves relating the original apportionment problem with
populations p to an imagined situation with the populations all doubled, to 2p.
Consider for a moment just the sum over the logarithms of the d¯∗sk:
ψ(a;p) =
∑
s
{
(as − ηs) log2bd¯sc+ ηs logs
(bd¯sc+ 1)}. (H42)
From our derivation of optimal choice of district sizes (see Appendix I), we may infer that for any other
choice of (sub-optimal) district sizes dsk consistent with populations p and apportionments a, it must
be the case that
S∑
s=1
as∑
k=1
log2 dsk ≤ ψ(a;p). (H43)
Now we notice that if we were to double all state populations and simultaneously double all apportion-
ments, ps → 2ps and as → 2as, then ηs would also double: ηs → 2ηs, but d¯s = ps/as (and hence bd¯sc)
would remain unchanged, so that
ψ(2a; 2p) = 2ψ(a;p). (H44)
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But now consider the actual problem of apportioning 2R seats to states with populations 2p =
(2p1, . . . , 2pS). Under conditional entropic apportionment, the optimal assignments will just be 2a,
and the optimal districts will just amount to twofold copies of the optimal districts for the original case
of apportioning R seats amongst states with population p. Therefore we may infer that for any other
set of seat assignments for the doubled problem,
S∑
s=1
2as∑
k=1
log2 dsk ≤ ψ(2a; 2p) = 2ψ(a;p). (H45)
In particular, one sub-optimal arrangement would be the following: we imagine splitting the (doubled)
population of all states into two exactly equal halves, 2p = p+ p. For all states but one, we still assign
the optimal number of seats (as′ to each half) and the corresponding optimal district sizes (d
∗
s′k within
each half). But for a single state s, for which as > 0, instead of assigning as districts to each half, we
can imagine assigning (as − 1) districts to one half, and (as + 1) to the other, then choosing best-case
district sizes within each half separately. In this case,
S∑
s=1
2as∑
k=1
log2 dsk = ψ(a1, . . . , as−1, as−1, as+1, . . . , aS ,p)+ψ(a1, . . . , as−1, as+1, as+1, . . . , aS ,p), (H46)
corresponds to a sub-optimal arrangement for the doubled-population problem, so
ψ(a1, . . . , as−1, as − 1, as+1, . . . , aS ,p) + ψ(a1, . . . , as−1, as + 1, as+1, . . . , aS ,p) ≤ 2ψ(a;p), (H47)
from which the discrete convexity of Kd(a; q;R,P ) = log2 PR − 1R ψ(a, q) follows.
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Appendix I: OPTIMAL CHOICE OF DISTRICT SIZES
Given an actual or proposed apportionment a = (a1, . . . , aS) assigning a whole number of representatives
to each state, minimization of the very same relative entropy functional use to allocate representatives can
also be used to determine optimal sizes for single-member districts within each state. Of course intuition
alone immediately suggests that if the goal is equality of representation, all districts should be chosen to
be as similar in size as possible, while remaining exclusive and exhaustive, and containing a whole number
of represented inhabitants of a single state. But confirming that this standard emerges automatically
via minimization of the conditional relative entropy offers a good sanity check, and, more importantly,
establishes that we can use the Kullback-Leibler divergence to quantify the extent of inequality in choice
of district sizes, for the purposes of evaluating proposed districts drawn up by state legislatures or
adjudicating court challenges, in place of more traditional but ad hoc measure likes the variance, range,
or relative RMS differences.
If a state has only a single representative, then obviously it must have in effect only one district consisting
of the entire represented state population, and a fortiori there can be no variation nor inequity between
the size of districts within that state alone.
Suppose that a state s has (at least) two districts, one with size ds1 and the other with size ds2 under some
proposed boundaries. Then, conditional on the proposed districting, the contribution to the conditional
relative entropy K just from this pair of districts can be written as
K = · · · − 1R log
(
ds1ds2
)
+ · · · = · · · − 1R log
[
1
4 (ds1 + ds2)
2 − 14 (ds1 − ds2)2
]
+ · · · . (I1)
Because the logarithm is a strictly monotonic function, without violating any constraints on seats, or
altering aspects of the apportionment for any other states, or the sizes for any other districts within
the state in question, we can decrease K by minimizing the product ds1ds2 while keeping the total
represented population (ds1 + ds2) within this pair of districts fixed. Keeping track of the minus signs,
we see that this is equivalent to minimizing the magnitude of the difference |ds1 − ds2| while fixing the
sum (ds1 + ds2). Therefore, whatever the choice of R and the apportionment of these representatives
between the various states, K will be locally minimized when the differences between intra-state district
sizes are made as small as possible, namely such that all districts in a given state differ in size by no
more than a single represented individual. In particular: in the sth state with as single-member districts,
the very best arrangements will have ηs = ps mod as districts of size dd¯se and the remaining (as − ηs)
districts of size bd¯sc.
One might of course argue that such fastidiousness in choosing district sizes within states could constitute
a case of false precision. After all, census counts for U.S. States are all almost surely subject to some
uncertainty at a level significantly higher than ±1 person, and at best they only provide a once-a-decade
snapshot of the represented populations that are inevitably almost immediately out-of-date due to the
cumulative effects of migration or other demographic shifts (e.g., inhabitants being born, moving, dying,
or naturalizing).
While the Supreme Court acknowledges that exact equality may obviously be impractical or impossi-
ble,203 current standards for U.S. Congressional districting are actually quite strict, with equality of
represented populations required204 “as nearly as is practicable,” interpreted to mean that each state
must make good-faith efforts to draw districts with almost exactly the same number of people in each
district within the state, and where any appreciable deviations from the “ideal” district-size d¯s must be
specifically justified by consistent state policy. In practice, policies that cause even a 1% spread from
largest to smallest district may be regarded as un-Constitutional unless a compelling justification for the
variation can be mustered.
203 In oral arguments for Evenwel vs. Abbott (2016) Justice Breyer noted that the “Constitution does not demand mathe-
matical perfection,” although this was in the context of redistricting for state-level legislatures.
204 Articulated in Wesberry vs. Sanders, in 1964 [82].
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So the entropic approach conforms nicely to longstanding Supreme Court jurisprudence involving dis-
tricting, and indeed provides a more fundamental measure of inequity relative to ideal district sizes,
than does either the standard deviation or the percentage difference between the largest and smallest
districts in the state. We again stress that the near-equality of intra-state district sizes does not arise
from any additional requirement or desideratum, whether ad hoc or not, but rather from optimization,
with respect to the intra-state district sizes dsk for each s, of the very same Kullback-Leibler divergence
function whose minimization with respect to the as yielded the congressional apportionment itself. Only
at this stage the minimization of K is to be performed with respect to the district sizes dsk, conditional
on the chosen as.
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Appendix J: BEST CASE DISTRICT-CONDITIONING VERSUS AVERAGE-DISTRICT
CONDITIONING
We try to argue in the main text why we should assume average district sizes rather than best case district
sizes. But in any event, for the case of U.S. Congressional apportionment, any numerical differences
between using averaged intra-state district sizes and best-case integral district sizes are expected to be
small, and very unlikely to change the optimal outcome. This is demonstrated here.
First, we estimate the typical magnitude of the entropy 1RK =
∑
j
aj log
aj
qj
under optimal apportionment.
Though entropic apportionment is not a quota method (in the absence of strong constraints), the aj
are expected to be reasonably close to the qs on average, so we can expand K in a Taylor series in
the apportionments as centered on the quotas qs. The zeroth-order and first-order terms cancel, so the
leading-order contribution becomes:
K = 1R
∑
s
as log
as
qs
∼ 12 ln 2 1R
∑
s
(as−qs)2
qs
+ · · · , (J1)
assuming the logarithms are taken base-2. Assuming as ∼ O(a¯) ∼ O
(
R
S
)
and |as − qs| ∼ O
(
1
2
)
, we find
K ∼ O( 34) 1R O(S (1/2)2a¯ ) ∼ O( 14 S2R2 ), (J2)
which for current parameters pertinent to U.S. Congressional apportionment, suggests K ∼ 3 · 10−3.
If we assume districting would be both predictable and best-case under a proposed apportionment, the
district sizes and identities constitute additional constraints which would increase the relative entropy,
by an amount
∆K =
{
log D¯− 1R
∑
s
∑
k
log dks
}
−
{
log D¯− 1R
∑
s
as log d¯s
}
= 1R
∑
s
as log d¯s − 1R
∑
s
[
(as − ηs) log
(bd¯sc)+ ηs log(dd¯se)], (J3)
where ηs = ps mod as. In this expression, we can then replace ηs log(dd¯se) with ηs log
(bd¯sc + 1)
because dd¯se = bd¯sc+ 1 unless dd¯se = bd¯sc = d¯s, which holds occurs if and only if ηs = 0, and because
ps = asd¯s = asbd¯sc+ ηs, we can also substitute bd¯sc = d¯s − ηsas :
∆K = 1R
∑
s
as log d¯s − 1R
∑
s
[
(as − ηs) log
(bd¯sc)+ ηs log(bd¯sc+ 1)]
= 1R
∑
s
as log d¯s − 1R
∑
s
[
(as − ηs) log
(
d¯s − ηsas c
)
+ ηs log
(bd¯s + 1− ηsas )]. (J4)
In the case of U.S. Congressional apportionment, the average district sizes all satisfy d¯s = ps/as  1,
while it is always the case that 0 ≤ ηsas < 1, so we can now expand the logarithms in a Taylor series
centered on d¯s:
log2(d¯s + ) = log2(d¯s) +
1
ln 2

d¯s
− 12 ln 2 
2
d¯2s
+ · · · , (J5)
assuming the logarithms are here taken base-2. The zeroth-order terms will obviously cancel. Somewhat
less obviously, the first-order terms also cancel, resulting in leading contributions from the second-order
terms:
∆K ≈ 12 ln 2 1R
∑
s
1
d¯2s
ηs
(
1− ηsas
) ≥ 0. (J6)
Approximating d¯s ∼ O(D¯) ∼ O
(
P
R
)
, as ∼ O(a¯) ∼ O
(
R
S
)
> 1, ηs ∼ O
(
a¯−1
2
)
, so that ηs(1 − ηs/as) ∼
O
(
a¯2−1
4a¯
)
, we can estimate
∆K ≈ O(1)O(1− S2R2 )O(R2P 2 ). (J7)
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For current U.S. demographic parameters, this comes out to ∆K ∼ 2 · 10−12. So the relative entropy
based on average-district sizes and that based on best-case exact district sizes are expected to differ by
a few parts in 1012. In comparison, the population of even the largest states can be specified to only a
few parts in 108, suggesting that we should not expect such small differences in the relative entropies to
have an observable effect in terms of the apportionments.
Actually, to get a sense of of whether the difference between the district-averaged and district-conditioned
version of the relative entropy should matter, a better comparison would look at a typical difference in
the relative entropy between the best and second best apportionments. Because of the convexity of the
entropy, we need look only at the very last seat awarded during the greedy allocation. Supposing we
shift this seat from the most deserving state (say state 1 without loss of generality) to the second most
deserving state (call it state 2), the relative entropy would be increased by an amount
δK = 1R
{
(a2 + 1) log
a2+1
q2
+ (a1 − 1) log a1−1q1 − a2 log a2q2 − a1 log a1q1
}
= 1R
{
a2 log
a2+1
a2
+ a1 log
a1−1
a1
+ log
[
a2+1
a1−1
q1
q2
]}
.
(J8)
At the optimum, the argument of each of the logarithms on the right hand side is not expected to be
too different from unity, so we can Taylor expand, leading to an estimate of δK ∼ O( 1R). But we should
also account for the fact that we are looking at the difference between the best and second-best values
of the relative entropy, i.e., the smallest of the entropic penalties that would be incurred if we were to
shift the last-awarded seat to one of the other (S − 1) states. Thinking about order statistics, we might
guess that the minimal such increment is likely to be smaller by a factor of something like O
(
1
S
)
than
the typical increment, so we shall predict δK ∼ O( 1RS ). For parameters pertinent to the current U.S.
Congress, this evaluates to δK ∼ 5 · 10−5, smaller than K itself but still several orders of magnitude
larger than ∆K, suggesting that changes on the scale of the latter would be unlikely to change the actual
seat assignments.205
205 Of course we can construct artificial examples where the difference could matter, but they would be very atypical.
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Appendix K: TABLES AND EXAMPLES
State Population Quota Adams (SD) Dean (HM) Huntington (EP) Webster (MF) Jefferson (GD) Entropic
A 9061 9.061 9 9 9 9 10 9
B 7179 7.179 7 7 7 8 7 8
C 5259 5.259 5 5 6 5 5 5
D 3319 3.319 3 4 3 3 3 3
E 1182 1,182 2 1 1 1 1 1
TOTAL 26 000 26 26 26 26 26 26 26
Relative entropy 0.01435 0.004953 0.004606 0.004582 0.004796 0.004582
TABLE III. Comparison of entropic apportionment to divisor methods for a hypothetical apportionment problem
constructed by Balinski and Young [80] using P = 26 000, S = 5, and R = 26, for which the five traditional
divisor methods all differ. Here the entropic method agrees with the Webster Method (Major Fractions), but
not the Huntington Method (Equal Proportions), although it does turn out that R = 26 as well as R = 27 are
particularly discordant choices for the total number of seats given this population distribution.
State Population Quota Dean Huntington Webster Entropic
A 729 7.29 7 7 8 8
B 534 5.34 5 6 5 5
C 337 3.37 4 3 3 3
TOTAL 1600 16 16 16 16 16
Relative Entropy 0.00653 0.00596 0.00154 0.00154
TABLE IV. Apportionments for a P = 1600, S = 3, R = 16 test case of Huntington [69], illustrating that
the Dean, Huntington, and Webster methods can all differ, while all remaining on quota. The entropic method
agrees with the Webster Method in this case.
State Population Quota Hamilton Entropic
J 987 9.87 10 9
K 157 1.57 2 2
L 156 1.56 1 2
TOTAL 1300 13 13 13
Relative Entropy 0.0189 0.0167
TABLE V. Apportionments for a P = 1 300, S = 3, R = 13 test case of Huntington [69], illustrating that the
size of the fractional remainders of the quotas do not determine the apportionments in the Huntington, Webster,
or entropic schemes (all of which agree here).
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State Population Quota Huntington Webster Entropic
Alabama 3893888 7.498 7 7 7
Alaska 401851 0.774 1 1 1
Arizona 2718215 5.234 5 5 5
Arkansas 2286435 4.403 4 4 4
California 23667902 45.574 45 45 45
Colorado 2889964 5.565 6 6 6
Connecticut 3107576 5.984 6 6 6
Delaware 594338 1.144 1 1 1
Florida 9746324 18.767 19 19 19
Georgia 5463105 10.520 10 10 10
Hawaii 964691 1.858 2 2 2
Idaho 943935 1.818 2 2 2
Illinois 11426518 22.003 22 22 22
Indiana 5490224 10.572 10* 11 10*
Iowa 2913808 5.611 6 6 6
Kansas 2363679 4.551 5 5 5
Kentucky 3660777 7.049 7 7 7
Louisiana 4205900 8.099 8 8 8
Maine 1124660 2.166 2 2 2
Maryland 4216975 8.120 8 8 8
Massachusetts 5737037 11.047 11 11 11
Michigan 9262078 17.835 18 18 18
Minnesota 4075970 7.849 8 8 8
Mississippi 2520638 4.854 5 5 5
Missouri 4916686 9.467 9 9 9
Montana 786690 1.515 2 2 2
Nebraska 1569825 3.023 3 3 3
Nevada 800493 1.541 2 2 2
New Hampshire 920610 1.773 2 2 2
New Jersey 7364823 14.182 14 14 14
New Mexico 1302894 2.509 3* 2 3*
New York 17558072 33.809 34 34 34
North Carolina 5881766 11.326 11 11 11
North Dakota 652717 1.257 1 1 1
Ohio 10797630 20.792 21 21 21
Oklahoma 3025290 5.825 6 6 6
Oregon 2633105 5.070 5 5 5
Pennsylvania 11863895 22.845 23 23 23
Rhode Island 947154 1.824 2 2 2
South Carolina 3121820 6.011 6 6 6
South Dakota 690768 1.330 1 1 1
Tennessee 4591120 8.841 9 9 9
Texas 14229191 27.399 27 27 27
Utah 1461037 2.813 3 3 3
Vermont 511456 0.985 1 1 1
Virginia 5346818 10.296 10 10 10
Washington 4132156 7.957 8 8 8
West Virginia 1949644 3.754 4 4 4
Wisconsin 4705767 9.061 9 9 9
Wyoming 469557 0.904 1 1 1
TABLE VI. U.S. Congressional apportionments of R = 435 seats following the 1980 census were assigned via the
Huntington-Hill Method. The entropic method assigns the same seats as the Huntington-Hill Method, differing
from the Webster Method for Indiana and New Mexico.
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State Population Quota Huntington Webster Entropic
Alabama 4062608 7.097 7 7 7
Alaska 551947 0.964 1 1 1
Arizona 3677985 6.425 6 6 6
Arkansas 2362239 4.126 4 4 4
California 29839250 52.124 52 52 52
Colorado 3307912 5.778 6 6 6
Connecticut 3295669 5.757 6 6 6
Delaware 668696 1.168 1 1 1
Florida 13003362 22.715 23 23 23
Georgia 6508419 11.369 11 11 11
Hawaii 1115274 1.948 2 2 2
Idaho 1011986 1.768 2 2 2
Illinois 11466682 20.030 20 20 20
Indiana 5564228 9.720 10 10 10
Iowa 2787424 4.869 5 5 5
Kansas 2485600 4.342 4 4 4
Kentucky 3698969 6.461 6 6 6
Louisiana 4238216 7.403 7 7 7
Maine 1233223 2.154 2 2 2
Maryland 4798622 8.382 8 8 8
Massachusetts 6029051 10.532 10* 11 10*
Michigan 9328784 16.296 16 16 16
Minnesota 4387029 7.663 8 8 8
Mississippi 2586443 4.518 5 5 5
Missouri 5137804 8.975 9 9 9
Montana 803655 1.404 1 1 1
Nebraska 1584617 2.768 3 3 3
Nevada 1206152 2.107 2 2 2
New Hampshire 1113915 1.946 2 2 2
New Jersey 7748634 13.536 13 13 13
New Mexico 1521779 2.658 3 3 3
New York 18044505 31.521 31 31 31
North Carolina 6657630 11.630 12 12 12
North Dakota 641364 1.120 1 1 1
Ohio 10887325 19.018 19 19 19
Oklahoma 3157604 5.516 6* 5 6*
Oregon 2853733 4.985 5 5 5
Pennsylvania 11924710 20.830 21 21 21
Rhode Island 1005984 1.757 2 2 2
South Carolina 3505707 6.124 6 6 6
South Dakota 699999 1.224 1 1 1
Tennessee 4896641 8.554 9 9 9
Texas 17059805 29.801 30 30 30
Utah 1727784 3.018 3 3 3
Vermont 564964 0.987 1 1 1
Virginia 6216568 10.859 11 11 11
Washington 4887941 8.538 9 9 9
West Virginia 1801625 3.147 3 3 3
Wisconsin 4906745 8.571 9 9 9
Wyoming 455975 0.797 1 1 1
TABLE VII. U.S. Congressional apportionments of R = 435 seats following the 1990 census were assigned via the
Huntington-Hill Method. The entropic method assigns the same seats as the Huntington-Hill Method, differing
from the Webster Method for Massachusetts and Oklahoma.
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State Population Quota Huntington Webster Entropic
Alabama 4461130 6.896 7 7 7
Alaska 628933 0.972 1 1 1
Arizona 5140683 7.946 8 8 8
Arkansas 2679733 4.142 4 4 4
California 33930798 52.447 53 53 53
Colorado 4311882 6.665 7 7 7
Connecticut 3409535 5.270 5 5 5
Delaware 785068 1.213 1 1 1
Florida 16028890 24.776 25 25 25
Georgia 8206975 12.686 13 13 13
Hawaii 1216642 1.881 2 2 2
Idaho 1297274 2.005 2 2 2
Illinois 12439042 19.227 19 19 19
Indiana 6090782 9.415 9 9 9
Iowa 2931923 4.532 5 5 5
Kansas 2693824 4.164 4 4 4
Kentucky 4049431 6.259 6 6 6
Louisiana 4480271 6.925 7 7 7
Maine 1277731 1.975 2 2 2
Maryland 5307886 8.204 8 8 8
Massachusetts 6355568 9.824 10 10 10
Michigan 9955829 15.389 15 15 15
Minnesota 4925670 7.614 8 8 8
Mississippi 2852927 4.410 4 4 4
Missouri 5606260 8.666 9 9 9
Montana 905316 1.399 1 1 1
Nebraska 1715369 2.651 3 3 3
Nevada 2002032 3.095 3 3 3
New Hampshire 1238415 1.914 2 2 2
New Jersey 8424354 13.021 13 13 13
New Mexico 1823821 2.819 3 3 3
New York 19004973 29.376 29 29 29
North Carolina 8067673 12.470 13 13 13
North Dakota 643756 0.995 1 1 1
Ohio 11374540 17.582 18 18 18
Oklahoma 3458819 5.346 5 5 5
Oregon 3428543 5.230 5 5 5
Pennsylvania 12300670 19.013 19 19 19
Rhode Island 1049662 1.622 2 2 2
South Carolina 4025061 6.222 6 6 6
South Dakota 756874 1.170 1 1 1
Tennessee 5700037 8.811 9 9 9
Texas 20903994 32.312 32 32 32
Utah 2236714 3.457 3 3 3
Vermont 609890 0.943 1 1 1
Virginia 7100702 10.976 11 11 11
Washington 5908684 9.133 9 9 9
West Virginia 1813077 2.802 3 3 3
Wisconsin 5371210 8.302 8 8 8
Wyoming 495304 0.766 1 1 1
TABLE VIII. U.S. Congressional apportionments of R = 435 seats following the 2000 census were assigned via
the Huntington-Hill Method. Both the entropic method and the Webster Method lead to the same apportionment
as the Huntington-Hill Method.
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State Population Quota Huntington Webster Entropic
Alabama 4802982 6.75747 7 7 7
Alaska 721523 1.01513 1 1 1
Arizona 6412700 9.02223 9 9 9
Arkansas 2926229 4.117 4 4 4
California 37341989 52.5376 53 53 53
Colorado 5044930 7.09787 7 7 7
Connecticut 3581628 5.03911 5 5 5
Delaware 900877 1.26747 1 1 1
Florida 18900773 26.5921 27 27 27
Georgia 9727566 13.686 14 14 14
Hawaii 1366862 1.92308 2 2 2
Idaho 1573499 2.21381 2 2 2
Illinois 12864380 18.0993 18 18 18
Indiana 6501582 9.14728 9 9 9
Iowa 3053787 4.29647 4 4 4
Kansas 2863813 4.02919 4 4 4
Kentucky 4350606 6.12101 6 6 6
Louisiana 4553962 6.40711 6 6 6
Maine 1333074 1.87554 2 2 2
Maryland 5789929 8.14603 8 8 8
Massachusetts 6559644 9.22897 9 9 9
Michigan 9911626 13.945 14 14 14
Minnesota 5314879 7.47767 8 8 8
Mississippi 2978240 4.19018 4 4 4
Missouri 6011478 8.45774 8 8 8
Montana 994416 1.39908 1 1 1
Nebraska 1831825 2.57725 3 3 3
Nevada 2709432 3.81199 4 4 4
New Hampshire 1321445 1.85918 2 2 2
New Jersey 8807501 12.3916 12 12 12
New Mexico 2067273 2.90851 3 3 3
New York 19421055 27.3241 27 27 27
North Carolina 9565781 13.4584 13* 14 13*
North Dakota 675905 0.950952 1 1 1
Ohio 11568495 16.2761 16 16 16
Oklahoma 3764882 5.29693 5 5 5
Oregon 3848606 5.41473 5 5 5
Pennsylvania 12734905 17.9171 18 18 18
Rhode Island 1055247 1.48466 2* 1 2*
South Carolina 4645975 6.53657 7 7 7
South Dakota 819761 1.15335 1 1 1
Tennessee 6375431 8.9698 9 9 9
Texas 25268418 35.5509 36 36 36
Utah 2770765 3.89828 4 4 4
Vermont 630337 0.886841 1 1 1
Virginia 8037736 11.3085 11 11 11
Washington 6753369 9.50153 10 10 10
West Virginia 1859815 2.61663 3 3 3
Wisconsin 5698230 8.01702 8 8 8
Wyoming 568300 0.799559 1 1 1
TABLE IX. U.S. Congressional apportionments of R = 435 seats following the 2010 census were assigned via the
Huntington-Hill Method. The entropic method assigns the same seats as the Huntington-Hill Method, differing
from the Webster Method for North Carolina and Rhode Island.
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State Population Quota Huntington Webster Entropic
1 60272 61.477 68 70 70
2 1226 1.251 1 1 1
3 1227 1.252 1 1 1
4 1228 1.253 1 1 1
5 1229 1.254 1 1 1
6 1230 1.255 1 1 1
7 1231 1.256 1 1 1
8 1232 1.257 1 1 1
9 1233 1.258 1 1 1
10 1234 1.259 1 1 1
11 1235 1.260 1 1 1
12 1236 1.261 1 1 1
13 1237 1.262 1 1 1
14 1238 1.263 1 1 1
15 1239 1.264 1 1 1
16 1240 1.265 1 1 1
17 1241 1.266 1 1 1
18 1242 1.267 1 1 1
19 1243 1.268 1 1 1
20 1244 1.269 1 1 1
21 1245 1.270 1 1 1
22 1246 1.271 1 1 1
23 1247 1.272 1 1 1
24 1248 1.273 1 1 1
25 1249 1.274 1 1 1
26 1250 1.275 1 1 1
27 1251 1.276 1 1 1
28 1252 1.277 1 1 1
29 1253 1.278 1 1 1
30 1254 1.279 1 1 1
31 1255 1.280 1 1 1
32 1256 1.281 2 1 1
33 1257 1.282 2 1 1
TOTAL 100000 102.0 102 102 102
TABLE X. Apportionments for a P = 100 000, S = 33, R = 102 test case of Balinski and Young [80], for which
the Huntington Method, Webster Method, and entropic method all violate upper quota. The latter two methods
happen to agree, while the former awards extra seats to two states whose populations only very slightly exceed
that of thirty other states.
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State Population Quota Huntington Webster Entropic
1 68010 69.370 60 64 63
2 1590 1.622 1 1 1
3 1591 1.623 1 1 1
4 1592 1.624 2 1 1
5 1593 1.625 2 1 1
6 1594 1.626 2 1 1
7 1595 1.627 2 1 2
8 1596 1.628 2 2 2
9 1597 1.629 2 2 2
10 1598 1.630 2 2 2
11 1599 1.631 2 2 2
12 1600 1.632 2 2 2
13 1601 1.633 2 2 2
14 1602 1.634 2 2 2
15 1603 1.635 2 2 2
16 1604 1.636 2 2 2
17 1605 1.637 2 2 2
18 1606 1.638 2 2 2
19 1607 1.639 2 2 2
20 1608 1.640 2 2 2
21 1609 1.641 2 2 2
TOTAL 100000 98.00 98 98 98
TABLE XI. Apportionments for a P = 100 000, S = 21, R = 98 test case of Balinski and Young [80], for
which the Huntington Method, Webster Method, and entropic method all violate lower quota. Note that all
three apportionments disagree for this artificial population distribution. The entropic method tends to “split the
difference” in terms of the seats given to the large state, and the level at which it begins allotting a second seat
to the smaller states.
State (scenario a) Population Quota Entropic Sub-Optimal
Apportionment Apportionment
X 731 7.31 8 7
Y 535 5.35 5 6
Z 334 3.34 3 3
TOTAL 1600 16 16 16
Relative Entropy 0.00552 0.00564
State (scenario b) Population Quota Entropic Sub-Optimal
Apportionment Apportionment
X 729 7.29 7 8
Y 535 5.35 6 5
Z 336 3.36 3 3
TOTAL 1600 16 16 16
Relative Entropy 0.00576 0.00588
TABLE XII. Apportionments for P = 1 600, S = 3, R = 16 test cases of Huntington [69], showing that one state’s
quota by itself does not determine its optimal apportionment—in both cases the population and quota for state
Y are the same, but its optimal apportionment differs under the two scenarios, as the number of seats received
may depend on small shifts in population between other states. Here the entropic apportionment, Huntington
apportionment, and Webster apportionment all coincide.
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State Population Quota Apportionment
A 1536 15.36 15
B 1535 15.35 15
C 1534 15.34 15
D 1533 15.33 15
E 1532 15.32 15
F 1530 15.30 15
G 162 1.62 2
H 161 1.61 2
I 160 1.60 2
J 159 1.59 2
K 158 1.58 2
TOTAL 10000 100 100
Group Population Group-Level Quota Total Apportionment
ABCDEF 9200 92.00 90
GHIJK 800 8.00 10
TOTAL 10000 100 100
TABLE XIII. Apportionments for a P = 10 000, S = 11, R = 100 test case of Huntington [69], showing that if
states are all on-quota in the usual (state-level) sense, then groups of states may depart from group-level quota.
